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ABSTRACT
Partisan-based conflict rhetoric has grown more important in political strategy over time
and is very often focused on delineating the differences between the parties. But, political
messaging frequently involves targeting different social groups or non-political entities as
responsible for social problems rather than political parties and opponents. Blame as a rhetorical
strategy involves appeals to group identities other than those based upon partisanship. The
brilliance of a blame strategy is that the group membership of the audience at which the blame
appeal is directed need not be explicitly defined. Much of the research studying the various
forms of conflict rhetoric (i.e. attack advertising) focuses on the partisan tensions inherent in
these messages, but only limited literature can shed light on how the public feels about or
responds to politicians blaming non-political groups. Through two original experiments reported
in three articles, dissertation attempts to fill this gap by exploring the parameters and effects of
strategically placed blame on various dimensions of political support. It seeks to answer the
degree to which political and policy goals are facilitated or impeded by this divisive form of
rhetoric.
Each article approached this question within the framework of social identity theory
(Tajfel, 1978, Tajfel & Turner, 1986). As suggested by social identity theory, politicians can use
conflict rhetoric to maximize the perceived differences between their in-group and the outgroup, thus stimulating favoritism with the in-group through the perceived threat from the outgroup. By examining the different effects of variations in blame, these articles offer an overview
of whether and when politicians may benefit from attacking the opposing party, attacking a nonpolitical group, or refraining from an attack. The results indicate that blaming an opposing party
offers more harm than good. Blaming a non-political group can be effective at manipulating
v

perceptions of the attacked group as well as raising demand for punitive policies. No blame
messages elicit positive reactions that are beneficial to political parties, but arouse emotions that
both help and harm measures of democratic support.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

1

The Importance of Studying Conflict Rhetoric
Whether used on the campaign trail, in the policy arena, or for the benefit of media
dissemination, rhetoric is a strategic and integral component of politics. Rhetoric is a tool
through which politicians align themselves with the precepts of an ideology and political party
and argue for their preferred policy initiatives. With rhetoric politicians and parties attempt to
differentiate themselves from each other to convince citizens they are more deserving of political
support than the competition. Emphasizing group conflict is particularly useful for politicians
and parties to create distance between themselves and the opposition. Because focusing on
conflict can heighten awareness of social group differences, it can create a sense of threat to
group status (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), cultivating anger, fear and frustration between groups. In
such an atmosphere, group identity and winning overcomes thoughtful deliberation (Miller &
Conover, 2015; Mason, 2015) decreasing the chances of accommodation and compromise.
Giving prominence to conflict in political rhetoric is not new to American politics. Even
the vitriolic and exceedingly nasty attacks that seem today to be new are not unique, as people
who lived through the turbulent political era of the 1960s will attest (Shea & Fiorina, 2013). A
common concern today, however, is that political rhetoric is more negative and less civil than in
the past. Research tracking increasing campaign negativity over time (Franklin-Fowler, Ridout
& Franz, 2016; Fowler & Ridout, 2012) and studying the prevalence and implications of vitriolic
policy debate (Grimmer, 2013) supports this consensus. With this uptick scholars have
expressed increasing unease about its effect on our political system (e.g. Galston, 2013). This
worry is reflected in the public sphere as well, as Table 1.11, outlining the increasing number of
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Table 1.1 and all subsequent tables can be found in Appendix A.

2

news articles devoted to the tone of political rhetoric, illustrates.
The main premise of this dissertation is that conflict rhetoric is a regularly relied upon
political tool used with the intention of activating different social identities in the electorate to
sow anger and anxiety toward out-groups and reap in-group support. The literature studying the
different forms of conflict rhetoric is extensive, yet whether the impact is deleterious or
beneficial remains an open question (e.g. Aldrich, 2013; Geer 2006; Lau, Sigelman & Roverner,
2007). As such, continued study of the effects of conflict rhetoric on the electorate is vital to
understanding the extent to which the public is manipulated by politicians’ public relations
efforts and what this means for democratic processes and outcomes. The seeming increase in
uncivil exchanges coupled with alarming trends like decreasing support for free speech and
democracy among millennials (Routledge, 2017; Poushter, 2015), suggest that there are less than
desirable consequences to the current atmosphere of open political hostility, and is the focus of
this research.
Negative and Ubiquitous: Conflict Rhetoric in Politics
Negative discourse in politics is often blamed on the media’s focus on conflict and
drama. The newsroom maxim if it bleeds, it leads illustrates the commercialization that drives
news organizations’ inclination to focus on “conflict, dissension and battle” (Schudson, 2011, p.
44) at the expense of positive stories. As Schudson (2011) notes, “out of a journalistic
convention that there are two sides to any story, news heightens the appearance of conflict even
in instances of relative calm” (p.44). The purpose of shock and awe in news media coverage is
to attract audiences. This deliberate focus on controversial events maintains and intensifies
conflict between groups, creating a “political spectacle” for the entertainment of the audience
(Edelman, 1988). Indeed, news is triggered by adverse events and political actors can increase
3

the likelihood of receiving media attention by adapting their language to this negative form of
communication. The explosion of communications experts employed in politics indicates that
government officials recognize and seek to exploit this media logic (Landerer, 2013).
That the media treats political conflict like a rubbernecker passing a traffic accident is not
surprising, given what psychology tells us about fear response and risk aversion impulses that
lead people to focus more on negative than positive information (Lau, 1985). Termed negativity
bias, this instinct causes people to spend more time and effort evaluating negative information
(Allen & Burrell, 2002; Kanouse & Hanson, 1972; Lau, 1985). This may be beneficial to
politicians because greater evaluative processing efforts can increase message persuasion
(Hilbig, 2012; Petty & Brinol, 2008; Tormala, Brinol, & Petty, 2007). Research on negative
campaign advertising indicates that politicians can use this communicative form of
rubbernecking to manipulate the information voters consider when making decisions (Druckman,
Kifer & Parkin, 2009). The subsequent increase in processing efforts due to the negativity bias
should enhance the persuasiveness of a negative message. Since people view negative messages
as more illuminating, informative and truthful than positive messages (Ahluwalia, 2002; Herr,
Karges & Kim, 1991; Hilbig, 2009), it follows that a strategically communicated negative
message may do more to rally political support or promote action than positive messages.
While campaign strategists and politicians believe negative campaigning works (Fridkin
& Kenney, 2008), research studying the effects of negative political advertising is mixed.
Negative campaign advertisements have been found to contain more information about
candidates’ policy positions than positive self-promoting ads (Geer, 2006), and may increase
citizen interest in politics (Brooks & Geer, 2007) and stimulate knowledge (Lau et al., 2007).
This may be due to campaign negativity increasing as candidates make their policy positions
4

clear (Hassell & Oeltjenbruns, 2013). Additionally, in markets with higher concentrations of
negative advertising activity people are more likely to be politically active (Hopp & Vargo,
2016). Researchers, however, agree that going negative in a campaign can backfire and,
therefore, is a risky strategy that should be used with caution (Damore, 2002; Dowling &
Wichovsky, 2015; Hale, Fox & Farmer, 1996; Kahn & Kenney, 1999; Peterson & Djupe, 2005;
Theilmann & Wilhite, 1998). The immediate boost from negative ads diminishes over time and
continued attacks can create a backlash effect (Banda & Windett, 2016). Uncivil attacks, often
termed mudslinging, can be particularly damaging for the message sender (Fridkin & Kenney,
2004), offsetting any harm to the target of the attack.
Beyond attempts to depress opponent’s evaluations, politicians use political messaging to
rally support among base constituents (Fenno, 1978). It is likely that politicians who engage in
conflict rhetoric are doing so for the benefit of their strongest supporters. By focusing on
conflict, politicians signal ideological and political divides between the parties. Perceiving this
polarization likely makes people more partisan (Lupu, 2014), arguably a goal of political
messaging. Research indicates that exposure to negative campaign advertising and partisan
rhetoric can lead to increased attitude polarization (Meffert, Chung, Joiner, Waks, & Garst, 2006;
Garramone, Atkin, Pinkleton, & Cole, 1990) and partisan intensity in the electorate (Morris &
Witting, 2001; Iyengar, Sood & Lelkes, 2012; Lupu, 2014). Furthermore, under polarized
conditions, people are more likely to adhere to partisan biases and discount strong but
incongruous arguments (Taber & Lodge, 2006; Druckman, Peterson & Slothuus, 2013),
indicating that negative attacks on the opposition are much more likely to reaffirm and
strengthen the opinions of partisans than to sway people with opposing opinions.

5

The downside of this is that negative attacks may also push opposing opinions even
farther away. Social judgment theory suggests that changes in opinion, including the direction of
change, is a function of the individual’s initial stance and the stance of the new communication
(Sherif & Hovland, 1961). The degree and direction of persuasion is determined by the distance
between a person’ already held opinion and the viewpoint expressed in the message. In practice
this means that when an opinion is not far from that expressed in the new message, it is possible
to bring that opinion in closer alignment with the message. However, if an opinion starts out far
from the new message, the likely result is that the opinion will be pushed to an even further
extreme. Studies of motivated reasoning indicate that sophisticated voters, and those with
strongly held opinions, are the least likely to be swayed by opposing arguments due to
disconfirmation bias and the tendency to argue against incongruent information (Taber & Lodge,
2006; Meffert et al., 2006; Biek, Wood & Chaiken, 1996; Chaiken, Liberman & Eagly, 1989).
As such, conflict rhetoric likely strengthens the opinions of the opposition as well as copartisans, perhaps cancelling any beneficial effect. With primary campaigns seemingly used as
political orthodoxy tests (Boatright, 2013), the likelihood of a candidate’s position being
relatively close to an opposition voter’s during the general election is decreasing and any
discussion of cross-party appeal may be for naught.
Relying on attack messages to increase support may also be a risky strategy because it
can result in indirect harm to both parties through decreasing support for factors important to a
healthy democracy. Negative campaign ads may demobilize voters (Ansolabehere & Iyengar,
1995), although other research disputes this finding (e.g. Finkel & Geer, 1998; Lau et al., 2007).
There is, however, evidence that negative advertising decreases feelings of efficacy
(Ansolabehere & Iyengar, 1995; Lau et al., 2007), which likely impacts voter turnout and faith in
6

democratic processes. Research also indicates that campaign negativity decreases trust in
government (Lau et al., 2007), which has been steadily declining since the late 1950’s (Pew,
2017), as instances of campaign negativity have increased. Likewise, increased party conflict,
often exhibited through political rhetoric, is linked to decreased confidence in and support for
Congress (Harbridge & Malhotra, 2011; Ramirez, 2009; Morris & Witting, 2001). With
negative advertising, negative political reporting and negatively focused opinion programming,
contemporary politicians appear submerged in uncivil discourse and, in the aggregate, citizens
don’t seem to like such partisan behavior (Ramirez, 2009; Harbridge & Malhotra, 2011; Hibbing
& Theiss-Morse, 1995). It does not appear that engaging in conflict rhetoric is likely to increase
confidence or trust in the government. It may even actively harm its legitimacy.
In the policy arena, research indicates that Senators under little political cross-pressure
from constituents are more likely to be ideologically extreme in their views and to engage in
partisan position-taking and negativity (Grimmer, 2013). Further, because they more often
engage in position-taking, these Senators tend to dominate policy debate. As a result,
ideologically extreme views expressed through vitriolic rhetoric may have more influence on
policy debate than more moderate views (Grimmer, 2013). Wolf, Strachan and Shea (2012)
found that strong partisans are more likely to be mobilized by negativity even if they believe
incivility to be detrimental to democracy. Couple this with the decreasing prevalence of crosspressured districts (Fleisher & Bond, 2004) and it appears that members of Congress are
electorally incentivized to adopt extreme positions and engage in combative rhetoric. The
uncompromising partisanship now detected in the electorate likely motivates politicians to
engage in uncivil rhetoric (Wolf, Strachan, & Shea, 2012). But, this likely results in the under
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representation or absence of representation in Congressional debate of citizens whose opinions
do not adhere to extreme positions.
Because the electorate clearly perceives the increases in party polarization (Aldrich,
2013), as demonstrated through party cues in conflict rhetoric, voters can better align their own
preferences and cast the “right” vote (i.e. voting for the party with aligned issue positions;
Levendusky, 2010; Hetherington, 2001). That parties are divided on a wider range of high and
low salience issues than has historically been the norm may be leading to more coherent attitudes
in the mass public (Layman & Carsey, 2002). If the decline in split-ticket voting (Stonecash,
2006) or the more consistent sorting of partisans into ideological camps (Aldrich, 2013) is any
indication, voters are more reliably voting for the party with which they align ideologically.
Additionally, research looking at data through 2008 indicates that markers of satisfaction with
government improved as political rhetoric devolved (Aldrich, 2013). Perceptions that public
officials care what the public thinks and that the government listens to the people increased over
time, while a majority of people reported being satisfied with democracy. More recent research,
however, detects declining support for democracy and democratic values in the U.S. and other
countries (e.g. Foa & Mounk, 2017).
It is important to note that the disparities in these findings appear to coincide with the
increasing dominance of social media in communication. During the 2008 presidential
campaign, social media emerged as important campaign media (Kushin & Yamamoto, 2010).
The 2016 campaign may be proof that social media can be leveraged by a savvy user to
overcome lack of relevant experience, knowledge and skills to reach and influence voters.
Recent survey research conducted by Pew Research Centers indicates that a majority of people
now get at least some news from social media sites (Bialik & Matsa, 2017). With the rise of
8

mass communications utilizing digital technologies, or new media, we find new iterations of
conflict rhetoric such as memes shared across social networks and real-time twitter feuds
between politicians and other public figures. As has been noted by some in the news media (e.g.
Edsall, 2017), and in the academic literature (e.g. Galston, 2013), the tone of political discourse
appears to have reached an unprecedented level of incivility that is outside the bounds of what
has traditionally been considered acceptable.
Diana Mutz (2013) argues that visual representations of political conflict have altered the
way people react to incivility and may be contributing to the rubbernecking tendency of televised
politics. The brevity and anonymity of much social media interaction is especially suited for
harsh criticism and vitriolic attacks (Tucker, Theocharis, Roberts & Barberá, 2017), as is
indicated with incidents of online trolling and cyberbullying. That civility seemingly has
decreased as modes of news consumption and other communications have changed suggests that
the evolution of media may be impacting social norms. As Esser (2013) argues, with this
evolution, the journalistic norms that drive media coverage decisions may institutionalize beyond
the traditional media realm to define appropriate rules of behavior. It is possible that the
evolution of media is contributing to a greater acceptance of uncivil discourse. Research has
begun to explore the use and prevalence of incivility in online communication formats (e.g.
Borah, 2014; Hopp & Vargo, 2016), but its effects remain unclear.
This review of the literature demonstrates that the impact of combative and negative
rhetoric is far from settled. That politicians continue to engage in conflict rhetoric despite the
public’s dislike of this behavior (Geer, 2006; Bartels, 2000), indicates that they think it works.
The research suggests, however, that “going negative” is not always a path to victory for political
actors and may also have detrimental effects for democratic outcomes. Although it may be
9

debatable whether political rhetoric is nastier than it used to be, the contradictory findings
discussed here indicate that we still have much to learn about whether and how negative-toned
rhetoric can benefit political interests and the long-term effects it has on democracy.
Pin the Tail on the Target: Blaming as a Political Tool
The term conflict rhetoric is used here to encompass political rhetoric employed with the
intention of highlighting differences between, and creating opposition to, people, groups or ideas.
A major assumption in this research is that this rhetorical strategy, often accomplished through
attacks and denigration of out-group members, is purposively used by political actors to activate
group allegiance among message receivers to bolster political support. Conflict rhetoric
manifests in political discourse in a variety of forms, including negative campaign advertising,
partisan rhetoric, outrage discourse, and blame. This dissertation focuses on the use of blame as
a political tool and its effect on political support.
Blame is an especially useful rhetorical strategy because it allows politicians and political
parties to deflect fault for policy failures and rally support for their own policy proposals.
Government officials are motivated to avoid the negative repercussions of policy failures
because, as predicted by negativity bias, failures draw more attention than success (Hood, 2010).
Research indicates that voters are more likely to punish politicians for failure than reward them
for success (Hood, 2010; Borraz, 2007; James & John, 2007). This is because “voters are more
sensitive to what has been done to them than what has been done for them” (italics in original;
Weaver, 1986, p. 373).
Politicians often engage in a preemptive form of blaming, whereby one party will ring the
alarm for potentially hazardous outcomes of proposed policy. Akin to Jerit’s (2009)
conceptualization of predictive appeals, the purpose of this type of attack is to depress the
10

favorability of a proposed policy by highlighting associated risks. As Lau, Smith and Fiske
(1991) note, policy advocates expend significant time and energy on the development of
rhetorical arguments about the potential consequences of policy proposals (Jerit, 2009). While
Jerit (2009) does not explicitly conceptualize predictive appeals to encompass blaming, the
implication exists in her description of the policy interpretation and rebuttal process in which
opposing policy actors engage:
Thus, elites who seek to reduce support for a legislative proposal may make drastic
predictions about the negative consequences of the bill. Supporters of a proposal might
forecast grand benefits as a way of generating support, or they may make dire claims
about what will happen in the absence of change. William Riker came to a similar
conclusion nearly two decades ago when he made this observation about rhetoric in
policy debates: “campaigners on each side emphasize the dreadful consequences of the
failure (or success) of the motion they advocate (or oppose)” (p. 412, Riker, 1990, p. 58).
Emphasizing the possible negative consequences of an opponent’s policy proposal implicitly
includes placing blame on the opponent should their policy be implemented and the dire
consequences come to pass.
The infamous example of this is the “Daisy Spot” 1964 presidential campaign
advertisement run by President Johnson’s campaign (LBJ Library, 2012). The advertisement
implied that not voting for President Johnson was a vote for Barry Goldwater and foreign policy
that will lead to nuclear war and dead children. While the “Daisy” ad may be extreme, this
alarmist form of blaming is common in policy debate and in campaign advertising when parties
and political candidates attack each other’s policy stances. Beyond lowering confidence in the
opposing party’s policy positions, an implication of such an attack is that the attacking party is
11

better suited to deal with the issue. With negative affect for the opposing party, potentially
comes positive affect for the attacking party, because the purpose of attacks is to lower
estimation of the opponent while also raising the comparative estimation of the attacker (Benoit,
2007).
Another form of blaming rarely addressed in the literature is when politicians and
political parties attack different groups to assign blame for social issues. For example, during the
2016 presidential election cycle, Senator Bernie Sanders (D-VT) blamed big banks for much of
the economic and societal woes in the U.S. (McAuliff, 2015), while Republican candidate
Donald Trump targeted Mexicans and Muslims (Deggins, 2015; Healy & Barbaro 2016).
Likewise, Governor Chris Christie (R-NJ) blamed universities for unmanageable student loan
debt (Haddon, 2015). Such messages identify for constituents an out-group at which to direct
anger, fear, and frustration over policy problems. Blame rhetoric can create political opportunity
and help politicians avoid risk by manipulating citizens’ perceptions of different social groups
(Schneider & Ingram, 1997). By choosing to lay blame for social problems on others, politicians
link problem definition to a target group and justify the use of certain policy tools. With blame,
politicians create credit-taking opportunities to prescribe solutions for social ills and to act
against those causing the problem.
The list of possible targets for blame is long and includes people and entities in and
outside of government (Hood 2010). Research has explored whether differences in message
sender (i.e. a candidate versus an outside group; e.g. Dowling & Wichowsky, 2015) and type or
degree of negativity (i.e. trait-based versus policy-based or civil versus uncivil; e.g. Fridkin &
Kenney, 2008; Brooks & Geer, 2007) impacts the effectiveness of a negative message. The
literature, however, has yet to investigate the disparate impact of politicians purposively blaming
12

different groups. Therefore, this dissertation focuses on blaming as an aspect of political
communication. Through two original experiments reported in three articles, this study explores
the parameters and effects of strategically placed blame on various dimensions of political
support. It also seeks to measure the degree to which political and policy goals are facilitated or
impeded by this divisive form of rhetoric.
Organization of the Dissertation
The results of the research for this dissertation are presented in three independent articles,
each examining the impact of strategically placed blame on specific dimensions of political
support. Chapter two describes the overarching theoretical framework for the three articles, an
explanation of each dimension of political support measured and the intervening, control, and
demographic variables included. Chapters three, four, and five comprise the articles, Negative
Gains: How Attack Messages Impact Partisan Identity and Party Reputation, You’ve Got to
Accentuate the Negative: Mediatization, Group Conflict and Building Policy Support, and
Unintended Consequences: Why Attack Rhetoric May Be Bad for Democracy, respectively.
Chapter six concludes with a summary of the findings from all three articles and a discussion
explaining the implications, interconnections, and contributions these articles make to the
literature. Included in this chapter is a brief discussion of the limitations posed by the study
design and suggestions for future research. All references, tables, and figures are reserved for
the end of the dissertation.
Article Summaries
Chapter three reports the result of research investigating the role conflict rhetoric plays in
stimulating feelings of partisan intensity and altering assessments of the aligned and opposing
parties. This research seeks to answer whether, as suggested by social identity theory (Tajfel &
13

Turner, 1986), politicians benefit from messages that create and sustain a sense of conflict
between the parties. Specifically, this study examines whether the target of blame matters to the
dependent variable political support, measured as partisan identity and party reputation. The
results indicate that blame messages do influence strength of partisan identity and estimation, but
not in the expected direction and with different outcomes for the two parties. In some instances,
targeting an opposing party diminished political support, while the absence of a blame target
increased it. Blaming a non-political group did not result in significant different effects
compared to the other conditions.
In Chapter four, I present a framework within which to understand the influence of the
media on political rhetoric and the ramifications for public policy. More specifically, this
research attempts to explain how the changing media landscape has impacted the communicative
behavior of political elites. As suggested by mediatization theory (Esser & Stromback, 2014),
social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), and social construction theory (Schneider &
Ingram, 1997), the media’s most important impact on the political system is indirect through its
effect on elite rhetoric and this effect can be traced all the way through the political process to
policy outcome. While this paper presents an explanation for the effect of the media and conflict
rhetoric on the entire public policy process, statistical analysis was limited to the effect of
blaming as it can impact support for public policy. The success of blaming as a strategy to raise
policy support, however, is likely mediated by perceptions of message credibility. This research
tested the impact of differing targets of blame on message support and support for proposed
policies through the mediational impact of message credibility. The results indicate perceptions
of message credibility significantly varied depending on message exposure, but message
credibility may not always act as a mediator for political messages. It may also act as a
14

suppressor variable magnifying the effects of conflict rhetoric and, therefore, is an important
factor that should be considered when investigating the effects of negative messages.
Importantly, direct effects indicate that blame messages can negatively impact perceptions of an
outgroup and lead to greater support for punitive policy.
Chapter five explores how the different emotions aroused by a blame message impact
political support, measured as democratic support. Research indicates that emotions may be the
connection between political messages and political support and researchers have begun to
seriously examine the link between emotions and vote choice (e.g. Marcus & MacKuen, 1993;
Redlawsk, Civettini & Lau, 2007), participation (e.g. Groenendyk, 2011; Valentino,
Gregorowicz & Groenendyk, 2009), partisanship (e.g. Weeks, 2015), activism (e.g. Roser &
Thompson, 1995), and attitude change (e.g. Smith, 2014; O’Neill & Nicholson-Cole, 2009).
Yet, little research explores the impact negative emotions have on some of the more nebulous
aspects of regime support. Attack rhetoric is not new to politics, but, as New York Times
columnist Thomas Edsall (2017) recently argued, conventional norms keeping political discourse
within the bounds of truth and good taste seem to have been abandoned and may be a contributor
to the recent documented decline in democratic support (e.g. Foa & Mounk, 2017). This
research seeks to answer whether attack rhetoric is contributing to declining support for
democratic governance and values by testing the impact of conflict rhetoric on democratic
support through the mediating impact of emotional arousal. As expected, emotional arousal
varied by treatment condition. Participants who received a no blame message reported
significantly more positive emotions than those who received a blame message. Those who
received a blame message reported significantly higher negative emotions than those who
received a no blame message. Differences in emotional arousal in response to variations in
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blame did influence levels of democratic support, in both positive and negative ways. However,
significant mediation results were more consistent for positive than negative emotions and along
each dimension of democratic support, the emotions elicited resulted in the same directional
impact.
Conclusion
Taken together, the research presented in this dissertation provides a broad understanding
of the impact conflict and its accompanying rhetoric has on political support in the electorate.
This research contributes to the extensive literature on the various forms of conflict rhetoric by
examining the differential impact of strategically placed blame on partisanship, policy support,
and democratic support.
Research has examined the role of partisanship in contributing to the negative tone of
political rhetoric (e.g. Morris & Witting, 2001; Harbridge & Malhotra, 2011; Grimmer, 2013;
Wolf, Strachan & Shea, 2012), but it has overlooked the impact conflict rhetoric has on
partisanship. Article one helps to fill this gap by examining whether blame messages increase or
decrease strength of partisan identity and, subsequently, perceptions of competence of and
feelings for the political parties. Article two adds to the sparse literatures on negativity and
credibility (e.g. Hilbig, 2009; Hilbig, 2012; Fessler, Pisor & Navarete, 2014) and the effects of
blame on policy support (e.g. Barry, Brescoll, Brownell, & Schlesinger, 2009; Thibodeau, Perko
& Flusberg, 2015) by examining these relationships in an explicitly political context.
Additionally, this article bridges theories from sociology, communication, and psychology to
make a theoretical contribution to the understanding of the impact of media on politics and
public policy. Lastly, article three contributes to the growing literature on the role emotions play
in political behavior and attitudes (e.g. Brader, Marcus & Miller, 2011; Smith, 2014; Valentino,
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Brader, Groenendyk, Gregorowicz, & Hutchings, 2011; Ryan, 2012) by using targeted blame
messages to induce emotional reactions and examining their impact on a previously unexplored
area, support for democratic governance and values.
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CHAPTER 2
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
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It’s Us Against Them: Conflict Rhetoric and Political Support
Harold Lasswell (1936) is credited with defining politics as the means of deciding “who
gets what, when and how,” a useful heuristic for explaining the complicated maneuvering of
different groups in the struggle for scarce resources. According to Lasswell (1936), it is the
influential who “get the most of what there is to get” (p. 295). In the struggle to exert influence,
rhetoric is central to creating political images for public consumption and evaluation. Rhetoric is
a key component at every stage of political debate because it is where “ideas are fashioned into
arguments with a certain force and direction in order to win the assent of an audience” (Martin,
2014, p. 9). It is through rhetoric that politicians and other political actors most directly attempt
to persuade the public to hold certain viewpoints. In this research, I assume that the rhetoric in
which politicians engage are purposive actions meant to manipulate the perceptions and attitudes
of message receivers. As a political tool, rhetoric affords politicians the opportunity to simplify
complex social problems to neatly packaged tropes that can influence policy demand and
political support in the electorate.
Conflict rhetoric, and blaming specifically, is well-suited to political debate because it is
designed to draw attention to social group differences, create inter-group tension and promote
“us versus them” narratives to pit one group against another. It is human nature to selfcategorize, but the positive value put on a group identity happens through comparison to other
groups (Tajfel, 1978). Because it is based on perceived rather than formal belonging (Greene,
1999), social group identity is easily activated and strengthened by conflict (Tajfel & Turner,
1986). As a rhetorical strategy, blaming is constructed specifically to persuade a targeted
audience rather than to call out the blamed (Hlavacik, 2016; Burke, 1969). The group targeted
for blame is merely a prop serving the message sender’s intention to stoke anger and anxiety
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about a social problem. As a strategy to raise political support from a specific group, such
rhetoric is meant to reassure the target audience that someone is attentive to their plight.
Targeting a group for blame allows political actors to appear to be responsive to policy issues
because blaming identifies for politicians a scapegoat against whom they can act. But, these
storylines diminish the power of factual knowledge as group-based beliefs and emotions hold
sway (Fischer, 2003), because blaming identifies for the afflicted the group toward which they
should direct their anger and anxiety. Blaming is an intentionally divisive strategy because by
appealing to one group, political actors are necessarily alienating another.
People identify with multiple groups throughout their lives (e.g. Catholics, Hispanics,
students, parents), providing many opportunities for politicians to emphasize group differences
and generate antagonism. Not all group conflict, however, will evoke the same emotional and
cognitive reactions in the target audience and the impact on different dimensions of political
support may vary. Further, some dimensions of political support may not be susceptible to
manipulation through group conflict. I expect that the strength and direction of influence will
vary depending on the group conflict created and the dimension of political support tested. The
ease and frequency with which politicians engage in conflict rhetoric implies a belief in its power
to shape political outcomes, but, as suggested in the literature, this time-honored tradition may be
a double-edged sword. There probably is little reason to doubt that creating conflict is an easy
way for political actors to gain attention, however, the research indicates that there is plenty of
reason to doubt that it is a sure-fire strategy for success.
The main premise of this research is that conflict rhetoric, manifested as blaming, is a
regularly relied upon political tool used with the intention of activating various social identities
in the electorate to sow anger and anxiety toward out-groups and reap in-group support. Despite
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the seemingly ubiquitous use of group-based appeals in political rhetoric, the research studying
conflict rhetoric focuses almost exclusively on the behavioral effects of political parties or
candidates attacking each other (i.e. negative campaign advertising). Targeting non-political
groups as the cause of social ills is a common rhetorical tool and is frequently reflected in public
policy (Schneider & Ingram, 1997). This research will extend the literature by comparing the
effect of attacks on opposing parties to attacks on non-political groups. Specifically, the purpose
of this research is to understand the circumstances in which conflict rhetoric is a useful and
beneficial strategy for political actors. Figure 2.1 illustrates the relationship between conflict
rhetoric and political support as conceptualized in this research.
Conceptualizing Political Support
Political support is a multi-dimensional concept that has been characterized as having two
main components: specific and diffuse support (Easton, 1975). Easton defines support generally
as “the way in which a person evaluatively orients himself or some object through either his
attitudes or his behavior” (p. 436). In this sense, political support includes not only tangible
actions (i.e. donating money to or voting for a specific candidate), but also latent attitudes
including partisan attachment, trust, affect, and perceptions of credibility.
The distinction between specific and diffuse support resides in the object toward which
the support is directed. Specific support involves actions and attitudes directed toward
incumbent political authorities and institutions based on satisfaction with governmental
performance and outputs. Diffuse support is directed more broadly toward the systems, offices
and structures that constitute the political community, as well as the individuals holding the
offices (Easton, 1975). For example, people may disapprove of President Trump retweeting a gif
depicting him hitting Hillary Clinton with a golf ball (Abramson, 2017), an aspect of specific
21

support, but they still support him as presidential office holder, an aspect of diffuse support.
Political support can be directed at three distinct levels: authorities, regimes, and the
political community (Easton, 1975). Authorities refers to politicians as a group and individual
political actors; regimes can be understood as the values, institutions and practical functioning of
the political system (democratic versus autocratic); and community is the nation state (Norris,
1999). Using Almond and Verba’s (1963) categorization of affective versus evaluative beliefs,
Dalton (1999) further refines these levels of support by distinguishing three different categories
of regime support: regime principles, regime performance, and regime institutions. Affective
orientations align with Easton’s (1975) diffuse support and involves acceptance of or
identification with an entity, while instrumental evaluations align with Easton’s categorization of
specific support and involves judgments of performance or appropriateness of political
phenomena (Dalton, 1999). Table 2.12 presents Dalton’s typology of political support with
examples of each category.
Dimensions of Political Support
Following Dalton’s (1999) typology, this dissertation will focus on the effect conflict
rhetoric has on the components “authorities” and “regime.” Article one concerns party
attachment and party reputation, dimensions of authorities and the regime sub-level political
institutions. Article two focuses on aspects of policy support, an affective dimension of the
regime sub-level political institutions. And article three, measures support for democratic values
and norms, satisfaction with democracy, and trust in institutions, encompassing the three sublevels of political regimes. The component “communities” is excluded from this research
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Table 2.1 and all subsequent tables can be found in Appendix A.
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because the theoretical connection between conflict rhetoric and support for the nation state
requires a conceptual framework outside what can reasonably be included in these articles.
Additionally, practical constraints with time, money and space prevent the measurement and
discussion of every dimension of political support. The following is a description of each
dimension of political support measured, as well as intervening, control, and demographic
variables.
Partisan Identity
Recent research has conceptualized party identity as a form of social group attachment
(e.g. Mason, 2015; Miller & Conover, 2015) akin to ethnicity and religious affiliation. Social
identity theory (Greene, 1999; Tajfel & Turner, 1986) suggests that by using negativity,
politicians can maximize the perceived differences between their in-group (the party affiliated
with the sender of the message) and the out-group (the target of the negative attack), thus
stimulating favoritism with the in-group. Partisan identity is defined as the extent to which
people feel group attachment to a political party. This research tests the extent to which blame
messages heighten feelings of partisan attachment. Partisan identity was operationalized in two
parts: through a measure of party identity strength and a measure of group attachment.
Party Reputation
A potential benefit to politicians of stronger partisan identity is an increase in positive
perceptions of the in-group and negative perceptions of the out-group. Social identity theory
suggests that stronger group attachment results in more biased evaluations of the in-group and
the out-group (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Benoit (2007) suggests that, in a campaign context, the
purpose of attacks is to lower estimation of the opponent while also raising comparative
estimation of the attacker. This goal can logically be extended to influencing perceptions of and
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feelings toward the political parties more generally. Party reputation, defined as the level of
esteem people hold for a political party, is a multi-dimensional concept and includes an affective
and an informative component (Butler & Powell, 2014; Stokes, 1963). The affective component
is people’s orientation (positive or negative) toward the parties. The informative component is
often conceptualized as the parties’ ideological signals (Butler & Powell, 2014), but has also
been conceptualized as issue ownership (Pope & Woon, 2008) or party competence (Jacobsen,
2015). Party reputation was operationalized in two parts: affect for the political parties and
perception of party competence.
Message Support
As defined by Easton (1975), part of political support is attitude orientation toward the
object, in this case the blame message. Attitude refers to an overall evaluation of persons,
objects and issues (Petty & Wegener, 1998) and orientation is the directional (positive or
negative) component of the attitude. Political messages are designed to persuade the target
audience to the sender’s point of view and raise support. As such, part of attitude toward the
message is the level of agreement with the opinions expressed in the message, including the
characterization of the issue and persons identified in the message. This research tests the effects
of blaming on message support as it relates to the policy issue and the target of blame identified
in the message.
Policy Support
One aspect of political support is approval of policy initiatives. Fischer (2003) argues
that rhetoric can be used by political elites to manage public perception of events, alleviate
concerns and reduce demand for policy responses. If rhetoric can serve to reduce policy demand
then it should also be capable of increasing demand for action and support for proposed policies.
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Blaming, specifically, can be viewed as a call to action (Hlavacik, 2016; Warner, 2005) seeking
to persuade a specific audience as to the cause of the problem (blame target) and appropriate
measures to deal with it (Hlavacik, 2016). This research tests the effect of blaming on policy
support, measured as people’s demand for policy action and support for specific public policy
interventions.
Democratic Support
As defined by Dalton (1999), one level of political support can be measured through
attitudes toward the political regime. This includes latent orientations such as trust in
government and belief in democratic governance and values. Declining trust in government,
democratic institutions, political leaders, and satisfaction with the political system is welldocumented (Foa & Mounk, 2017; Pew, 2017; Jones, 2016), and these attitudes may be
influenced by the combative behavior of political elites (Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 1995). This
research tests the effects of blaming on people’s attitudes toward democracy and the political
system, termed here democratic support. Democratic support was operationalized in three parts:
trust in institutions, support for democratic governance and values, and satisfaction with the
democratic system.
Intervening Variables
Emotions
Conflict rhetoric is designed to stimulate negative emotions such as anger and anxiety
and these emotions can impact cognitive reasoning and message response (Westen, 2007).
Anger, for example, may lead to regular voting habits because it boosts efficacy, while anxiety
under some circumstances can demobilize (Valentino et al., 2011). Anger can also trigger
group-based hatred (Groenendyk, 2011) and encourage partisan motivated reasoning (Weeks,
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2015). Anxiety encourages information seeking (Groenendyk, 2011), reasoning based on a
greater variety of information instead of that most easily accessible (Groenendyk, 2016) and
consideration of the information presented rather than partisan leanings (Weeks, 2015). As
noted by Petty and Wegener (1998), emotional response is often included in a mediational model
of attitude change that has dominated the persuasion literature. This research tests whether
participants’ emotional responses differ by target of blame and their mediational effects on
different dimensions of political support. The emotions measured were: anger, happiness, pride,
shame, excitement, sadness, disgust, fear, hope, and anxiety.
Credibility
The persuasive power of a message is related to its credibility (Eisend, 2010; Wilson &
Sherrell, 1993), defined as believability (Wathen & Burkell, 2002; Fogg, 1999; Tseng & Fogg,
1999). Therefore, a credible message is more likely to enhance support than a non-credible
message. The persuasiveness of a message has been found to be based on two components:
source and message credibility (Webb & Eves, 2007). Message credibility has been shown to be
based on perceptions of information quality, accuracy and completeness (Flanagin & Metzger,
2007) distinct from perceptions of source credibility (Appelman & Sundar, 2016). This research
tests whether participants’ perceptions of message credibility differ by target of blame and its
mediating effect on measures of regime support.
Control and Demographic Variables
Student Loans
While experiments increase internal validity through more effective elimination of
extraneous variables and temporal control not available with other research designs (Singleton &
Straits, 2010), the likelihood that student loan reform is a salient issue for respondents introduces
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the possibility of response bias. As such, participants were asked questions to capture their
familiarity with the student loan debt crisis, their level of concern for this issue, and their
personal experience with student loan debt. By controlling for prior knowledge of student loan
debt reform and personal experience with student loans, it is more likely any differences detected
can be attributed to the result of the manipulation of the message.
Demographics
The survey included questions regarding ideology, age, race, sex, income, education, and
political knowledge. If appropriate, statistical analysis included demographic variables likely to
influence the dimensions of political support as conceptualized in the theoretical framework of
each article. Ideology is likely to influence party attitudes (Miller & Conover, 2015). Age, race,
sex, and income and are common factors in party divisions (Miller & Conover, 2015;
Abramowitz, 2010). Education and political knowledge have been shown to impact attitudes
toward democratic norms (Miller & Conover, 2015; Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996).
Table 2.2 provides a list of conceptual definitions for each dimension of political support
measured in this research, as well as the independent and intervening variables. The survey
questions used to measure each variable are provided in Appendices E (experiment 1) and F
(experiment 2). The operationalization of each variable is explained in the relevant article.
Data Collection
This research reports the results of two survey experiments. The first experiment was
conducted in the Fall of 2016. Participants (N=439) were students enrolled in political science
and communication classes at the University of Tennessee, Knoxville (UTK) and the University
of Tennessee at Chattanooga (UTC), respectively. The second experiment was conducted in the
Spring of 2018. Participants (N=1023) were recruited using an online panel service through
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Qualtrics, a provider of online survey software, that the University of Tennessee system
currently subscribes to for use by faculty, staff, and students. Specific details about methodology
are provided in each article. All methods for data collection were reviewed and approved by the
UTK (experiments 1 and 2) and UTC (experiment 1) Institutional Review Boards prior to
implementation.
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CHAPTER 3
NEGATIVE GAINS:
HOW ATTACK MESSAGES IMPACT PARTISAN IDENTITY
AND PARTY REPUTATION
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Introduction
Despite the public’s professed dislike of negative political rhetoric and the possibility of
backlash (Geer, 2006; Bartels, 2000; Brooks, 2000) politicians continue to employ this strategy
to diminish their opponents and bolster their own standing with the public. One goal of message
communication is to reinforce support among base constituents (Fenno, 1978). Negative
messages, generally defined as a criticism of an opposing politician, party or issue stance (Geer,
2006), allow politicians to highlight what is different or undesirable about the opposition. This
differentiation creates for partisans a sense of “otherness” about members of the opposing party,
possibly increasing favorability for their own party. Using negativity to “otherize” can create the
impression of group conflict where little or none exists, thus increasing the likelihood that people
will react to the information as group members rather than individuals (Tajfel & Turner, 1986)
and rally against the possible negative repercussions for the group. Conceptualizing partisan
identity as a form of social group identity, this paper explores whether negativity can help
politicians strengthen the support of their base constituents by activating feelings of group
attachment.
Beyond its debatable success in dampening candidate appraisal, how and why negativity
may directly benefit politicians is overlooked (see Geer, 2006; Soroka, 2014; Lau, Sigelman, &
Roverner, 2007 for extensive literature reviews). Social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner 1986)
suggests that group conflict highlighted through negative political messages should induce or
reinforce hostility and bias for the out-group, while also increasing positive feelings of loyal
attachment to the in-group. If attack messages rouse negative affect for the opposition and
activate feelings of attachment for the in-group, it is likely a contributing factor in much of the
polarization and accompanying partisan hostility that has intensified in recent years. Using an
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original experiment, this study tests the role negative political messages play in stimulating
feelings of group identity and esteem for the aligned and opposing parties.
Negativity and Partisan Identity
Although research has long emphasized the importance of party affiliation on political
behavior, including opinion formation and voting preferences (e.g. Campbell, Converse, Miller,
& Stokes, 1960; Bartels, 2002), researchers have only recently begun to explore party affiliation
as a form of social group identity (Miller & Conover, 2015; Mason, 2015, 2013; Iyengar, Sood,
& Lelkes, 2012; Greene, 1999). A social identity is the self-concept an individual derives from
group membership and the emotional value attached to that membership (Tajfel, 1978).
According to social identity theory, it is human nature to self-categorize, but the positive value
put on the group identity happens through comparison to other groups, heightening group
differences and a sense of “us versus them.” People identify with multiple groups throughout
their lives (i.e. child, mother, student, Catholic) and, as experiments in minimal intergroup
discrimination have shown (e.g. Oakes & Turner, 1980; Billig & Tajfel, 1973), previous
interaction with other group members is not a requisite of social group identification.
Social identity theory suggests group identity does not require formal membership
because it is based on perceived rather than formal belonging to a group (Greene, 1999). Group
conflict can activate and strengthen a social identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), making politics, by
nature riddled with conflict between opposing sides, the perfect backdrop for group competition
and the emotions attached to group success and failure. As such, the heightened polarization
detected among the electorate (Abramowitz & Saunders, 2008) suggests that the conflict
between political elites has extended to the public in general and is likely resulting in an increase
in partisan identity strength. According to Mason (2015; 2013), people do not disagree on issues
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any more than they used to, but they do feel more strongly about their own party and more
negative affect, bias and anger for the opposing party. People are increasingly behaviorally
polarized because party affiliation has developed into a social identity on par with ethnicity and
religious affiliation. This research seeks to answer whether, as suggested by social identity
theory, politicians benefit from negative messages because it creates and sustains the sense of
conflict between the parties, thus activating and heightening partisan group identity.
Changes in the perception of elite polarization can lead to changes in the electorate.
Clear party polarization provides better cues to the electorate as to where the parties stand on
issues so voters can better align their own preferences and cast the “right” vote (i.e. voting for
the party with aligned issue positions; Levendusky, 2010; Hetherington, 2001). But if citizens
could not previously perceive the differences between parties to form coherent ideological
attitudes across issues (Converse, 1964; Lippman, 1946), something has changed to increase this
perception. Layman and Carsey (2002) argue that “conflict extension,” the theory that the
parties are divided on a wider range of high and low salience issues than has historically been the
case, is leading to more coherent attitudes in the mass public. This supports the claim that
parties are providing better cues. But while studies of elite polarization do indicate that the
parties are increasingly divided on a broad array of issues (Poole & Rosenthal, 2007), this does
not guarantee that the public understands or is aware of the differences. This research asserts
that it is the increasing negativity that alerts the public to conflicts and differences between the
political parties.
Negative messaging is one tool used by politicians to alert the public to party divisions.
Social identity theory (Greene, 1999; Tajfel & Turner, 1986) suggests that by using negativity,
politicians can maximize the perceived differences between their in-group (the party affiliated
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with the sender of the message) and the out-group (the target of the negative attack), thus
stimulating favoritism with the in-group. Research linking negativity to increasing mass
partisanship and negative affect for opposing parties supports this relationship. Exposure to
negative campaign advertising and partisan rhetoric can lead to increased attitude polarization
(Meffert, Chung, Joiner, Waks, & Garst, 2006; Garramone, Atkin, Pinkleton, & Cole, 1990) and
partisan intensity in the electorate (Morris & Witting 2001). That negativity drives this division
is supported by later research linking negative affect for the opposing party to increasing
exposure to negative campaigning (Iyengar, Sood, & Lelkes 2012). Using panel data, the
authors demonstrate that affective polarization, the tendency to view opposing partisans
negatively and aligned partisans positively (Iyengar & Westwood, 2015; Campbell et al., 1960;
Green, Palmquist, & Schickler, 2002), increased over the course of the 2008 Presidential
campaign. The increase was especially pronounced in battleground states where attack
advertising was heavier. They conclude that negative campaigns, and exposure to campaigns
generally, reinforce partisan identity.
The increasing negativity is not just highlighting what is different about the opposition or
their issue stances, it is contributing to the perception that the parties are engaged in an endless
struggle where only one can prevail. If one must prevail, then the other must be defeated and it
is this threat of defeat that is stimulating stronger partisan identity. Without all the vitriol from
political elites it is unlikely people would perceive to the same degree any differences between
the parties or feel the same degree of animosity.
While most research discusses negativity, or more broadly incivility, as a consequence of
partisan division (e.g. Miller & Conover, 2015; Mason, 2013), and at the elite level this may be
accurate, in the electorate it is the exposure to the persistently negative tone of political discourse
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that is driving the division. The greater the intensity of intergroup conflict, the more likely that
people from opposing sides will respond to each other as group members rather than as
individuals (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) and, as conflict escalates, people will respond by closing
group ranks rather than opening up to different viewpoints. If politicians are always working to
further electoral goals (Mayhew, 1974; Fenno, 1978) negative messaging appears to be an
effective and efficient way to strengthen their partisan base because it stimulates reliance upon
partisan identification and reinforces negative affect for the opposing party. It is most likely that
by using negative messages, politicians are not attempting to sway those unlikely to support
them, rather, they are looking to reinforce their base constituents and influence the few in the
middle who might be reached.
By turning policy debate into an “us against them” discussion politicians can manipulate
in the electorate anger and anxiety towards the opposing party and activate and reinforce
partisanship. Playing to partisanship through negativity enables politicians to incite behavior
similar to that found in sport competitions, where team status and winning overtakes thoughtful
deliberation and participation (Miller & Conover, 2015; Mason, 2015). Such rivalry is beneficial
to politicians because, as with fans of rival teams, in-group identification is heightened in
response to group conflict and strong group identification is often accompanied by negative
feelings for out-groups (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). This decreases the likelihood that out-group
members or their views will be accepted. People are less likely to sympathize with or listen to
the opposing viewpoints of out-groups (Hart & Nisbett, 2012) and through negativity politicians
can create a sense of conflict and rivalry between the parties to encourage out-group bias among
partisans and leaners. Rather than politics for the good of the country, negativity induces politics
for the good of the party.
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With a negative attack politicians can control a portion of the information that people
learn about the opposition. In a campaign context, politicians can use negative messages to
manipulate what information voters consider when making decisions (Druckman, Kifer, &
Parkin, 2009) because people respond more strongly and give more weight to negative
information (see Meffert et al., 2006; Fridkin & Kenney, 2004). Through a fear response or risk
aversion impulse stimulated by this negativity bias (Lau, 1985), politicians can manipulate
citizen’s emotions, lessening their ability to act rationally and in their best interests (Geer, 2006;
Jamieson, 1992).
A now infamous political campaign example exploiting fear is the 1988 Willie Horton
campaign ad run by supporters of George H.W. Bush in his race against Michael Dukakis. The
advertisement implied that voting for Governor Dukakis meant accepting policies that put
murderers back on the street. The flip side, of course, was that a vote for Vice President Bush
would prevent this from becoming a reality. As the success attributed to this example illustrates,
negative messages may achieve the desired goals of lowering citizens’ evaluations of targeted
candidates (Fridkin & Kenney, 2008), by eliciting fear or anger about societal problems or
specific policies and highlighting possible harmful outcomes due to action or inaction.
While it is reasonable to suspect that such effects will be more evident during campaigns
when political advertisements are numerous and politics is more salient to the general
population, it is also reasonable to believe that such effects are not limited to campaigns.
Partisan identity transcends the timing of political campaigns (Green, Palmquist, & Schickler,
2002). Likewise, negativity in American politics does not start and stop with campaign cycles;
rather, it is an integral component of the political process used to continue the sense of struggle
and competition between the parties that is readily apparent during campaigns.
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Negative messages in political discourse are limited neither to campaigns nor to targeting
an opposing candidate or party. Politicians and political parties can also use negative messages
to deflect blame for policy failures and rally support for their own policy proposals. The list of
possible targets for these criticisms is long and includes people and entities in and outside of
government (Hood, 2010). During the 2016 presidential election cycle, Senator Bernie Sanders
(D-VT) blamed big banks for much of the economic and societal woes in the U.S. (McAuliff,
2015), while Republican candidate Donald Trump targeted Mexicans and Muslims (Deggins,
2015; Healy & Barbaro, 2016). Likewise, Governor Chris Christie (R-NJ) has blamed
universities for unmanageable student loan debt (Haddon, 2015). Such messages identify for
constituents an out-group at which to direct anger, fear and frustration.
An implication of social group identity is the existence of an in-group (the group with
whom one identifies) and an out-group with which to compare the status of one’s own group.
And while technically any other group qualifies as an out-group, not all out-groups warrant
comparison (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). While offering a target of blame may deflect any negative
repercussions away from the sender and toward the blame target, as the examples above
illustrate, in order for the message to stimulate increased feelings of group identity, the blame
target must be a group perceived as similar. The implication of group comparison as defined
within social identity theory is that strengthening partisan identity requires specifically blaming
the opposing party, not just a group other than the favored political party.
While some research has explored whether differences in message sender (e.g. Dowling
& Wichowsky, 2015) and type or degree of negativity (e.g. Fridkin & Kenney, 2008; Brooks &
Geer, 2007) impacts the effectiveness of a negative message, the disparate impact of differing
targets of blame is as yet unexplored in the literature. Social identity theory suggests that
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activation of group identity through awareness of group conflict is dependent, in part, on the
conflict being with a comparable out-group. If the negative message does not offer a comparable
out-group then the message should not have an impact on strength of identity. Hypothesis one
will test whether people’s reliance on partisan identity and their response to the negative message
depends on the target of the negative attack:
Hypothesis 1: Those who receive a negative message targeting an opposing party will
exhibit stronger partisan identity than those who do not receive a negative message
targeting an opposing party.
A potential benefit to politicians of stronger partisan identity is an increase in positive
perceptions of the in-group and negative perceptions of the out-group. Benoit (2007) suggests
that, in a campaign context, the purpose of attacks is to lower estimation of the opponent while
also raising comparative estimation of the attacker. This goal can logically be extended to
influencing perceptions of and feelings toward the political parties more generally. As such, this
research tests the effect of differing targets of blame on party reputation. Party reputation,
defined as the level of esteem people hold for a political party, is a multi-dimensional concept
and includes a valence and an informative component (Butler & Powell, 2014; Stokes, 1963).
The valence component is people’s orientation (positive or negative) toward the parties and here
is conceptualized as affect. The informative component is often conceptualized as the parties’
ideological signals (Butler & Powell, 2014), but has also been conceptualized as issue ownership
(Pope & Woon, 2008) or party competence (Jacobsen, 2015).
With awareness of group conflict and heightened group identity should come positive
affect for the in-group and negative affect for the out-group (Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Greene,
1999). If negative messages strengthen group identity, then such messages should also dampen
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estimation of the opposing party and boost estimation of the aligned party. As stated above, the
target of political negativity can move beyond the opposing party to non-political entities;
however, it is not likely that targeting a non-political entity will elicit negative feelings for the
opposing party or an increase in positive feelings for the aligned party. Hypothesis two will test
whether targeting a political party is more likely to achieve the desired affect:
Hypothesis 2: People that receive a negative message targeting a political party will feel
greater (lesser) affect for the aligned (opposing) party than those who receive a message
that does not target a political party.
Attempts to influence the second dimension of party reputation, party competence, can be
seen in attacks on policy stances. One party will often ring the alarm for potentially hazardous
outcomes of policy proposed by the opposing party, as exhibited through the 1988 Willie Horton
ad campaign mentioned earlier. The purpose of this type of attack is to depress the favorability
of the proposed policy by highlighting associated risks. However, beyond lowering confidence
in the opposing party’s policy stance, an implication of such an attack is that the attacking party
or politician is better suited to deal with the issue. According to social identity theory (Tajfel &
Turner, 1986), perceived group belonging increases discrimination favoring the in-group. If
people favor a particular party, it is likely they will feel that party is more able to deal with
problems facing society. Such results are supported by intergroup discrimination research (see
Oakes & Turner, 1980). Hypothesis three will test how negative messaging affects people’s
perceptions of job competence:
Hypothesis 3: People that receive a negative message targeting a political party will
have lower (higher) perceptions of party competence for the opposing (aligned) party
than those who receive a message that does not target a political party.
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Methodology
To test the impact of differing targets of blame on partisan identity and party reputation, I
conducted an online survey experiment using a student sample. The survey was administered via
the Qualtrics online survey platform. Using a between-subjects 3 x 2 experimental design,
participants were randomly assigned to one of six treatment conditions. Each condition
consisted of a negative message about student loan debt reform. Despite experiments being low
in external validity compared to other methods, they are commonly used in research to test the
impact of message variation (i.e. framing effects; e.g. Lecheler, Bos, & Vliegenthart, 2015;
Nelson, Clawson & Oxley 1997; Smith & Petty, 1996) because experiments “provide the most
rigorous way to establish causal relationships between independent and dependent variables”
(Thorson, Wicks & Leshner 2012, p. 112). Controlling for confounding variables through
randomization allows researchers to attribute any response differences to the experimental
manipulation rather than the personal characteristics of respondents, strengthening support for
the theoretical underpinnings of significant results.
Sample
Participants (N= 392) were undergraduate students enrolled at two southern universities.
Participation in the study was voluntary; students received extra credit for participation. The
sample was predominantly white (80%), female (55%), and, not surprisingly, young (M=20.23,
SD=2.64, range 18-39). Fourty-seven percent identified as conservative, fourty-one percent as
liberal, and twelve percent as neither conservative nor liberal. Sixty-eight percent of participants
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expected to have student loan debt upon graduation. A full breakdown of respondent
characteristics is provided in Table 3.13.
Procedure
All participants answered questions consisting of control variables regarding student
loans. Next, participants were exposed to the stimulus condition, a news article excerpt about the
student loan debt reform. Last, participants answered questions regarding their level of partisan
attachment, affect and estimation for the political parties, and demographic variables.
Manipulation
The experimental manipulation was a negative message about student loan debt reform
varying the attribution of blame for the student loan debt crisis (Republican or Democratic Party,
universities, and no target of blame) and the political party affiliation of the message sender
(Republican or Democratic Party). A message received from a Republican politician either
targeted the Democratic Party, targeted universities or contained no target. Likewise, a message
received from a Democratic politician either targeted the Republican Party, targeted universities
or contained no target. Table 3.2 displays the experimental design. A manipulation test run
prior to the full experiment indicated the treatment conditions were successful in alerting the
participant to the political party affiliation of the message sender and the target of blame.
Messages that included a target of blame were worded as follows:
[Republican/Democratic] Representative Robert Murphy blames [Democrats/
Republicans/universities] for not doing enough to address the problems of student loan
debt and soaring costs that have inflated tuition rates. “The [Democrats/
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Table 3.1 and all subsequent tables can be found in Appendix A.
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Republicans/universities] are proposing policy changes that won’t slow the rising cost of
college and won’t lower total debt owed and payments to a manageable level,” Mr.
Murphy said. “Listening to [Democrats/Republicans/universities] will make this crisis
worse.’’
Messages with no target of blame were worded:
[Republican/Democratic] Representative Robert Murphy wants to address the problems
of student loan debt and soaring costs that have inflated tuition rates. “Current policy
changes won't slow the rising cost of college and won't lower total debt owed and
payments to a manageable level,” Mr. Murphy said.
As a policy issue, student loan reform is an area where there is some bipartisan agreement
that something needs to be done, but disagreement over how to fix the issue (Madison, 2013);
there is also evidence of negative economic and social ramifications affecting the U.S. at large
due to excessive student loan debt and people’s inability to make payments (Korkki, 2014).
While this issue is likely to be highly salient to a portion of the population, especially students, it
is not an issue that receives constant attention in the press, therefore, it was unlikely many
respondents would be well informed on where each party stands on the issue or the details of the
debate. This made it more likely that participants did not already have strongly held beliefs
about the causes of the student loan crisis or what should be done and, therefore, may be more
susceptible to messaging. Additionally, the issue can be conceived of as the result of poor
student loan policy and thus blamed on the policies supported by either political party;
alternatively, the student loan debt problem can be conceived of as the result of high tuition rates
and blamed on universities’ policies.
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Measures
The dependent variable, strength of partisan identity was operationalized in two parts:
through a measure of party identity strength and a measure of group attachment. Party
reputation was opertationalized through a valence and informative component. Table 3.3
provides summary statistics of all dependent variable measures.
Partisan Identity Strength. After indicating party affiliation, participants answering
Republican or Democrat were asked to place themselves on a 7-point scale ranging from “Strong
Democrat” to “Strong Republican.” Participants answering “Independent” were asked to
indicate towards which party they generally leaned, Republican, Democratic or neither, as
leaners often have strong affective ties to one party (Miller & Conover, 2015; Petrocik, 2009).
Following Petrocik (1974), the scale was then folded to ignore partisan direction, creating a 5point scale from 0 to 4 measuring strength of affiliation (no preference, weak, leaner, moderate,
strong). Leaners were placed following weak partisans because for many variables related to
partisanship leaners indicate stronger preferences than weak partisans (Petrocik, 1974).
Group attachment was measured by 10 items on a 5-point Likert-like scale (does not
describe my feelings to clearly describes my feelings) adapted from Mael and Tetrick’s (1992)
Identification with a Psychological Group Scale (IDPS), found to be a robust and reliable
measure (Greene, 1999; Mael & Ashforth, 1992; Mael & Tetrick, 1992), with “Democrat(s)” or
“Republican(s)” substituted as the referent group:
•

When someone criticizes my political party, it feels like a personal insult.

•

I don’t act like the typical member of my political party.

•

I’m very interested in what others think about my political party.

•

The limitations associated with my political party apply to me also.
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•

When I talk about my political party I usually say “we” rather than “they.”

•

I have a number of qualities typical of members of my political party.

•

My political party’s successes are my successes.

•

If a story in the media criticized my political party, I would feel embarrassed.

•

When someone praises my political party, it feels like a personal compliment.

•

I act like a member of my political party to a great extent.

A test of Cronbach’s alpha produced a reliability coefficient of α=0.8846 indicating a strong
relationship between the concept measured by each question. Questions were averaged to create
a single indicator for strength of group identity. Party identity strength and group identity
strength were moderately correlated (r=0.484), indicating that the two scales measure related but
not identical constructs (Singleton & Straits, 2010).
Party Reputation. The valence component of party reputation was measured with a
feeling thermometer question similar to that used on the ANES survey, “On a scale from 0 to 10,
please indicate how you feel about the [Republican/Democratic] party, with 10 meaning a very
warm, favorable feeling, 0 meaning a very cold, unfavorable feeling, and 5 meaning not
particularly warm or cold” for each party. For the informative component, participants were
asked, “Please indicate the degree to which the statement below represents what you believe.
[Republicans/Democrats] would do a better job dealing with student loan reform.” Participants
answered on 5-point semantic differential scales, disagree/agree and false/true. This format was
adapted from the Generalized Belief Measure developed by McCroskey and Richmond (1996;
McCroskey & Teven, 1999) to measure perceptions of believability and to capture attitude
certainty. These two questions produced very strong correlations for each party (r>0.88) and
were averaged to create one job competence score.
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Student Loans. To control for any response bias associated with knowledge of the
student loan reform debate or personal experience with student loans, participants were asked:
“how familiar are you with proposals for student loan debt reform?”; “how concerned are you
about the issue of student loan debt reform?”; “how important an issue is student loan debt
reform?”; and “as a student, do you expect to have student loan debt upon graduation?”
Results
One purpose of this study was to determine how differing the blame target influenced
people’s strength of partisan identity, therefore, true independents (N=28), as sorted through the
party identity questions were excluded from the analysis of partisan identity strength. Table 3.4
displays how participants self-labeled on the party identity strength scale.
Hypothesis one predicted that those who received a negative message targeting an
opposing party would exhibit stronger partisan identity than those who did not receive a negative
message targeting an opposing party. Using three dichotomous variables (targeting the opposing
party, targeting universities, and no target), Table 3.5 displays the mean party identity strength
and mean group identity strength for each condition. Contrary to expectations, people who read
a no blame message indicated the highest levels of partisan identity strength for both measures.
Table 3.6 reports the results of OLS regression analysis using the first measure of
strength of partisan identity, the folded scale created from the party affiliation strength question,
and the three dummy variables. Model 1 reports the results with the no blame group as the
excluded condition. Blaming an opposing party decreased party identity strength by 0.269 units
(p<0.05, two-tailed) compared to those who received a no blame message. These results do not
support hypothesis one and suggest the opposite relationship – attacking the opposing party may
result in weaker party identification strength. Participants also indicated lower party identity
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strength in the blame opposing party conditions compared to the blame universities condition (b=
-0.223, p<0.10), but results were not significant at the 95% confidence level (Model 2).
However, these results may indicate a trend that was not adequately captured with this sample,
that compared to other types of blame messages, people react negatively when the political
parties attack each other. No significant difference was detected between the blame universities
and no blame groups.
Using the IDPS scale as the dependent variable (Table 3.7), no results were significant at
the 95% confidence level for any condition and Hypothesis 1 was not supported. However, as
with the results for party identity strength, the differences between the blame opposing party and
no blame conditions (b=-0.180, p<0.10, two-tailed) may indicate a negative trend in reactions to
the political parties attacking each other. The results for the two measures of partisan identity
are contrary to expectations and may be indicative of participants’ aversion to the partisan
behavior displayed in the negative message as suggested in some research (e.g. Morris &
Witting, 2001; Harbridge & Malhotra, 2011).
Hypotheses two and three predicted that people who receive a blame message targeting
an opposing party would exhibit greater estimation for the aligned party’s reputation and lower
estimation for the opposing party’s reputation than those who receive a message that does not
target an opposing party. Using the dummy variables, blame opposing party, blame universities,
and no blame, Tables 3.8 and 3.9 display the mean affect and party competence for each party by
treatment group and participant party alignment. Not surprisingly, mean scores indicate that
participants consistently rated their aligned party higher than the opposing party regardless of
message exposure. Interestingly, Democratic participants rated their own party lower on each
dimension of party reputation for the blame opposing party condition compared to the blame
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universities and no blame conditions, while Republican participants rated their party lower for
affect, but higher for party competence.
To test whether these rating differences were significant, OLS regression coefficients
were estimated by participant party affiliation. Tables 3.10 and 3.11 display the results for affect
for the Democratic and Republican Parties, respectively (H2). Models 1 and 2 displayed in
Table 3.10 indicate that participants aligned with the Democratic Party in the blame opposing
party condition felt significantly less affect for the Democrats compared to those in the no blame
(b= -1.290, p<0.01, two-tailed) and blame universities (b= -0.869, p<0.05, two-tailed)
conditions. No significant differences between conditions were found for Republican aligned
participants affect for the Democratic Party (Models 3 and 4). As reported in Table 3.11,
treatment conditions had no significant effect on affect for the Republican Party for participants
aligned with either party. These results do not support hypothesis two, but for participants
aligned with the Democratic Party they do reinforce the surprising results for party identification.
It appears that messages attacking an opposing party may diminish base support for the
Democratic Party.
Tables 3.12 and 3.13 display the results for the impact of differing targets of blame on
Democratic and Republican Party competence, respectively (H3). Models 1 and 2 in Table 3.12
indicate that participants aligned with the Democratic Party in the blame opposing party
condition rated the Democratic Party significantly lower on job competence compared to those in
the no blame (b= -0.375, p<0.05, two-tailed) and blame universities (b= -0.360, p<0.05, twotailed) conditions. These results align with those found for affect, indicating that blaming the
opposing party may be detrimental to the Democratic Party. No significant differences between
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conditions were found for Republican aligned participants’ ratings of Democratic Party
competence (Models 3 and 4).
As reported in Table 3.13, no significant differences between treatment conditions were
found for Republican Party competence for participants aligned with either party. The
comparison between the blame opposing party and no blame conditions is worth noting. Results
for both Democratic (b=0.283, p<0.10, two-tailed) and Republican (b=0.307, p<0.10, two-tailed)
participants (Models 5 and 7) suggest that the blame opposing party condition may have
enhanced rather than diminished perception of party competence for the Republican Party.
While these results are not conclusive, it is interesting that the treatment conditions appeared to
have opposite effects on each party.
The results for party competence do not support Hypothesis three, but are, nevertheless,
noteworthy because they indicate that as a strategic tool, blaming the opposing party may
backfire for the Democratic Party yet may help the Republican Party, even with Democratic
partisans. In further analysis using all participants, those exposed to the blame opposing party
treatment rated the Republican Party significantly better on party competence than those exposed
to the no blame condition (b=0.315, p<0.01, two-tailed). Results comparing the blame
universities condition trended in the same direction (b=0.198, p<0.10, two-tailed). It appears
that messages blaming the opposing party helped the Republican Party with participants
regardless of party affiliation.
Discussion
This research tested whether differing targets of blame in negative political messages will
lead to variations in participants’ strength of partisan identity and estimation of party reputation.
As suggested by social identity theory, creating conflict through rhetoric such as blame messages
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should strengthen social identity and negatively impact perceptions of the outgroup.
Specifically, this research hypothesized that a message blaming an opposing party, as compared
to a no blame message or one blaming a non-political group will strengthen partisan identity and
enhance party reputation for the in-group, while damaging party reputation for the out-group.
Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes’ (2012) provide evidence in part supporting this supposition using
data from the 2004 Blair Center Election Study. They found that people in battleground states
where negative attack advertising was heavier reported higher levels of affective partisanship
compared to those in non-battleground states.
The results for the experiment reported here do not support that blame messages enhance
partisan identity or party reputation, especially for the Democratic Party. Contradicting expected
results, party identity strength, the first indicator of partisan identity, was weakest among
participants exposed to a blame message targeting an opposing party. Results for the second
measure of partisan identity strength, group attachment, also provided weak evidence that
blaming the opposing party diminished partisan identity. Further, both measures of party
reputation, affect and job competence, were significantly diminished for the Democratic Party
among democratic respondents. Affect for the Republican Party was not impacted by any blame
message, but results for Republican Party competence, while weak and inconclusive, do suggest
that it was enhanced by the blame opposing party message among participants in both parties.
Taken together, these results are surprising and indicate that negative messages that promote
conflict between the parties can have unexpected and, for the most part, undesirable results in
terms of benefiting the political parties.
The mixed results for hypothesis two and three suggest that negative messages may hurt
the Democratic Party and help the Republican Party. When parsed by participant party
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affiliation, the results indicate that it was only Democrats that reacted strongly to the differing
messages. Democrats in the blame opposing party conditions reported lower affect and party
competence for their own party, but not for the Republican Party. It appears that, for the
Democratic Party, negative messages can drive away partisans. In the same condition,
Republican Party competence was weakly boosted among all participants. It seems
counterintuitive that a message would diminish party identity, while at the same time increasing
estimation as suggested by the results for the Republican Party. The answer to this puzzle may
be in differential expectations of behavior from the two political parties or behavioral differences
between partisans from each party. The effects on party identity found with this experiment also
contradict expectations from prior research (Iyengar, Sood, & Lelkes, 2012). Together, this
indicates that the impact of negative political messages may not be uniform across people and
situations, which may help explain the contradictory results reported in the negativity literature.
These results do not support the hypothesized relationships, but they may not be
counterintuitive. Some research indicates that going negative in a campaign can backfire,
resulting in diminished views of both candidates (Peterson & Djupe, 2005; Damore, 2002; Hale,
Fox, & Farmer, 1996; Kahn & Kenney, 1999; Theilmann & Wilhite, 1998), and a similar result
may have occurred here. A message intended to boost partisan identity and estimation backfired
and instead depressed it. Research suggests that citizen’s dislike of Congress is based on
Congressional behavior (Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 1995) and, in the aggregate, citizens do not
respond positively to partisan behavior such as exhibited through negative rhetoric (Morris &
Witting, 2001) or party conflict (Harbridge & Malhotra, 2011). The weaker partisan identity
strength exhibited by participants exposed to a blame message targeting an opposing party may
be another indicator of an already recognized trend in American politics.
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While these results are not generalizable to the U.S. population, they raise the possibility
that the rising share of the electorate that claims no party affiliation may be, in part, a reaction to
the increasingly negative tone of political discourse. That those who received a no blame
message exhibited the highest levels of party identity strength and no discernible difference was
found compared to those who received a blame universities message may indicate it is
specifically negative messages attacking the opposing party that respondents found most
objectionable, not negative messages generally. This is supported by research studying the
positive effects of negativity (e.g. Geer, 2006).
Limitations
There are three major limitations associated with this study. The first is the use of a
student sample. While the results found are interesting and counterintuitive, a student sample
limits the implications that can be drawn from these results about the general population.
However, the purpose of this study was to test that the theoretical relationship hypothesized
exists and student samples are more than adequate to this task as surface realism is not critical to
this assessment (Shapiro, 2002; Mook, 1983). That the results were the opposite of what was
expected indicates that further study with a representative sample is warranted in order to draw
conclusions about the generalizability of the findings.
The second major limitation is that the treatment consisted of only one exposure to a
single blame message. In reality, people who follow current events are likely to be exposed to
multiple negative messages from differing viewpoints, so results from one specific example of a
negative message does not allow for generalizations across message types. That one relatively
civil blame message produced some significant, but surprising, results suggests that negative
messages may have an impact on perceptions of and attachment to the political parties, but
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studies varying the type and number of negative messages and the policy issue highlighted are
needed to draw more definitive conclusions.
The third major limitation was that the data for this experiment was collected during the
Fall of 2016, an especially politically contentious time. The 2016 Presidential election appeared
unusual for its level of personal incivility between the candidates and lack of focus on
substantive policy issues. It may be that even among this student sample, partisan identity and
perceptions of the political parties were already impacted to a degree that exposure to the
stimulus had limited impact. Additionally, Bernie Sanders campaigned in part on free college
tuition (see BernieSanders.com), a policy proposal unlikely to succeed, but one that may have
resonated with the sample used for this research. It is possible that the uneven response between
party affiliations is due in part to electoral disappointment among democratic respondents.
Conclusion
This study supports and extends previous research demonstrating that negative messages
impact information processing and attitude formation (see Soroka, 2006; Meffert et al., 2006;
Smith & Petty, 1996; Lau, 1982) by examining the differential effects of strategically placed
blame on partisan identity and party reputation. Overall, the results of this research do not
support the relationship between negative rhetoric and partisan support as predicted by social
identity theory: that creating conflict between oppositional groups through political rhetoric will
boost social identity and dampen goodwill toward the outgroup. The results tell the opposite
tale, that focusing on conflict can backfire and promote negative attitudes toward the in-group.
If anything, these results suggest that the political parties are better off not attacking each
through political messaging. An explanation for these results may be found in the literature
studying the role of emotions in intergroup relations. Research indicates that when group
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members feel shame in response to in-group actions group identity will be negatively affected
(Kuppens &Yzerbyt, 2014; Iyer & Leech, 2008; Smith, Seger & Mackie, 2007). It may be that
some participants were repulsed by attack messages from their own party. Further research
exploring the emotions elicited by negative rhetoric will likely shed light on its impact on
partisan support.
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CHAPTER 4

YOU’VE GOT TO ACCENTUATE THE NEGATIVE:
MEDIATIZATION, GROUP CONFLICT,
AND BUILDING POLICY SUPPORT
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Introduction
Negative discourse in politics is often blamed on the media’s focus on conflict and
drama. “If it bleeds, it leads,” goes the maxim that betrays the priority of shock and awe in news
media coverage driven by commercialization. While, the news generally covers activities
considered undesirable (i.e. crime, corruption, vice; Gans, 1979), it is shaped to attract audiences,
and the focus on controversial events maintains and intensifies conflict between groups creating
a “political spectacle” for the entertainment of the observer (Edelman, 1988). Indeed, news is
triggered by adverse events and tends to emphasize “conflict, dissension and battle” over “civil
harmony” (Schudson, 2011, p. 44). The explosion of communications experts employed in
politics indicates that government officials know of and exploit this media logic (Landerer,
2013). The focus on discord reduces complex problems to a “morality tale of battle” between
hero and villain (p. 42), thus implicitly expressing which behaviors are desirable, who is to
blame and reinforcing accepted social values (Gans, 1979). As such, to understand the media’s
tendency to cover conflict over harmony as merely contributing to the increasingly negative tone
of politics simplifies the impact the media has on politics and society.
Politics is by nature riddled with conflict, and the struggle between groups over “who
gets what, when and how” (Lasswell, 1936) naturally lends itself to hyperbole and “us versus
them” narratives. Through this conflict rhetoric government officials can highlight group
differences, connect undesirable behaviors to out-groups and link unwelcome social changes to
them. The most obvious forms of conflict rhetoric are negative attacks such as those found in
campaign advertising and blame messages such as those found in policy debate. Recent research
has tracked increasing campaign negativity over time (Geer, 2012; Fowler & Ridout, 2012;
Franklin-Fowler & Ridout, 2016) and this trend is intimated in studies outside the campaign
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context (Grimmer, 2013; Lee, 2016). Not surprisingly, most prior research on negativity focuses
on the behavioral effects of political advertising (e.g. Fridkin & Kenney, 2004; Ansolabehere &
Iyengar, 1995; Geer, 2006; Druckman, Peterson, & Slothuus, 2013) and the negative emphasis in
news coverage (e.g. Dunaway, 2012). Beyond implications for policy debate (e.g. Grimmer,
2013), however, little research has addressed the impact negativity and other types of conflict
rhetoric have on the public policy process. The first section of this article presents a framework
within which to understand the media’s impact on political discourse and how this impact can be
traced throughout the policy process. The second section reports the results of an original
experiment testing the impact of conflict rhetoric on message and policy support, and the final
section discusses the implications of the findings.
Mediatization, Social Construction and Public Policy
Most research studying the relationship between the media and public policy has focused
on the media’s ability to shape what issues the public thinks about (public agenda setting; e.g.
Iyengar & Kinder, 2010) and how they think about these issues (framing/influence; e.g. Nelson,
Clawson, & Oxley, 1997), as well as what issues politicians debate (political agenda setting; e.g.
Van Aelst, Thesen, Walgrave, & Vliegenthart, 2014) and political actors’ ability to shape what
the media report (indexing; e.g. Gershon, 2012). But, such effects reduce the media’s influence
to a direct one-way interaction that fails to capture its full impact on society. Recent research
suggests that the media’s impact on public policy is a more pervasive, and perhaps insidious,
influence through societal-level adjustments to the media’s continuing evolution and governance
over how we communicate.
Mediatization theory focuses on how society is increasingly “mediatized,” meaning that
“communication refers to media and uses media so that media in the long run increasingly
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become relevant for the social construction of everyday life, society and culture as a whole”
(Krotz, 2009, as quoted in Adolf, 2011, p. 156). New media and its modes of use have altered
the pattern of interaction between the media, the public and political actors (Armoudian &
Crigler, 2010) from a primarily one-way passive reception to a more interactive exchange. As
this evolution has impacted patterns of communicative behavior and the way we construct
reality, the influence of traditional media has diminished. When mediatization occurs, media
logic, or the “media-specific rules of selecting, interpreting, and constructing political news
messages,” has institutionalized beyond the traditional media realm to define appropriate rules of
behavior (Esser, 2013, p. 159).
The mediatization of politics is evident in the rising frequency of political actors
communicating in terms amenable to media logic, such as in negative campaign advertising
(Fowler & Ridout, 2012), vitriolic policy debate (Grimmer, 2013), and generally combative and
uncivil political rhetoric (Galston, 2013). The media prioritizes the contest between groups by
focusing on conflict, negativity and drama (Gans, 1979), and political actors can increase the
likelihood of receiving media attention by adapting their language to this negative form of
communication. Full mediatization occurs only when political actors have gone beyond
acceptance of and adaptation to media logic to the total adoption of media logic in
communicative behavior (Strömbäck, 2008), meaning that politicians intuitively adhere to media
logic in their communication strategy and efforts. This self-mediatization, or internalization of
the standards of newsworthiness, has led to more negative, conflict-driven news coverage (Esser,
2013), but it has also led to the dominance of conflict rhetoric in unmediated forms of political
communication.
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Perhaps the best example of this is President Trump’s frequent use of Twitter to attack
and insult his opponents and cast blame for a variety of failures and problems (Ott, 2017). Ott
(2017) argues that it is the brief and impulsive nature of social media interactions, particularly
Twitter, that is driving the decline in civility in public discourse. The brevity and anonymity of
much social media interaction is especially suited for harsh criticism and vitriolic attacks
(Tucker, Theocharis, Roberts & Barberá, 2017), as is indicated with incidents of online trolling
and cyberbullying. But, mediatization theory helps explain why people tend to employ negative
discourse to begin with: we have been conditioned to believe negativity will garner greater
media attention. Indeed, Trump’s ability to use Twitter to drive traditional news coverage of
himself (Wells, et al., 2016) indicates that he knows what sells. The rising importance of the
internet and social media as a source of news (Shearer & Gottfried, 2017; Gottfried & Shearer,
2017) has diminished the influence and power of traditional media as gatekeepers and agenda
setters. As Ott (2017) points out, the traditional news media increasingly are turning to Twitter
and its negativity as the impetus for news coverage (see also Parmalee, 2013). The media has
long created a political spectacle to attract the audience (Edelman, 1988), but with the media
evolution, Trump and other political actors now have more power to create the spectacle that
captivates audiences, the media, and the public, alike. That this might be the tail wagging the
dog exemplifies the pervasiveness of media logic.
In a prescient and somewhat alarming article, Patterson (1996) argues that news coverage
which includes journalists’ interpretation of politicians’ motives and actions looks like watchdog
journalism, but is not. Rather, this interpretive journalism is ideological in its premise and
cynically assumes politicians act solely out of self-interest instead of political conviction. As
such, "conflict, always an element of political coverage, became the predominant theme" (p.
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103), which has robbed political leaders of the public confidence to govern effectively and has
forced politicians to interact in a specific way. A conclusion to be drawn from this observation is
that the media’s tendency to assume the role of cynical critic encourages in politicians the notion
that negativity and blame are necessary and effective tools to gain attention and support.
Therefore, their use of conflict rhetoric in social media and other direct, unmediated
communication is logical. For politicians, President Trump’s skill at using Twitter for audience
manipulation may be an outlier, but it also may be a harbinger of elite communication strategy.
Reliance on conflict rhetoric to rally support even through unmediated forms of political
communication indicates that negativity, blame and conflict are increasingly accepted as the
norm for political discourse and may even be second nature for some political actors, as
predicted by mediatization theory (Strömbäck, 2008). With mediatization, media logic is
integral, consciously or not, to the policy-making process (Strömbäck, 2008), and the impact of
the increasing vitriol on public policy is a legitimate cause for concern (Grimmer, 2013). As
predicted by social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), conflict rhetoric can create
awareness of group differences, injecting an “us versus them” attitude into group interactions
that increases negative affect for outgroups. By focusing on conflict rather than common
ground, politicians can manipulate anger and anxiety between groups in the electorate and incite
behavior where winning overtakes thoughtful deliberation and participation (Miller & Conover,
2015; Mason, 2015). When groups hold antagonistic and negative views of others, policy
becomes a means to ensure continued dominance by the powerful, rather than an effort to work
toward the common good (Schneider & Ingram, 1997). In the struggle to maintain status, people
are less likely to sympathize with or listen to opposing viewpoints (Hart & Nisbett, 2012) and
cooperation and compromise between groups is unlikely. Conflict rhetoric can heighten this
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sense of zero-sum competition where conceding to others means a loss to the in-group. After all,
it is far easier to rally support against a common enemy than to convince people that everyone
will benefit from addressing the underlying social and institutional mechanisms that inhibit the
success of the less powerful. In this light, Patterson’s (1996) argument that interpretive news
coverage portraying political actors as purely self-interested is less a lament about the nature of
the news than a prediction of where conflict rhetoric will lead.
As a tool to control the narrative around a policy issue, rhetoric is “where political
meanings are negotiated” (Beasley, 2001, p. 24), including negatively constructing a target group
for blame. By using rhetoric to create negative group images, officials appeal to group identities,
link unwanted behaviors to targeted out-groups, and identify which groups will be rewarded and
punished through public policy (Ingram & Schneider, 2005). Problem definition is where
rhetoric most obviously impacts public policy because, as Schattschneider (1960) observed, “the
definition of alternatives is the supreme instrument of power” (p. 68). Through rhetoric, policy
actors orient and limit attention by identifying a cause and constraining solutions (Rochefort &
Cobb, 1994; Best, 1989). In other words, problem definition is how policy actors construct
social problems to limit consideration to preferred alternatives; and, part of problem definition is
the identification of a group to associate with the problem as justification for policy
prescriptions.
Public policy is a means for the government to influence or control the behavior of
individuals, groups and entities to reach desired outcomes. Policy problems are often identified
to fit already available solutions (Baumgartner & Jones, 2015), and to increase the likelihood of
success for preferred policies, lawmakers must develop a rationale for their policy designs
(Sidney, 2005). Rhetoric can be used to create political opportunity and avoid risk by
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manipulating citizens’ perceptions of different social groups (Schneider & Ingram, 1997). With
the language of conflict, political leaders can “link problems and solutions in ways that tap into
people’s preexisting notions of who is to blame for a social crisis” (Newton, 2005, p. 142).
Issues often involve groups already deemed problematic (Newton, 2005; Stone, 1989) and blame
messages are specifically designed to create negative affect between groups over perceived or
threatened loss of status, increasing the likelihood that aggrieved groups will rally against these
possible negative repercussions and demand policy change. Through targeting groups to blame,
politicians create credit-taking opportunities to prescribe preferred solutions for social ills and to
act against those “causing” the problem.
Such rhetoric reinforces negative perceptions and stereotypes, often leading to policies
that exacerbate (perhaps intentionally) the inequities they are meant to alleviate (Sidel, 2000).
Blaming is a common rhetorical strategy constructed specifically to persuade a targeted audience
rather than to call out the blamed (Hlavacik, 2016; Burke, 1969). The blamed are merely a prop
serving the message sender’s intention to stoke anger and anxiety about a social problem.
Strategically, this rhetoric is meant to reassure the target audience that someone is attentive to
their plight by identifying for the afflicted toward whom they should direct their anger and
anxiety. Because these storylines diminish the power of factual knowledge in favor of groupbased beliefs and emotions (Fischer, 2003), politicians can reinforce the unfavorable perceptions
and stereotypes underlying negatively constructed groups and limit the types of policies applied
to them.
An example of this is the focus on illegal and legal immigrants as a driver of falling
wages and employment among working class citizens. This argument plays on the fears of the
unknown to present a simple solution that is easily conveyed to the public: keeping immigrants
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out will save your jobs. This ignores the confluence of factors such as globalization, monopoly
power, advancing technologies, stagnant wages, and dying industries that have led to these
problems and limits the search for policy solutions to those that will remove or keep out
immigrants. Such arguments use broad rhetorical strokes to reduce complex social problems to
“us versus them” dynamics and are specifically designed to create fear and anger between groups
rather than to promote fact-based discussion, reasoning, and compromise. As the aggrieved
groups rally in support of these messages and demand policy action, it becomes easier to justify
coercive or punitive policies against the targeted groups.
How a problem is understood can identify the locus of blame, establish parameters for
possible solutions and implementation, dictate which groups are involved in the policy process
(Rochefort & Cobb, 1994), and define success (Marsh & McConnell, 2010). Social
constructions are not static, however, and it follows that a change in problem definition or
understanding can shift the social constructions attached to the problem, leading to a change in
key policy actors and policy preferences (Baumgartner & Jones, 2015). Thus, problem
definition and redefinition is a central struggle in public policy, as any change can alter the
power dynamic. By controlling problem definition, policy actors can control the trajectory of the
policy process and increase the likelihood of success for preferred alternatives.
Whether a group will be targeted for reward or punishment is most likely due to the
valence of their social construction (Stone, 1989) and the specific policy tools chosen are often
tied to behavioral assumptions about the target group (Schneider & Ingram, 1990). Negatively
constructed, or undeserving, groups are more likely to be the target of coercive, controlling and
punitive policy than positively constructed deserving groups (Ingram & Schneider, 2005).
Therefore, if political actors are increasingly using conflict rhetoric to target groups for blame,
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more groups will be negatively constructed, and the enactment of coercive, controlling, or
punitive policies as a way of dealing with the “problem” group is more likely.
Using blame rhetoric to control the policy narrative is an attempt by policy actors to
persuade the audience that the message conveyed about the target group is one that should be
believed and supported. Fischer (2003) argues that rhetoric can be used by political elites to
alleviate concerns and reduce demand for policy responses. If rhetoric can serve to alleviate
concerns and reduce policy demand then it should also can create concerns and increase demand
for action. Blaming, specifically, can be viewed as a call to action (Hlavacik, 2016; Warner,
2005) seeking to persuade a specific audience as to the cause of the problem (blame target) and
appropriate measures to deal with it (Hlavacik, 2016), thus raising support for proposed policies.
One caveat of message persuasion, however, is that it is dependent on the audience
believing the content of the message because the persuasive power of a message is related to its
credibility (Eisend, 2010; Wilson & Sherrell, 1993). Therefore, based in truth or not, a message
perceived as credible is more likely to persuade and enhance support among message recipients
than one perceived as non-credible. Negativity in political messages, such as through blaming,
may enhance the credibility of the message. Research indicates that negative messages are
viewed as more informative and truthful than positive messages (Hilbig, 2009, 2012; Fessler,
Pisor & Navarete, 2014), possibly because fear response and risk aversion impulses lead people
to focus more on negative than positive information (Lau, 1985). Termed negativity bias, this
instinct causes people to spend more time and effort evaluating negative information (Allen &
Burrell, 2002; Kanouse & Hanson, 1972; Lau, 1985) and greater evaluative processing efforts
can increase message persuasion (Hilbig, 2012; Petty & Brinol, 2008; Tormala, Brinol, & Petty,
2007).
62

Further, people do not always remember the source of a message over long periods of
time (Wathen & Burkell, 2002; Self, 1996; Hovland, Lumsdaine, & Sheffield, 1949; Hovland,
Janis, & Kelley, 1953), but message source greatly affects message credibility and
persuasiveness. Perceived commonalities with the message source (i.e. party affiliation) enhance
message credibility (Groeling & Baum, 2008; Calvert, 1985; Crawford & Sobel, 1982; Kydd,
2003), as do message source “matches” with receiver attitudes (Wathen & Burkell, 2002, p.
136), indicating that partisan sources that reinforce a viewer’s attitudes will be more credible to
that viewer than those that contradict attitudes. Lipsitz and Geer (2017) demonstrate that
perceptions of negativity and fairness in campaign advertising differ substantially by the subject
of the message and political affiliation. Co-partisans consistently rated ads supporting their
party’s candidate as less negative and fairer than those supporting the opposition. The authors
argue that perceptions of truthfulness and fairness should be included in research examining the
impact of negative messaging.
Although this discussion primarily focused on the use of blame to target different groups
in society, much blame in policy debate involves pointing the finger at the opposing party. This
may be a sensible political strategy since voters are more likely to punish politicians for failure
than reward them for success (Hood, 2010; Borraz, 2007; James & John, 2007). But, blame as a
political strategy is not limited to the opposing party. As suggested by the preceding discussion,
politicians often target non-political groups for blame to appeal to group identities and rally
support for policy initiatives. Research has yet to explore the disparate impact of politicians
purposively blaming opposing parties compared to a non-political group, but it is logical that
differing targets of blame would have differential impacts on levels of message and policy
support. However, as suggested by the literature, people’s perception of message credibility
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should mediate the impact of the message on political support. This research seeks to answer
whether, strategically, politicians are better off blaming a non-political group, an opposing party
or avoiding a blame message when trying to raise political support. Hypotheses one through four
test this relationship:
H1: Variations in blame target will lead to variations in level of message support.
H2: Variations in blame target will lead to variations in level of policy support.
H3: Variations in blame target will lead to variations in perception of message
credibility.
H4: Perception of message credibility will mediate the effect of the blame message on
message and policy support.
Methodology
To test the impact of differing targets of blame on message and policy support, I
conducted an online survey experiment using a diverse sample of the U.S. population. Using a
between-subjects 3 x 2 experimental design, participants were randomly assigned to one of six
treatment conditions. Each condition consisted of a negative message about the student loan
debt crisis. Despite experiments being low in external validity compared to other methods, they
are commonly used in research to test the impact of message variation (i.e. framing effects; e.g.
Lecheler, Bos, & Vliegenthart, 2015; Nelson, Clawson & Oxley 1997; Smith & Petty, 1996)
because experiments “provide the most rigorous way to establish causal relationships between
independent and dependent variables” (Thorson, Wicks & Leshner 2012, p. 112). Controlling
for confounding variables through randomization allows researchers to attribute any response
differences to the experimental manipulation rather than the personal characteristics of
respondents, strengthening support for the theoretical underpinnings of significant results.
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Sample
Participants were recruited through Qualtrics Panels online survey services. A major
criticism of online panels is validity concerns about their use of non-probability samples,
especially mismatches between the target population and the sampling frame (Couper, 2000);
but, many argue that the chronically low response rates typical of probability sampling via mail
or phone raise the same concerns (Brick, 2011). Research indicates that opt-in internet samples
are relatively diverse with respect to age, gender, socioeconomic status, and geographic region
when compared to samples collected with traditional probability sampling (Gosling, Vazire,
Srivastave, & John, 2004) and Qualtrics panels have compared well (Heen, Lieberman &
Miethe, 2014). Qualtrics employs an invitation-only recruitment strategy that results in a crosssection more generalizable to the public (Hagtvedt, 2011).
The sample (N=1023) was sixty-four percent white, fifty-one percent female and the
average age of participants was 44 (M=43.6, SD=2.64, range 18-85). Thirty-four percent
identified as Republican or republican leaning, and sixty percent identified as conservative.
Fourty-three percent of participants expected to have student loan debt upon graduation.
Detailed respondent characteristics are provided in Table 4.14.
Procedure
All participants answered pretest questions consisting of control variables regarding
student loans. Next, participants were exposed to the stimulus condition, a news article excerpt
about the student loan debt crisis. Last, participants answered posttest questions regarding
message and policy support.

4

Table 4.1 and all subsequent tables can be found in Appendix A.
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Manipulation
The experimental manipulation was a negative message varying the attribution of blame
for the student loan debt crisis (Republican or Democratic Party, universities, and no target of
blame) and the political party affiliation of the message sender (Republican or Democratic
Party). A message received from a Republican politician either targeted the Democratic Party,
targeted universities or contained no target. Likewise, a message received from a Democratic
politician either targeted the Republican Party, targeted universities or contained no target.
Table 3.2 displays the experimental design. A manipulation test run prior to the full experiment
indicated the treatment conditions were successful in alerting participants to the political party
affiliation of the message sender and the target of blame. Messages that included a target of
blame were worded as follows:
The Federal Reserve released on Wednesday the latest statistics about student
loan debt. Over two-thirds of college graduates leave school with some student loan debt.
In total, student loan debt has topped $1.7 trillion and measures more than 6% of overall
national debt. More than 11% of student loan borrowers are behind on their payments or
in default.
In a series of tweets yesterday, [Democratic/Republican] Representative Brad
Young blamed [Republicans/Democrats/Universities] for not doing enough to address the
problems of crippling student loan debt and soaring costs that have inflated tuition rates:
Student loan debt is out of control and harming our economy because
[Republicans/Democrats/Universities] have pushed disastrous policies that do
nothing to lower tuition rates or the debt students are forced to take on.
Self-seeking [Republicans/Democrats/Universities] say they care about
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inequality, but they keep backing ineffective policies that just make college more
expensive.
If we keep listening to [Republicans’/Democrats’//Universities’] dishonest claims,
the student loan debt crisis will only get worse and soon higher education will be
out of reach for most people.
--Representative Brad Young (@BradYoung) February 10, 2018
Messages with no target of blame were worded:
The Federal Reserve released on Wednesday the latest statistics about student
loan debt. Over two-thirds of college graduates leave school with some student loan debt.
In total, student loan debt has topped $1.7 trillion and measures more than 6% of overall
national debt. More than 11% of student loan borrowers are behind on their payments or
in default.
In a series of tweets yesterday, [Democratic/Republican] Representative Brad
Young commented on the effort to address the student loan debt crisis:
Student loan debt is out of control and is harming our economy.
Current policies do nothing to lower tuition rates or the debt students are forced
to take on.
We need to work together to put policies in place that fix the problem.
--Representative Brad Young (@BradYoung) February 10, 2018
As a policy issue, the student loan debt crisis is an area where there is some bipartisan
agreement that something needs to be done, but disagreement over how to fix the issue
(Madison, 2013); there is also evidence of negative economic and social ramifications affecting
the U.S. at large due to excessive student loan debt and people’s inability to make payments
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(Korkki, 2014). While this issue is likely to be highly salient to a portion of the population, it is
not an issue that receives constant attention in the press, therefore, it was unlikely many
respondents would be well informed on where each party stands on the issue or the details of the
debate. This made it more likely that participants did not already have strongly held beliefs
about the causes of the student loan crisis or what should be done and, therefore, may be more
susceptible to messaging. Additionally, the issue can be conceived of as the result of poor
student loan policy and thus blamed on the policies supported by either political party;
alternatively, the student loan debt problem can be conceived of as the result of high tuition rates
and blamed on universities’ policies.
Measures
The dependent variables measured in this study were message and policy support. Both
variables were operationalized in multiple parts and each subsequent dimension was treated as a
unique dependent variable. Message support was operationalized as people’s agreement with the
message, their perception of issue importance, and their agreement with the negative
characterizations in the message. Policy support was operationalized as demand for policy
action and support for policy initiatives. Table 4.2 provides summary statistics of all dependent
variable measures.
Message Support. For message agreement and issue importance, participants were asked,
“To what extent do you agree or disagree with Representative Young’s tweets about the student
loan debt crisis?” and “There are many important problems facing our country today. In your
opinion, how important or unimportant a problem is the student loan debt crisis?” Respondents
answered on 5-point scales ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree and not at all
important to extremely important, respectively. To measure agreement with the negative
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characterizations, participants were asked to rate on a 5-point scale (strongly disagree to strongly
agree) their agreement with positive and negative descriptions about universities (Thibodeau,
Perko & Flusberg, 2015; Public Agenda; “Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with
the following statements about universities/colleges”):
•

Colleges today are mostly interested in making sure students have a good educational
experience.

•

Colleges today are like most businesses and mainly care about the bottom line.

•

Overall, universities have a positive effect on the way things are going in this country.

•

Universities don’t care about making college affordable for people.

These items were not sufficiently correlated to justify combining them into one scale variable.
The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy was 0.55, considered very poor
(Beavers, et al., 2013), and reliability was low (a = 0.63). As such, each item was tested
separately.
Policy Support. Demand for policy action was measured through a proxy question
regularly used on the General Social Survey (GSS) to measure public perception of whether the
government is spending enough on combating the issue, “We are faced with many problems in
this country, none of which can be solved easily or inexpensively. Please indicate whether you
think we're spending too much money on it, too little money, or about the right amount of money
on dealing with the student loan debt crisis.” Following Barry, Brescoll, Brownell, &
Schlesinger’s (2009) test of obesity metaphors on policy support, participants were asked to rate
on a 5-point scale (strongly oppose to strongly support) four policy initiatives aimed at the
student loan debt crisis:
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•

Allow the government to put a lien on the paychecks of people who fail to make
student loan payments.

•

Make student loans profit-free for the federal government by eliminating all interest
on federal student loans.

•

Require universities to pay back all student loan funds they accepted if their former
students prove they cannot afford the payments.

•

Allow universities to determine the amount students can borrow for student loans.

These items were also insufficiently correlated to justify combining them into one scale variable.
The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy was 0.50, considered very poor
(Beavers, et al., 2013), and reliability was very low (a = 0.30). As such, each item was tested
separately.
Message Credibility. Following Appelman and Sundar’s (2016) three-item message
credibility scale, participants were asked, “how well do the following adjectives describe
Representative Young’s tweets?” Accurate, authentic, and believable were each rated on a 5point scale (describes very poorly to describes very well). The three items were averaged to
create one message credibility score (a = 0.91).
Participant Party Alignment with Message Sender and Message Negativity. As indicated
in the literature, partisan leaning and perception of message negativity are likely to influence
whether participants find the message credible. Therefore, all models controlled for the effects
of these two variables. A dichotomous variable indicating whether the participant identified with
the message sender’s party was created to control for variations due to partisan leanings. Party
identification was determined through a two-part question like that used on the General Social
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Survey (GSS). Participants who answered independent or neither to “Generally speaking, do
you think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?” were asked “Do
you generally lean toward the Republican or Democratic Party?” Leaners were included in the
in-group category along with party identifiers because for many variables related to partisanship
leaners indicate stronger preferences than weak partisans (Petrocik, 1974). Opposition
identifiers and true independents were included in the outgroup category. Perception of message
negativity was measured on a 5-point scale with “In your opinion, how negative or positive was
Representative Young’s message?” (Lipsitz & Geer, 2017).
Student Loans and Political Knowledge. To control for any response bias associated with
knowledge of the student loan debt crisis or personal experience with student loans, participants
were asked: “How familiar or unfamiliar are you with ongoing student loan debt crisis?”; “How
much attention do you think the student loan debt crisis is receiving from lawmakers? Would
you say it is receiving the right amount of attention, it should receive more attention, it should
receive less attention, or are you unsure?”; and “Do you have now or did you have in the past
student loan debt?”
All models also included a general measure of political knowledge as a control variable
since people who more closely follow politics are more likely to be familiar with what is a
credible message associated with each party. Following Delli Carpini and Keeter (1995),
participants were asked “Which party held the majority in the U. S. House of Representatives
before the 2016 election?”; “Which job or political office is currently held by Mike Pence?”; and
“Which party would you say is more conservative?” Answers were added together to create a 4point index ranging from none correct to all correct.
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Results
It is expected that variations in the blame message will lead to variations in message and
policy support and that this relationship will be mediated by participants’ perception of message
credibility. Differences are expected between those who received a blame message targeting an
opposing party, a non-political group, and a no blame message. Three dichotomous variables for
each comparison were created to test these differences: targeting an opposing party to targeting
universities, targeting an opposing party to no target of blame, and targeting universities to no
target of blame.
Directs Effects of Blame Targets on Dimensions of Message Support
Step one assessed the impact of variations in blame target on message and policy support.
For dimensions of message support, results show that variations in blame target had substantial
impact on some, but not all measures. Participants in the blame opposing party condition
(M=3.20, SD=1.18) were significantly less likely to agree with the message than those in the
blame universities (M=3.69, SD=0.95; b=-0.305, p<0.001) and no blame conditions (M=3.86,
SD=1.03; b=-0.288, p<0.001). No significant difference in agreement was found between
participants in the blame universities and no blame condition. It is interesting to note that people
in the no blame conditions exhibited the strongest agreement with the message. Participants in
the blame universities conditions (M=3.63, SD=0.93) considered the student loan debt crisis
slightly more important than those no blame conditions (M=3.58, SD=0.95, b=0.138, p <0.05).
No significant differences were found comparing the blame opposing party conditions (M=3.56,
SD=0.97) to the other conditions for message importance.
For the last dimension of message agreement, perception of the outgroup, educational
experience (item 1) and positive effect (item 3) can be considered viewing colleges and
72

universities positively, while bottom line (item 2) and making college affordable (item 4) can be
considered viewing colleges and universities negatively. From the means displayed in Table 4.3
we can see that across all conditions people agreed more with items 2 and 4 than they did with
items 1 and 3, indicating than participants may tend to hold negative rather than positive
perceptions of colleges and universities. Additionally, participants in the no blame conditions
rated colleges and universities more favorably than participants in the blame universities and
blame opposing party conditions. Significant differences were found between the blame
universities and no blame conditions for bottom line (item 2; b=0.202, p<0.025) and making
college affordable (item 4; b=0.169, p<0.05). For these two items, people who received the
blame universities condition did view colleges and universities less favorably than those who
received the no blame condition. A significant difference was also found for bottom line (item
2) between the blame opposing party and no blame conditions (b=0.194, p<0.05). For this item,
people who received the blame opposing party message viewed colleges and universities more
negatively than those in the no blame condition.
These results provide some support for Hypothesis 1. In some instances, variations in the
blame target led to variations in the dimensions of message agreement, such that blaming
universities led to more negative perceptions of colleges and universities, and greater belief that
the issue is important. Blaming universities did not, however, increase message agreement,
while blaming the opposing party decreased agreement. Overall, blaming universities appears to
be more helpful for building message support than blaming the opposing party, although there
also appear to be some benefits to avoiding blame. These results suggest that blame messages
require a nuanced strategy for politicians to ensure desired impact.
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Direct Effects of Blame Targets on Dimensions of Policy Support
Hypotheses 2 predicted that variations in the blame message would lead to variations in
policy support. For the first measure, demand for policy action, people in the blame universities
condition (M=1.95, SD=0.88) exhibited greater demand for action than those in the blame
opposing party (M=1.88, SD=0.89) and no blame (M=1.88, SD=0.87) conditions. However, the
differences between the conditions were not significant.
Looking at support for punitive policy, policy 1 (lien on paychecks) would help the
government and harm students, policy 2 (eliminate interest on loans) would harm the
government and help students, policy 3 (universities pay back student loan funds) would harm
universities and help students, while policy 4 (university decide amount of loans for students)
would help universities and potentially harm students. Table 4.4 outlines the mean support for
each policy rated.
Overall, participants were most supportive of the policies that harmed the government
(policy 2) and universities (policy 3). Surprisingly, however, the mean response for policy 2 was
highest in the blame universities conditions and lowest in the blame opposing parties condition,
while support for policy 3 was highest in the blame opposing party conditions. Significant
differences were found between the blame opposing parties and no blame conditions for policy 1
(lien on paychecks; b= 0.216, p<0.05), policy 3 (universities pay back student loan funds; b=
0.220, p<0.025) and policy 4 (universities decide amount of loans; b= 0.211, p<0.05). No other
significant results were found.
These results show some support for Hypothesis 2. Variations in blame did effect
support for punitive policies against an outgroup, although not in expected ways. Those in the
blame opposing party conditions were supportive of punitive policies against universities (policy
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3) and students (policies 1 and 4), but not the government. This may be indicative that
participants did not believe the message that a political party should be held responsible, but still
felt someone should be blamed. However, those in the blame universities condition did support
punitive policies against the government (policy 2; b= 0.153, p=0.056) and universities (policy 3,
b= 0.166, p=0.075) more than those in the no blame conditions. Although these results are not
significant at the 95% confidence level, they trend in the expected direction, especially if policy
2 is construed as helping students.
Direct Effects of Blame Target on Message Credibility
Mean comparisons show variations in blame target did lead to variations in perception of
message credibility (H3). People in the no blame conditions (M=3.75, SD=0.86) rated message
credibility higher than those in the blame opposing party (M=3.18, SD=1.09) and blame
universities conditions (M=3.58, SD=0.84). However, significant differences were found only
between the blame opposing party and no blame conditions (b= -0139, p<0.05) and the blame
opposing party and blame universities conditions (b= -0.198, p<0.001). No significant
difference in message credibility was found between the blame universities and no blame
conditions. As indicated by the research, participant party alignment with the message sender
should impact perception of message credibility and this is indeed the case. Overall, participants
who identified with the message sender’s party consistently rated the message more credible
(M=3.76, SD=0.83) than those who did not align with the message sender’s party (M=3.30,
SD=1.02; t(1021) = -7.695, p<0.001). Figure 4.15 illustrates perception of message credibility by
condition and participant and message sender party alignment.

5

Figure 4.1 can be found in Appendix B.
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Mediation Analysis
Hypothesis 4 predicted that perception of message credibility will mediate the effect of
varying targets of blame on dimensions of message and policy support. Mediation was assessed
per treatment comparison. Table 4.5 displays results for dependent variable measures where
mediation was significant. For message agreement, results show that when comparing the
impact of the blame opposing party conditions to the blame universities (b=-0.086, p=0.03) and
no blame (b=-0.134, p=0.001) conditions, the indirect effects of the treatment through message
credibility were significant and partial mediation occurred. The variation in perception of
message credibility due to treatment conditions mediated 44% and 30% of the impact of the
variation in blame on message agreement, respectively. No other direct mediation effects were
found.
As shown in Table 4.5, however, results indicate that in some instances message
credibility acted as a suppressor variable to magnify the importance of the variation in blame on
message and policy support. A suppressor variable strengthens the relationship between the
dependent and independent variable by reducing the model error variance (Ludlow & Klein,
2014). This relationship is also termed inconsistent mediation (MacKinnon, Krull, & Lockwood,
2000). Message credibility strengthened the differential impact of the varying targets of blame
on issue importance; bottom line (perception item 2); lien on paychecks (policy 1); universities
pay back loan funds (policy 3); and universities decide amount to borrow (policy 4) when
comparing the blame opposing party to no blame conditions. Comparing the no blame to blame
universities condition, message credibility strengthened the differential impact for bottom line
(perception item 2); make college affordable (perception item 4); and eliminate interest on
student loans (policy 2). These results indicate that while credibility may not directly mediate
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the impact of variations in blame on many measures of message and policy support, it is an
important endogenous variable that should be taken in account.
Discussion
This research presented a framework within which to understand the strategic use of
negative messaging in political communication. Mediatization theory suggests that politicians
engage in negative attacks because they have learned that the media and the public pay more
attention to negative over positive messages. Additionally, as suggested by social identity and
social construction theory, attacks against different groups are politically effective because they
can heighten social group differences, increase negative affect for the attacked groups, and rally
political and policy support among in-group members. It is likely, however, that the effect of
these messages is mediated by people’s perception of message credibility.
The results of this experiment show that message credibility may not always be a direct
mediator between political rhetoric and political support, but it is an important factor that can
influence the impact of variations in negative messaging. Overall, participants found the blame
opposing party messages to be much less credible than the blame universities and no blame
messages. This reflects partisan leanings, but also, perhaps, is an indication that people perceive
negative attacks on political parties as a political ploy rather than a message to be seriously
considered. That people in the blame opposing party conditions were the least likely to agree
with the message supports this interpretation and may be a marker of the identified trend that
people don’t particularly like attack messages (Geer, 2006; Bartels, 2000; Brooks, 2000).
Further, people in the no blame conditions were the most likely to agree with the message, which
indicates that people respond more positively to messages that do not contain an attack. These
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results support Lipsitz and Geer’s (2017) assertion that it is important to consider message
credibility when studying the effects of negative messages.
The direct effects of variations in blame indicate that blaming non-political groups can be
effective at increasing negative perceptions of outgroups. Overall, participants in the blame
universities conditions exhibited the most negative perceptions of colleges and universities, and
compared to those in the no blame conditions, considered the issue more important and were
more supportive of policy punishing universities. Further analysis revealed that for three out of
four perception measures, the more negatively participants’ perceived universities and colleges,
the more likely they were to support that universities be required to repay student loan funds
(item 1: b= -0.063, p<0.05; item 2: b= 0.208, p<0.001; item 4: b=0.252, p<0.001).
Additionally, those in the blame universities condition were the most supportive of eliminating
interest on student loans, which would hurt the government, but also help students.
Surprisingly, compared to the other conditions those in the blame opposing party
conditions were significantly more supportive of all the policies except eliminating interest on
student loans. It could be that despite the lack of credibility, blaming the opposing party raised
awareness of the issue and the inclination that something should be done. Alternatively, this
could be an indication of attribution of blame, whereby participants were less likely to support a
policy they perceived as helping people that chose to take on these debts. Additionally,
compared to those in the no blame conditions, participants who received a blame opposing party
message had much more negative perceptions of universities. While overall, participants
appeared to hold negative perceptions of universities regardless of treatment group, this may be
indicative that the additional negative feelings aroused by the blame message carried over to
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influence participants’ perceptions of universities. Such carryover effects have been identified in
studies of emotional arousal (e.g. Lerner & Keltner, 2000).
Across measures of message and policy support, the results of this research were
inconsistent. Nevertheless, predicted by the research framework, the results do indicate that
conflict rhetoric can lead to more negative perceptions of attacked groups and more willingness
to support punitive policy against the groups. If politicians are using blame messages with the
intention of manipulating perceptions of the blame target to raise support for punitive policies,
these results suggest that it can be a successful strategy. These results also bode ill for the longterm political impact of much attack messaging as blaming the opposing party may harm
credibility and levels of message support.
Limitations
A major limitation of this study is the use of student loans as the policy issue. While it is
an issue that is gaining more and more attention in the media, it may not elicit reactions as strong
as some more salient and emotionally charged issues (i.e. immigration or terrorism). Further,
while the results indicate that, overall, universities are not perceived positively, they may not be
a group as readily identified as an outgroup in the same way that definable social groups are (i.e.
immigrants or Muslims). As the 2016 election made plain, Donald Trump gained more traction
denigrating immigrants and Muslims than Bernie Sanders did denigrating big banks. It is
possible that with identifying a more emotionally charged outgroup, results would have been
more pronounced. Additionally, looking at just one policy limits the generalizability of the
results to other policy areas.
It was unknown who participants felt is responsible for the student loan crisis. It is very
possible that people may view students with large amounts of student loan debt as more
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responsible than political parties or universities. Further, the treatment groups did not provide a
blame target that could be construed as personally responsible. Universities and political parties
are institutions rather than a social group that would have provided a hypothetical figure to
which individual responsibility could have been attributed (i.e. an individual that took on student
loan debt). Studies of obesity policy have shown that perceptions of personal responsibility can
impact support for policy initiatives (Barry, Brescoll, Brownell, & Schlesinger, 2009). A similar
effect may have occurred here. The study as designed did not allow for the blaming of students
to be taken in to account.
Conclusion
There are many groups that would likely inspire more intense negative reactions in the
populace than did universities. That a relatively tame attack message against an institution
would still elicit discernible reactions, however, is noteworthy. It is also cause for concern.
Public policy provides benefits to or imposes punishments on different groups in society and
through the rhetoric used by political actors, we can detect which groups they believe should
bear the burdens and which should reap the rewards of government action. Groups that can be
identified in the people we see in public every day more easily become targets than faceless
entities with whom we cannot or do not interact.
The negative stereotypes attached to some social constructions are created through the
differentiation of the “other.” Therefore, using conflict rhetoric to target a group for blame
increases the likelihood that the group will be perceived as negatively constructed. It is these
negatively constructed groups that will most likely be the losers in public policy, receiving
punishment rather than reward (Schneider & Ingram, 1997) because the behavior of negatively
constructed groups is more likely to be considered deviant and in need of controlling. With the
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cover of public support raised in response to blame messages, politicians can enact punitive
policies against the targeted groups and take credit for policy action.
Thus, the impact mediatization has had on elite rhetorical style matters because if
political actors are increasingly using conflict rhetoric to target groups to blame, more groups are
likely to be negatively constructed and therefore subject to coercive, controlling or punitive
policy. As a result, policy outcomes are less likely to be successful because punitive and
coercive policies often fail to produce compliance or lasting change (Moller, Ryan, & Deci,
2006), but succeed in reinforcing inequities (Sidel, 2000; Soss, 2005). For example, if
universities were penalized when their graduates failed to pay student loans, it is very likely that
in response universities would minimize the number of students they accept who need to take
large amounts of loans to attend. The result would likely reinforce the higher education system
as one that is increasingly out of reach for any but the wealthy.
Public policy shapes and institutionalizes norms of treatment for different social groups
and, historically, these norms have had important economic repercussions for marginalized and
disadvantaged groups that persist today. No policy exists in a vacuum; instead, it is heavily
influenced by previous policy, entrenched behavioral norms, the current social and political
contexts, and our evolving relationship with history. Today, the tension between economic and
social policy is especially severe and is driving the widening ideological rift we are currently
experiencing. The current emphasis on “identity” and “grievance” politics is merely a symptom
of this underlying tension. In such antagonistic and divisive cultures,
Public policy is not a means of solving problems or even resolving conflicts
among competing perspectives, but is instead an instrument of power that can
be used opportunistically by each faction to further its own legitimacy,
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popularity, or future power positions (Schneider & Ingram, 1997, p. 105).
Policymakers create political messages to generate support for policy initiatives, but the
rhetoric they choose to promote their preferred solutions betrays which groups they favor and
believe should be the winners and losers in public policy. That conflict rhetoric may lead to
policy failure is important to recognize because the mediatization of politics makes it unlikely
that this negative discourse will abate anytime soon. Understanding how language and rhetoric
constructs groups and constrains policy choices can help policy experts overcome these
parameters to develop more effective policy.
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CHAPTER 5
UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES:
WHY ATTACK RHETORIC MAY BE BAD FOR DEMOCRACY
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Introduction
Since Donald Trump’s campaign for the Republican Party presidential nomination, an
abundance of political news, commentary, and analysis has focused on his tendency toward
incendiary speech during political rallies, formal addresses, and, especially, on twitter. People
across the political spectrum have opined on whether and how his rhetoric compares to autocratic
rulers (e.g. McNeill, 2016; Buric, 2016; J.P.P., 2016) and many have displayed a palpable fear
that his use of such speech as a political weapon may lead the United States away from
democracy (e.g. Faris, 2017; Lanktree, 2018; Collinson, 2018). Perhaps not coincidentally, some
recent research has focused on a seeming decline in support for democratic governance and
values, particularly among younger generations (e.g. Ellis, 2017; Wike, 2016). Overall support
for democracy is still high, but many people appear open to other, less democratic forms of
government (Wike, Simmons, Stokes, & Fetterolf, 2017). This trend is not unique to the United
States and is, perhaps, a factor in the elections of and political support for populist figures such
as Donald Trump, Rodrigo Duterte, and Marine Le Pen (Foa & Mounk, 2017).
A possible explanation in the weakening support for democracy is a greater acceptance of
antisocial behavior among certain segments of the population indicating a shift in perceived
behavioral norms (Howe, 2017). While Howe (2017) specifically discusses illegal behavior such
as accepting bribes and cheating on taxes, New York Times columnist Thomas Edsall (2017)
suggested that a new tolerance for violations of the norms of political discourse, specifically the
unprecedented incivility in political rhetoric, may be the culprit. As research studying the rise
and fall of democracies has shown, adherence to norms such as civility in political discourse
matter. Through the slow erosion of social and political norms, democratic deconsolidation can
occur with the willing support of lawmakers and the public (Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018). The
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specter of a Trump-led descent into fascism may be a valid concern, and it certainly makes for
sensational news fodder, but the important question is whether the conflict-laden rhetoric so
embraced by politicians is helping to create conditions that will allow this to happen.
The power of rhetoric as a persuasive tool lay in its ability to “engage and transform
emotions” in the audience (Kastely, 2004, p. 222; Gorgias, 1972) and intense emotional arousal
may be the connection between political messages and the activation of political support.
Emotions have been shown to influence vote choice (e.g. Marcus & MacKuen, 1993; Redlawsk,
Civettini & Lau, 2007), willingness to participate (e.g. Groenendyk, 2011; Valentino,
Gregorowicz & Groenendyk, 2011), levels of partisanship (e.g. Weeks, 2015), likelihood of
activism (e.g. Roser & Thompson, 1995), and attitude change (e.g. Smith, 2014; O’Neill &
Nicholson-Cole, 2009). Yet, little research explores the impact emotions have on some of the
more nebulous aspects of political support, such as for democratic values and institutions. Using
an original experiment this research explores how the different emotions “engaged and
transformed” by conflict rhetoric impact democratic support. Results show that the emotions
elicited through conflict rhetoric do impact levels of democratic support in both positive and
negative ways.
Appealing to Emotions with Political Rhetoric
In the struggle to exert influence, rhetoric is central to creating political images for public
consumption and evaluation. Rhetoric is a key component at every stage of political debate
because it is where “ideas are fashioned into arguments with a certain force and direction in
order to win the assent of an audience” (Martin, 2014, p. 9). It is through rhetoric that politicians
and other political actors most directly attempt to persuade the public to hold certain viewpoints.
Thus, political rhetoric is purposive action meant to manipulate the perceptions and attitudes of
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message receivers with the aim of garnering electoral and legislative support.
The term conflict rhetoric is used broadly here to refer to political rhetoric employed with
the intent of highlighting differences between, and creating opposition to, people, groups, or
ideas. The purpose of this rhetorical strategy, often accomplished through attacks and
denigration of out-group members, is to activate group allegiance among message receivers to
bolster political support. It can be classified under what Dryzek (2010) terms bonding rhetoric,
or rhetoric meant to mobilize groups through shared identity, interests, or values. Bonding
rhetoric can be beneficial to society because it can help weak or fragmented groups find a
stronger unified voice with which to participate in democratic debate and bring attention to new
or underrepresented viewpoints (Dryzek, 2010). Such rhetoric is not new to politics, but, as
Edsall (2017) argues, conventional norms keeping political discourse within the bounds of truth
and good taste seem to have been abandoned. It is this move into what Dryzek (2010) termed
“ugly rhetoric” (p. 333) that presents problems. While bonding rhetoric can promote deliberative
democracy through its ability to cohere and strengthen previously fragmented voices, ugly
rhetoric can derail deliberative systems through its attempts at manipulation and misdirection.
The negative versions of conflict rhetoric manifest in political discourse in a variety of
forms, including campaign attack advertising, partisan rhetoric, outrage discourse, and blame.
Blame is an especially useful political strategy because it allows politicians and political parties
to simultaneously deflect fault for problems and rally support for preferred policy solutions. The
most obvious target for blame in politics is an opposing party. Strategically, this conflict
messaging is necessary if political actors are to convince voters to prefer one party over the other
(Lee, 2016). But, political blame is not limited to opposing parties or their members. These
types of criticisms can include people, groups, and entities in and outside of government (Hood,
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2010). Recent examples include Senator Bernie Sanders (D-VT) blaming big banks for much of
the economic and societal woes in the U.S. (McAuliff, 2015), Donald Trump blaming Mexicans
for drug and crime problems (Deggins, 2015; Gabbatt, 2015), and Governor Chris Christie (RNJ) blaming universities for unmanageable student loan debt (Haddon, 2015). Such messages
reduce complex social or economic issues to a matter of group dynamics and provide an object
from which to exact retribution.
In rhetorical strategy, the blame target is used to persuade an audience to a specific
viewpoint (Hlavacik, 2016; Burke, 1969). Thus, the target object is only important in relation to
the who constitutes the audience. Appealing to social group tensions through blame can be
beneficial because political debate often centers on which groups deserve to benefit from
government largesse. It is a simple rhetorical act to portray one group’s benefiting as a threat to
another group’s status. Such arguments are meant to orient the audience to a topic or event
through emotional arousal (Martin, 2016) and the “us versus them” dynamic inherent in blame
messages direct where the target audience should aim their anger, fear, and frustration about
current problems. That rhetoric attempts to persuade through emotional appeals is an early
insight (Kastely, 2004), but blame is potentially pernicious because it can be an “extreme
rhetorical act” (Hlavacik, 2016, p. 162) that aims to divide groups through the arousal of
specifically negative emotions. Blame highlights what should be feared and its target is a
rhetorical prop designed to serve the message sender’s intention to create divisions in society in
order to build support among certain groups.
Politics is, by definition, about group conflict and blaming is sound political strategy
because it is designed to create inter-group tensions and promote “us versus them” narratives to
pit one group against another. Blaming can be conceived of as a form of misinformation
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intentionally deployed to distract from factual contexts in political debate. It is an effective
strategy for evading responsibility for governing failures because “voters are more sensitive to
what has been done to them than what has been done for them” (italics in original; Weaver,
1986, p. 373). By identifying a culprit to scapegoat for social ills, “a smokescreen [designed] to
divert attention from strategic political actions or challenges” (Lewandowsky, Ecker, & Cook,
2017, p. 364) is created. Rhetoric is “where political meanings are negotiated” (Beasley, 2001,
p. 24) and blaming affords politicians the opportunity to simplify complex social problems to
neatly packaged tropes that can influence political support. As a political tool, blaming
conveniently identifies a visible cause of an issue without the inconvenience of identifying and
addressing all factors that may have contributed to problem development.
Through its claim to be based on “some truth or genuine viewpoint,” the biased
interpretation of social problems inherent in much misinformation, such as blame messages, may
have greater capacity to influence public opinion than does demonstrably false information
(Webb & Jirotka, 2017, p. 415). Targeting a group for blame allows political actors to appear to
be responsive to policy issues important to their constituencies and reassure them that someone is
attentive to their plight. But, these storylines diminish the power of factual knowledge as groupbased beliefs and emotions hold sway (Fischer, 2003). When groups hold antagonistic and
negative views of others, policy becomes a means to stave off threats to group status and ensure
continued dominance by the powerful, rather than an effort to work toward the common good
(Schneider & Ingram, 1997).
Blame is “ugly rhetoric” because, through scapegoating, it simplifies the cause of a social
problem to a visible symbol at which the afflicted can direct their frustration, anger, and anxiety.
In such situations, people are less likely to sympathize with or listen to opposing viewpoints
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(Hart & Nisbett, 2012), thus inhibiting “further deliberation by closing down dissent or
prejudging the opinions of others, thereby eliminating the need to engage them in dialogue”
(Martin, 2014, p. 112). Blaming fails to live up to the goals of deliberative democracy because it
is rhetoric that strategically uses others as a means to an end rather than encouraging
understanding and cooperation between differing viewpoints (Martin, 2014; Young, 2002). As
such, the accuracy or fairness of the blame message is inconsequential to its use as a rhetorical
strategy to influence the target audience (Hlavacik, 2016).
With blatant appeals to group-based emotions, conflict rhetoric situates the target
audience in relation to matters of controversy (Martin, 2014), whether real or manufactured. The
brilliance of a blame strategy, however, is that the group membership of the audience at which
the blame appeal is directed doesn’t need to be explicitly defined in the message because
appealing to a conscious sense of belonging isn’t necessary to activate emotions against an outgroup (Mackie & Smith, 2017). Group identities are easily constructed and manipulated through
rhetoric (Beasley, 2001) because they are based on perceived rather than formal belonging
(Greene, 1999). In fact, the use of subtle priming or cues in political messaging is sufficient to
activate group identities (Seger, Smith, & Mackie, 2009). As such, political actors can appeal to
group memberships indirectly by using conflict to create an outgroup against which to unite.
Thus, the perceived threat to group status highlighted through the blame appeal should easily
activate both a sense of group identity and the negative appraisal of an outgroup (Tajfel &
Turner, 1986) even in cases where individuals do not directly identify as a member of a specific
in-group (Iyer & Leach, 2008). In other words, blame is effective at instigating intergroup
dynamics because a conscious awareness of group identity is not necessary for the blame target
to be perceived as a threat. Blaming works not because it unifies fragmented voices, but rather,
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because it identifies for the audience an “other” to unite against. The purpose of this “ugly
rhetoric” is to create a distraction that captures negative attention and inhibits thoughtful
deliberation and compromise, thus dividing groups through the perception of conflict.
Rhetoric works through the unconscious activation of subjective perceptions orienting the
audience emotionally by degrees toward an object to influence reasoning in specific ways
(Martin, 2014). As such, attitudinal and behavioral responses from the audience should depend
upon which emotions are activated (Iyer & Leach, 2008; Frijda, Kuipers, & ter Schure, 1989).
Research has shown that positive frames are more successful at eliciting positive emotions and
opinions than negative emotions, and vice versa (Lecheler, Bos, & Vliegenthart, 2015) and in a
political context different emotions lead to different cognitive and behavioral responses. For
example, messages which elicit enthusiasm or anger about a candidate are more likely to
motivate people to become politically involved, but also promote knee-jerk partisan reactions
and motivated reasoning (Marcus & MacKuen, 1993; Valentino, Brader, Groenendyk,
Gregorowicz, & Hutchings, 2011; Groenendyk, 2011; Weeks, 2015). Anxiety, on the other
hand, promotes information seeking and thoughtful processing (Johnston, Lavine, & Woodson,
2015; Marcus, 2002; Brader, 2005; Brader, Marcus, & Miller, 2011) and may increase the
likelihood that people will share the fear-inducing message (Boehmer & Friedman, 2015). But,
in some circumstance anxiety can also demobilize voters (Valentino, Brader, Groenendyk,
Gregorowicz, & Hutchings, 2011). As a rhetorical tool, blaming is often used to induce anger
which can trigger group-based hatred and spur action (Groenendyk, 2011). It is not surprising
then that strong partisans are more likely to be mobilized by campaign negativity than weaker
partisans (Wolf, Strachan, & Shea, 2012).
A savvy political actor or group can use rhetoric to stifle or arouse specific emotions in
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order to focus support and dissuade dissent (Moisander, Hirsto, & Fahy, 2016). However, for
effective results such rhetorical strategies require skill and finesse in execution because desired
reactions are never guaranteed. For example, rhetoric induced disgust has been shown to lead to
less support for gay rights, but, also increased support among message receivers who reacted in
anger against the derogatory nature of the message (Gadarian & van der Vort, 2014). This
backlash effect may be due to greater identification with a super-ordinate category that includes
the out-group targeted (Iyer & Leach, 2008; Yzerbyt, Dumont, Wigboldus, & Gordijn, 2003) or
to concern for the out-group’s disadvantage (Van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer & Leach, 2004) as
signified in the attack. Similarly, in-group members that experience shame or guilt at their
group’s action have been shown to exhibit lowers levels of group attachment (Smith, Seger, &
Mackie, 2007), which suggests that rhetoric meant to activate negative reactions toward
outgroups may drive some in-group members away due to a backlash effect against the
undesirable in-group behavior. This may explain the unexpected results in article one of this
dissertation.
As political strategy, conflict messages are designed to elicit group level reactions to rally
support for specific political actors, groups, or ideas. It is not surprising then that research
studying conflict rhetoric has focused primarily on its impact on micro- and meso-level political
support, or what Dalton (1999) classified as political authorities and institutions (see Table 2.1
for Dalton’s typology of political support). That is, its impact on support for and perception of
individual politicians (e.g. Garramone, 1985; Fridkin & Kenney, 2004; Malloy & PearsonMerkowitz, 2016), policy preferences (e.g. Koch, 1998; Jorgensen, Song, & Jones, 2017), and
political parties and institutions (e.g. Ramirez, 2009; Morris & Witting, 2001; Harbridge &
Malhotra, 2011). Likewise, research examining the effects of emotions in politics has focused
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on micro- and meso-level support and behaviors. Little research directly examines the impact of
conflict rhetoric or emotions on macro-level political support, or what Dalton described as
political processes, principles, and communities. There are indications, however, that the effect
is not necessarily positive and concern is warranted.
Research tracking the use of conflict rhetoric in politics indicates that its use is steadily
increasing. The frequency of negative attacks fluctuates with each campaign, but the trend over
time has been an unequivocal increase, with the 2012 and 2016 presidential campaigns being the
most negative on record (Franklin-Fowler, Ridout, & Franz, 2016). Outside of the campaign
context, research studying negativity in policy debate (Grimmer, 2013) and the use of conflict in
political strategy (Lee, 2016) also indicate a steadily increasing use of the various forms of
conflict rhetoric in the political and policy arenas. At the same time support for democratic
governance and values appears to be decreasing, especially among younger generations.
In 2011, 24 percent (an all-time high) of young Americans agreed that democracy is a
bad or very bad way of running this country (Foa & Mounk, 2017) and the number of Americans
that agree it is essential to live in a country that is governed democratically drops dramatically as
age decreases (Foa & Mounk, 2016). A variety of surveys (e.g. Poushter, 2015; Bucknell, 2017;
Villasenor, 2017; Frankovich, 2017), report that college students support the ideal of free speech,
but when asked about specific forms (i.e. offensive costumes, expressions of radical ideas),
exceptions begin to emerge (Ellis, 2017; Wike, 2016). Similarly, support for democracy is still
high, but many people are open to other, less democratic forms of government (Wike, Simmons,
Stokes, & Fetterolf, 2017). For example, the number of U.S. citizens who think that army rule
may be a good or very good idea has increased from 1 in 16 in 1995 to 1 in 6 in 2014 (Foa &
Mounk, 2016). These trends may be coincidental, and are certainly the product of many factors,
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but they do suggest that there are less than desirable long-term consequences to the increasingly
normalized atmosphere of open political hostility. The data collected for this research reveals
similar patterns for democratic support by age group. Table 5.16 illustrates that democratic
support as measured by the willingness to limit free speech, belief that civil rights are important,
and the Democracy/Autocracy Index is lower among younger age groups.
The extensive research on conflict rhetoric also provides some indication that it harms
attitudes important to a healthy democracy. Negative advertising decreases feelings of efficacy
(Ansolabehere & Iyengar, 1995; Lau, Sigelman, & Roverner, 2007), which likely impacts voter
turnout and faith in democratic processes. Campaign negativity decreases trust in government
(Lau et al., 2007), which has been steadily declining since the late 1950’s (Pew, 2017), as
instances of conflict rhetoric have increased. Strategically, highlighting party conflict in political
messaging has increased in importance as margins of victory for majority control have narrowed
(Lee, 2016), but the increased party conflict has been linked to decreased confidence in and
support for Congress (Harbridge & Malhotra, 2011; Ramirez, 2009; Morris & Witting, 2001),
suggesting a vicious cycle. Conflict rhetoric appears to negatively impact attitudes towards
governmental institutions. However, for as long as politicians and political operatives continue
to believe these attacks work (Fridkin & Kenney, 2008), it is unlikely political discourse will
change.
With negative advertising, negative political reporting, negatively focused opinion
programming, and now attacks via social media, citizens are continually bombarded with
messages designed to outrage or frighten. This “ugly rhetoric” aims to divide groups, shut down
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Table 5.1 and all subsequent tables can be found in Appendix A.
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dissent, and derail productive deliberation through the arousal of intense negative emotions.
More alarming, however, is the possibility that negative emotional arousal due to exposure to
conflict rhetoric can have implications beyond intergroup dynamics to affect macro-level
political support. Researchers have long known that engaging in political attacks is a risky
strategy that can induce a backlash against the message sender (Damore, 2002; Dowling &
Wichovsky, 2015; Hale, Fox & Farmer, 1996; Kahn & Kenney, 1999; Peterson & Djupe, 2005;
Theilmann & Wilhite, 1998; Fridkin & Kenney, 2004; Banda & Windett, 2016), but it may also
cause harm to the political system through the detrimental effects of continued negative arousal
from manipulation, propaganda, and promotional self-interest (Martin, 2014; Dryzek, 2000).
Recently, studies of democratic deconsolidation have linked support for populist
movements to rhetoric designed to elicit fear and anger. Enflamed through relentless messaging,
populist support likely derives from a sense of shame at (potential) loss of social standing
transforming over time into anger at an outgroup (Salmela & von Scheve, 2017) and the level of
anger individuals feel about economic crises (Rico, Guinjoan, & Anduza, 2017). Furthermore,
repeated appeals to outrage designed to drive political divisions may, over time, evolve into
disgust with the system that produces the rhetoric, leading to loss of support for the system
(DeBell, 2016). Indeed, emotions activated in response to one event can orient thoughts to other
events (Lerner & Keltner, 2000), because emotional arousal can induce spillover effects for
judgments of other related and unrelated situations. Eliciting negative reactions through conflict
rhetoric may produce short-term electoral support for political candidates and parties, but, due to
the spillover effects of emotional arousal it may, in the long-term, be detrimental to popular
support for democracy. As suggested by Thomas Edsall (2017), it is possible that the long-term
negative repercussions of political attacks may reverberate beyond the impact on the message
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sender and the target of the attack to the entire political system by weakening support for
democratic governance and values.
Yet despite the laments of the downward spiral in political civility, not all evidence
points to negative repercussions. In the U.S., research looking at data through 2008 indicates
that markers of satisfaction with government improved (Aldrich, 2013) as political rhetoric
devolved. Leading up to 2008, perceptions that public officials care what the public thinks and
that the government listens to the people increased over time, while a majority of people reported
being satisfied with democracy. This is possibly due to the fact that the electorate clearly
perceives the increases in party polarization (Aldrich, 2013), as demonstrated through party cues
in conflict rhetoric, and can better align their own preferences and cast the “right” vote (i.e.
voting for the party with aligned issue positions; Levendusky, 2010; Hetherington, 2001). As
previously mentioned, blame is a rhetorical strategy used in part to convince people that political
actors are responsive to their problems, which may elicit enthusiasm, hope, or schadenfreude
rather than anger or fear. It is possible that conflict rhetoric activates emotions in some people
that may reinforce faith in democratic processes or at least continued support for the system.
Research in American politics has yet to directly investigate the impact of conflict
rhetoric on democratic support. Given what is now known about the temporal precedence of
affective responses to cognitive appraisals, beliefs, and actions (see Marcus, 2013), it is likely
that any impact will be subject to the emotions activated by the message. As such, the current
study seeks to add to the literature by addressing whether the emotions aroused through “ugly
rhetoric” enhance or diminish support for the broad constructs that should bind Americans
together as a nation, such as belief in democratic governance, principles, and institutions.
Through an experiment designed to test the effects of strategically placed blame, this research
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investigates whether the arousal of negative emotions caused by conflict rhetoric is contributing
to the decline in measures of democratic support. The following hypotheses will be tested:
H1: Variations in the attribution of blame will lead to variations in emotional arousal
such that a blame message will arouse more negative emotions than a no blame
message and a no blame message will arouse more positive emotions than a
blame message.
H2: Variations in emotional arousal will lead to variations in democratic support such
that the arousal of positive emotions will lead to greater support and the arousal of
negative emotions will lead to lesser support.
H3: Emotions function as an indirect mediator for the effect of variations in blame on
democratic support.
Methodology
The results reported are from data collected through an online survey experiment using a
varied sample of American citizens. Using a between-subjects 3 x 2 experimental design,
participants were randomly assigned to one of six treatment conditions. Each condition
consisted of a negative message about student loan debt reform. Despite experiments being low
in external validity compared to other methods, they are commonly used in research to test the
impact of message variation (i.e. framing effects; e.g. Lecheler, Bos, & Vliegenthart, 2015;
Nelson, Clawson & Oxley 1997; Smith & Petty, 1996) because experiments “provide the most
rigorous way to establish causal relationships between independent and dependent variables”
(Thorson, Wicks & Leshner 2012, p. 112). Experiments are also well-suited to elicit emotional
responses, as discrete emotions arise in response to events and prevailing situations (Angie,
Connelly, Waples, & Kligyte, 2011; Frijda, 1986).
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Sample
Participants were recruited through Qualtrics Panels online survey services. A major
criticism of online panels is that the samples are non-probability and thus raise validity concerns,
especially mismatches between the target population and the sampling frame (Couper, 2000);
but, many argue that the chronically low response rates typical of probability sampling via mail
or phone raise the same concerns (Brick, 2011). Research indicates that opt-in internet samples
are relatively diverse with respect to age, gender, socioeconomic status, and geographic region
when compared to samples collected with traditional probability sampling (Gosling, Vazire,
Srivastave, & John, 2004) and Qualtrics panels have compared well (Heen, Lieberman &
Miethe, 2014). Qualtrics employs an invitation-only recruitment strategy that results in a crosssection more generalizable to the public (Hagtvedt, 2011).
The sample (N=1023) was sixty-four percent white, fifty-one percent female and the
average age of participants was 44 (M=43.6, SD=2.64, range 18-85). Thirty-four percent
identified as Republican or republican leaning, and sixty percent identified as conservative.
Fourty-three percent of participants expected to have student loan debt upon graduation.
Detailed respondent characteristics are provided in Table 4.1.
Procedure
All participants answered questions regarding their experience with student loans and
familiarity with the debt crisis. Next, participants were exposed to the stimulus condition, a
news article excerpt about the student loan debt crisis. Last, participants answered questions
measuring their level of emotional arousal and democratic support.
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Manipulation
The experimental manipulation was a negative message about the student loan debt crisis
varying the attribution of blame (Republican or Democratic Party, universities, and no target of
blame) and the political party affiliation of the message sender (Republican or Democratic
Party). A message received from a Republican politician either targeted the Democratic Party,
targeted universities or contained no target. Likewise, a message received from a Democratic
politician either targeted the Republican Party, targeted universities or contained no target.
Table 3.2 displays the experimental design. A manipulation test run prior to the full experiment
indicated the treatment conditions were successful in alerting participants to the attribution of
blame and the political party affiliation of the message sender and blame target. Messages that
included a target of blame were worded as follows:
The Federal Reserve released on Wednesday the latest statistics about student
loan debt. Over two-thirds of college graduates leave school with some student loan debt.
In total, student loan debt has topped $1.7 trillion and measures more than 6% of overall
national debt. More than 11% of student loan borrowers are behind on their payments or
in default.
In a series of tweets yesterday, [Democratic/Republican] Representative Brad
Young blamed [Republicans/Democrats/Universities] for not doing enough to address the
problems of crippling student loan debt and soaring costs that have inflated tuition rates:
Student loan debt is out of control and harming our economy because
[Republicans/Democrats/Universities] have pushed disastrous policies that do
nothing to lower tuition rates or the debt students are forced to take on.
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Self-seeking [Republicans/Democrats/Universities] say they care about
inequality, but they keep backing ineffective policies that just make college more
expensive.
If we keep listening to [Republicans’/Democrats’//Universities’] dishonest claims,
the student loan debt crisis will only get worse and soon higher education will be
out of reach for most people.
--Representative Brad Young (@BradYoung) February 10, 2018
Messages with no target of blame were worded:
The Federal Reserve released on Wednesday the latest statistics about student
loan debt. Over two-thirds of college graduates leave school with some student loan debt.
In total, student loan debt has topped $1.7 trillion and measures more than 6% of overall
national debt. More than 11% of student loan borrowers are behind on their payments or
in default.
In a series of tweets yesterday, [Democratic/Republican] Representative Brad
Young commented on the effort to address the student loan debt crisis:
Student loan debt is out of control and is harming our economy.
Current policies do nothing to lower tuition rates or the debt students are forced
to take on.
We need to work together to put policies in place that fix the problem.
--Representative Brad Young (@BradYoung) February 10, 2018
While the student loan debt crisis as a policy issue is likely to be highly salient to a
portion of the population, it is not an issue that receives constant attention in the press, therefore,
it was unlikely many respondents would be well informed on where each party stands on the
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issue or the details of the debate. This made it more likely that this is not an issue about which
people already held strong beliefs or were emotionally charged and, therefore, participants were
likely to be more susceptible to emotional manipulation through messaging. Additionally, the
issue can be conceived of as the result of poor student loan policy and thus blamed on the
policies supported by either political party; alternatively, the student loan debt problem can be
conceived of as the result of high tuition rates and blamed on universities’ policies.
Measures
This research tests the effects of blaming on people’s attitudes toward democracy and the
political system, termed here democratic support. As defined by Dalton (1999), one level of
political support can be measured through attitudes toward the political regime. This includes
latent orientations such as trust in government and belief in democratic governance and values.
Democratic support, consists of three dimensions: trust in institutions, support for democratic
governance and values, and satisfaction with the democratic system. Each dimension was
operationalized in multiple parts, described below, and each subsequent measure was treated as a
unique dependent variable. Table 5.2 provides summary statistics of all dependent variable
measures.
Trust in Government. Participants rated their trust in the government in Washington, DC,
the Republican and Democratic parties, and Congress with a question from the New Democracy
Barometer developed by Mishler and Rose (1997) to capture feelings of distrust and trust for
government and institutions (“There are many different institutions in this country, for example,
the government, courts, police, civil servants. Please indicate on the 7-point scale below, where
1 represents great distrust and 7 represents great trust, how much is your personal trust in each of
the following:”).
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Support for Democratic Governance and Values. Support for democratic governance
was measured with two indexes used on the World Values Survey (WVS;
www.worldvaluessurvey.org) as measures of the stability of democracy (Inglehart, 2003): the
Democracy/Autocracy Index and the Materialist/Post-materialist Values Index. The
Democracy/Autocracy Index consists of four statements rated on a 5-point scale (strongly
disagree to strong agree) combined as (C+D) – (A+B) and rescaled to 0-1 for ease of
interpretation. A higher score indicates greater support for democratic governance:
A. Having experts, not government, make decisions according to what they think is best for
the country is a good way of governing this country.
B. Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with Congress and elections is a good
way of governing this country.
C. Having a democratic political system is a good way of governing this country.
D. Democracy may have its problems, but it’s better than any other form of government.
The Materialist/Post-materialist Values Index prompts participants to choose two of four items
(“People differ in assigning priority or importance to various goals. If you had to choose among
the following things, which are the two that seem most desirable to you?”):
1. Maintain order in the nation
2. Give people more say in the decisions of the government
3. Fight rising prices
4. Protect free speech
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Answers were coded as 1 = items 1 and 3; 2= items 1 and 2 or items 1 and 4 or items 2 and 3 or
items 3 and 4; and 3 = items 2 and 4. A higher score on the index indicates greater support for
democratic governance.
To measure support for democratic values, people indicated on 5-point scales how
strongly they agreed or disagreed with two statements used on the WVS, “It is important to have
civil rights that protect people’s liberty from state oppression” and “It’s okay for the government
to stop people from saying things that are offensive to some groups.”
Satisfaction with the Democratic System. To measure satisfaction with the democratic
system participants answered three questions from the WVS, “On the whole, are you extremely
satisfied, very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the way
democracy works in the United States?”; “Would you say that the government is pretty much run
by a few big interests looking out for themselves or that it is run for the benefit of all people?”;
and “How much do you feel that having elections makes the government pay attention to what
people think?”, answered with not so much, some, and a good deal. Each question was treated as
a separate variable.
Emotions. Following previous studies (e.g. Lecheler, Bos, & Vliegenthart, 2015; Levin,
Kteily, Pratto, Sidnaius, & Matthews, 2016), participants were asked to rate how much they felt
ten specific emotions in response to the blame message. Studies of emotions often look at the
impact of valence rather than individual emotions, but discrete emotions with the same valence
can produce different behavioral and attitudinal effects (i.e. anger and fear; Lerner & Keltner,
2000; Peterson, 2010). As such, this research explores the impact of valence as well as distinct
emotions. The emotions chosen were previously studied in the political and policy literature or
identified as discrete emotions in the psychological literature likely to elicit unique behavioral
102

and attitudinal responses. Participants rated on 5-point scales (not at all to very) the extent to
which the blame message induced feelings of anger, disgust, fear, sadness, nervousness, shame,
hope, happiness, excitement, and pride (“This scale consists of a number of words that describe
different feelings and emotions. Please read each item and indicate to what extent
Representative Young’s tweets make you feel this way right now”; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen,
1988). Positive and negative emotions were averaged to create two variables, positive affect
(hope, happiness, excitement, pride; a=0.90, M=2.19, SD=1.13) and negative affect (anger,
disgust, fear, sadness, nervousness, shame; a=0.88, M=2.34, SD=0.98).
Control Variables. To control for any response bias associated with knowledge of the
student loan debt crisis or personal experience with student loans, participants were asked: “How
familiar or unfamiliar are you with the ongoing student loan debt crisis?”; “How much attention
do you think the student loan debt crisis is receiving from lawmakers? Would you say it is
receiving the right amount of attention, it should receive more attention, it should receive less
attention, or are you unsure?”; and “Do you have now or did you have in the past student loan
debt?”
All models also included a general measure of political knowledge as a control variable
since people who more closely follow politics are more likely to be familiar with what is a
credible message associated with each party. Following Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996),
participants were asked “Which party held the majority in the U. S. House of Representatives
before the 2016 election?”; “Which job or political office is currently held by Mike Pence?”; and
“Which party would you say is more conservative?” Answers were added together to create a 4point index ranging from none correct to all correct.
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A dichotomous variable indicating whether the participant identified with the message
sender’s party was created to control for variations due to partisan leanings. Party identification
was determined through a two-part question similar to that used on the General Social Survey
(GSS). Participants who answered independent or neither to “Generally speaking, do you think
of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?” were asked “Do you
generally lean toward the Republican or Democratic Party?” Leaners were included in the ingroup category along with party identifiers because for many variables related to partisanship,
leaners indicate stronger preferences than weak partisans (Petrocik, 1974). Opposition
identifiers and true independents were included in the outgroup category.
Results
It is expected that variations in the blame message will lead to variations in emotional
arousal such that blame messages will elicit greater negative emotions and no blame messages
will elicit greater positive emotions (H1). Differences in emotional arousal are expected between
those who received a blame message targeting an opposing party, a non-political group, and a no
blame message. It is also expected that differences in emotional arousal will lead to variations in
democratic support, such that positive emotions will lead to more support and negative emotions
will lead to less support (H2). No difference is hypothesized for the direct effect of variations in
blame on democratic support because it is expected that emotions will indirectly mediate the
relationship between the blame message and dimensions of democratic support (H3). Three
dichotomous variables for each comparison were created to test these differences: targeting an
opposing party to targeting universities, targeting an opposing party to no target of blame, and
targeting universities to no target of blame.

104

Direct Effects of Variations in Blame on Dimensions of Democratic Support
Indirect mediation does not require that the independent variable directly impact the
dependent variable (Zhao, Lynch, & Chen, 2010); therefore, no direct effects between the
independent and dependent variables are predicted. As expected, no direct effects were detected
for most treatment comparisons and dimensions of democratic support. However, in a few cases
direct effects were found. Compared to the blame universities conditions, those in the blame
opposing party conditions scored higher on the Democracy/Autocracy Index (b=0.029, p<0.05)
and the Post-Materialist Values Index (b=0.316, p<0.05), indicating higher support for
democracy, but compared to those in the no blame conditions, reported being less satisfied with
democracy (b=-0.188, p<0.05). Compared to those in the no blame conditions, those in the
blame universities conditions were also less satisfied with democracy (b= -0.174, p<0.05) and
less likely to believe that elections make politicians pay attention to what people think (b=0.304, p<0.05). It appears that blame messages may cause people to believe democracy isn’t
working as it should, but nonetheless, may reinforce support for democracy and its goals. In
these cases, any mediation effects will be direct rather than indirect.
Direct Effects of Variations in Blame on Emotional Arousal
Comparing mean emotions by treatment conditions (Table 5.3) reveals that participants in
the blame opposing party conditions exhibited the most negative emotions, followed by the
blame universities, then no blame conditions. Conversely, those in the no blame conditions
exhibited the highest levels of positive emotions, followed by the blame universities, then blame
opposing party conditions.
Table 5.4 displays all regression coefficients for emotions on treatment comparisons.
Significant differences were found for negative affect, disgust, positive affect, and hope
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comparing the blame opposing party to blame universities conditions. Comparing the blame
opposing party to no blame conditions, significant differences were detected for all emotions
except nervousness. Between the blame universities and no blame conditions, significant
differences were found for all but four emotions, nervous, shame, sad, and fear. Overall the
results support the prediction that the blame conditions would arouse greater levels of negative
emotions than the no blame conditions and the no blame conditions would arouse greater levels
of positive emotions than the blame conditions (H1). However, variations in blame appeared to
make more of a difference to participants feeling greater positive than negative emotions.
The Impact of Emotions on Dimensions of Democratic Support
Examining the impact of emotions on dimensions of democratic support without
controlling for treatment condition revealed that regardless of valence, stronger emotional
arousal led to the same variations in democratic support. That is, when results were significant,
stronger positive and negative emotions impacted the different dimensions of democratic support
in the same direction. Anger and sadness were not found to have any effect on any dimension of
democratic support and across dimensions, positive emotions more consistently impacted
democratic support than negative emotions. Table 5.5 displays the regression coefficients for
each dimension of democratic support by each emotion. These results provide only partial
support for hypothesis two. When significant, negative emotions decreased democratic support
as measured with the Democracy/Autocracy and Post-Materialist Values Indices, willingness to
protect free speech, and the importance of civil rights. Contrary to expectations, however,
participants exhibiting stronger negative emotions indicated increased support for all four trust
measures, satisfaction with democracy, elections cause politicians to pay attention to what the
public thinks, and government is run for the people. Conversely, positive emotions increased
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support for all four trust measures, satisfaction with democracy, elections cause politicians to pay
attention to what the public thinks, and government is run for the people. But, also contrary to
expectations, participants with stronger positive emotions indicated decreased support on the
Democracy/Autocracy and Post-Materialist Values Indices, free speech, and the importance of
civil rights.
Mediation Analysis
Table 5.6 displays the results of mediation analysis. With the exception of the PostMaterialist Values Index where no mediation effect occurred, significant mediation was detected
for at least one emotion variable across all dimensions of democratic support. Looking first at
dimensions with direct effects, controlling for the mediators and comparing the blame opposing
party to blame universities conditions, the direct effect of variations in blame was rendered
nonsignificant by hope for the Democracy/Autocracy Index (b=0.020, p>0.05). Comparing the
blame opposing party to no blame conditions, the direct effect of variations in blame was
rendered nonsignificant by all positive emotions for the measure satisfaction with democracy
(positive affect: b=-0.079, p>0.05; excite: b=-0.105, p>0.05; happy: b=-0.111, p>0.05; hope:
b=-0.065, p>0.05; pride: b=-0.138, p>0.05). Additionally, for satisfaction with democracy, all
positive emotions also fully mediated the effect of variations in blame when comparing the
blame universities to no blame conditions (positive affect: b=-0.106, p>0.05; excite: b=-0.122,
p>0.05; happy: b=-0.125, p>0.05; hope: b=-0.119, p>0.05; pride: b=-0.132, p>0.05).
Negative affect and disgust were found to act as suppressor variables for satisfaction with
democracy when comparing the blame opposing party to no blame conditions (negative
emotions: b=-0.221, p<0.01; disgust: b=-0.226, p<0.001). In these instances, negative affect
and disgust magnified the effect of variations in blame on satisfaction with democracy.
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Table 5.6 also illustrates that even when direct effects were absent, the differing emotions
aroused by variations in blame often impacted levels of democratic support. Hope proved to be
the most impactful emotional response as it was effected by all comparisons and functioned as a
mediator most often. It was the only emotion that proved to be a significant mediator for any
dimension of democratic support when comparing the blame opposing party to blame
universities conditions. For this comparison, along with full direct mediation for the
Democracy/Autocracy Index, hope indirectly mediated for all four trust measures (government in
Washington, Republic Party, Democratic Party, and Congress), limit free speech, civil rights are
important, and satisfaction with democracy.
The literature repeatedly indicates that enthusiasm, anger and anxiety are very important
in understanding political behavior (e.g. Redlawsk, Civettini, & Lau, 2007; Marcus & MacKuen,
1993; Brader, Marcus, & Miller, 2011; Ryan, 2012; Valentino, Brader, Groenendyk,
Gregorowicz, & Hutchings, 2011). Excitement did prove to be a significant mediator for many
dimensions of democratic support when comparing the blame to no blame conditions.
Surprisingly, however, anger had no impact on any dimension of democratic support.
Nervousness and fear both had direct effects on some measures of democratic support, but only
fear proved to be an indirect mediator (for protection of civil rights and limiting free speech).
The negative emotions that did indirectly mediate the variation in blame message increased trust
in the Republican Party (disgust), the Democratic Party (shame and negative affect), and
Congress (negative affect), which is surprising given that the literature points to a negative
impact for conflict rhetoric on trust and confidence in government. Shame was also a significant
indirect mediator for limit free speech, importance of civil rights, and the Democracy/Autocracy
Index when comparing the blame opposing party to no blame conditions.
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When comparing the blame conditions to no blame conditions, significant indirect effects
were evident for positive and negative emotions across many dimensions of democratic support,
but overall, mediation was more consistent for positive than negative emotions. This is not
surprising, as the no blame conditions more consistently elicited greater positive emotions than
the blame conditions did greater negative emotions. Specifically, when comparing the blame
opposing party to no blame conditions all four positive emotions (excite, happy, hope, pride) and
positive affect indirectly mediated the effect of variation in blame for all trust measures, the
Democracy/Autocracy Index, and limit free speech. Excite, happy and pride proved to be
indirect mediators for the importance of civil rights, while hope was the only indirect mediator
for elections cause politicians to pay attention to what people think. When comparing the blame
universities to no blame conditions, all four positive emotions indirectly mediated the effect of
variation in blame for limit free speech and all trust measures, with the exception of pride and
trust in Congress.
Overall, this mediation analysis confirms that emotions will indirectly mediate the impact
of variations in blame, as predicted by hypothesis three. Despite an absence of direct effects, the
emotions induced by the treatment significantly impacted many dimensions of democratic
support, even when controlling for variations in blame. Additionally, in the presence of direct
effects, full mediation occurred for some emotions and dimensions of democratic support. The
directional effect of emotional impact, however, was not always as expected. For each
dimension, democratic support was influenced in the same direction regardless of valence or the
distinct emotion elicited by the blame message.
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Discussion
Increasing amounts of research illustrate that emotions play an important role in political
support and behavior. However, the extant literature provides very little guidance as to how the
emotions elicited through political messaging likely impact more nebulous aspects of political
support, such as satisfaction with the democratic system or support for democratic governance.
By examining the impact of conflict rhetoric on macro-level political support through the
mediating effects of emotional arousal, this research attempted to fill this gap in the literature.
This study also contributes to the extensive literature on the role of negativity in politics by
examining the differential impact of attacks against a political party to a non-political entity. The
results of this research further support the growing evidence that demonstrates how variations in
political messaging can lead to varying emotional responses and that emotions impact opinions
and behaviors (e.g. Brader, 2005; Clifford & Wendell, 2016; Gardarian & van der Vort, 2014;
Lecheler, Bos, & Vliegenthart, 2015; Smith, 2014). Not surprisingly, the variation in blame
message produced very few direct effects on dimensions of democratic support. Much political
messaging is crafted to garner short-term political support like vote choice and policy
preferences, rather than regime support, and these results illustrate how the impact of political
rhetoric on support for a system of governance is more complex than a simple immediate
reaction.
For all emotions, the most frequent significant variations were found between the blame
opposing party and no blame conditions. As expected, the blame conditions elicited more
intense negative emotions than the no blame conditions, while the no blame conditions elicited
more intense positive emotions than the blame conditions. But, participants reacted more
negatively to the blame opposing party conditions than the blame universities condition, which
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may be an indication of the known distaste for partisan rhetoric (Geer, 2006; Bartels, 2000;
Brooks, 2000). While participants did also react more negatively to the blame universities
conditions compared to the no blame conditions, it is possible that such attacks are not viewed in
the same light as partisan attacks. Also, as expected, greater emotional arousal led to variations
in democratic support for many of the dimensions and emotions measured. However, neither the
valence of the emotions nor the difference in discrete emotions evoked seemed to matter in terms
of the direction of the effect. For each measure of democratic support, the discrete emotions
aroused by the political message influenced support for that measure in the same direction.
These results are surprising given the growing number of articles that demonstrate how different
discrete emotions often produce distinct behaviors and opinions (e.g. Lerner & Keltner, 2000;
Peterson, Sznycer, Cosmides, & Tooby, 2012, Brader, Marcus & Miller, 2011). Yet here, it
appears that only the intensity of emotional arousal impacted levels of democratic support. A
possible reason for this is that the emotions elicited strengthened already existing opinions about
democracy, rather than directionally influenced those opinions.
Important to note, however, is that the variations in blame were more effective at
producing differences in the intensity of positive than negative emotions. That is, the no blame
conditions appeared to more consistently elicit significantly more positive emotions than the
blame conditions comparatively did with negative emotions. Overall, the pattern of emotional
response and mediation effects indicate that increasing positive emotions may have more impact
on levels of democratic support than negative emotions. Positive emotions were more likely to
mediate the impact of variations in blame than negative emotions and the mediation effect was
most consistent when comparing the blame opposing party to no blame conditions, but also
frequent when comparing the blame universities to no blame conditions. It may be that when
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considering support for democracy and its institutions and ideals, the positive emotions political
messaging elicits are more important than the negative emotions. However, with the possible
exception of hope, no conclusions can be drawn about the importance of some emotions over
others as all emotions impacted democratic support in the same direction. Hope did prove to be
the most prominent emotion in this study, as it was impacted by all treatment comparisons and
effected all dimensions of democratic support. A search of the political science literature
indicates that hope is an emotion not generally considered in political behavior, but as it is a
future-oriented emotion (Aspinwall & Leaf, 2002) it is likely important to the consideration of
political support over time. These results suggest that examining the role of hope in raising and
maintaining political support is warranted.
The most interesting aspect of these results is the split among dependent measures where
support grew and diminished. Eliciting intense emotional arousal led to greater democratic
support as indicated by the trust and satisfaction with democratic governance measures,
indicators of a healthy democracy, whereas the same emotions often led to significant decreases
in support for democratic governance and values. These decreases indicated bear out some of
the fears recently expressed regarding the decline in civility and other political norms negatively
impacting support for democracy. However, the increases in the trust and satisfaction with
democratic governance measures lends support to Aldrich’s (2013) conclusions that the
increasing incivility may actually be helping democratic health in the United States. This split in
the direction of support among the measures may indicate a disconnect between how people feel
about the government as it is working and how they feel about the mechanisms that actually
constitute a legitimate democracy. Trusting the institutions that make up the system and
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expressing satisfaction with how it is working is not the same thing as supporting a system of
government and its inherent values as the best form of governance.
It is important to keep in mind that the variations in blame more consistently elicited
strong positive than negative emotions and that the positive emotions more consistently impacted
democratic support. This indicates that refraining from blame may be beneficial to indicators of a
healthy democracy, such as trust in institutions and the belief that democracy is working.
However, that these same emotions appear to suppress support for democratic governance and
values is concerning. It may be that the no blame messages were pleasing to some precisely
because they lacked offensive opinions and these messages reaffirmed and enhanced autocratic
tendencies such as the willingness to limit free speech.
In the end, what can be concluded from these results is that variations in political
messaging produce variations in emotional response and these emotions do impact democratic
support. The results of this research do not allow for any definitive conclusions specifically
about the negative repercussions of conflict rhetoric on support for democracy, as the no blame
message appeared to have similar, although more consistent, impact.
Limitations
The largest limitation to drawing inferences from the results found here is that this
experiment provides only a snapshot of a single moment in time. Any impact from negative
political attacks on democratic support is likely to build over time. Some recent research
indicates that the effects of sustained negative rhetoric can increase support for populism at the
expense of democracy (Rico, Guinjoan, & Anduiza, 2017) and studies of democratic
deconsolidation indicate that the erosion of norms can lead to a slow decline in support over time
(Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018). One experiment using one message exposure and one set of
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measures of democratic support cannot capture the cumulative effects of repeated exposure to
political messaging, nor can any conclusions about lasting effects be drawn.
Although, temporally the experimental manipulations can be said to have caused
variation in emotions elicited, it does not explain what specifically in the blame (or no blame)
messages led to the variations in emotions. It is possible that the emotions elicited were in
response to some perceptions not measured, such as who the participants felt was to blame for
the student loan debt crisis. Perceptions of intentionality can influence emotional response
(Peterson, 2010) and it is possible that variations in perception of the intentions of the blame
target influenced responses. Additionally, it may be that respondents perceived another group
not mentioned in the vignettes (i.e. students) as to blame for the student loan debt crisis.
The pattern of results indicates that the (lack of) attack influenced levels of positive and
negative emotions felt by participants. It is very possible, however, that using another policy
issue would have elicited a more distinct pattern of emotional responses. Further, a more salient
or emotionally charged issue may result in more consistent direct effects or different appraisals
of the democratic system, just as momentary issue salience influences perceptions of presidential
performance (Edwards, Mitchell, & Welch, 1995). Further studies using a variety of policy
issues and contexts are needed to determine the cognitive mechanisms leading to the variations
in response.
Conclusion
This research sought to answer whether the open hostility between the political parties
and other groups that is now the norm in American politics is contributing to the documented
decline in support for democratic governance and values. It provides a contribution to the
literature in that it focuses on the impact a routine attack message can have on democratic
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support through the mediating impact of emotional arousal. In the end, this study adds additional
support to the growing evidence that emotions matter in the role of political messaging in
influencing political behavior. This experiment confirmed that variations in political messaging
can lead to variations in emotional response, which in turn will impact democratic support. Yet,
the experimental results were also unexpected in that it was the intensity of the emotions aroused
rather than the valence or the variation in discrete emotions elicited that affected levels of
democratic support.
The lack of variation among the impact of discrete emotions or the valence of the
emotions aroused is contradictory to the conclusions of the growing literature examining the role
of emotions in politics and the extensive literature on the psychology of emotions. Study after
study confirms that different emotions lead to different cognitive, affective and behavioral
responses (e.g. Johnston, Lavine, & Woodson, 2015; Keltner, Ellsworth & Edwards, 1993;
Marcus & MacKuen, 1993; O’Neill & Nicholson-Cole, 2009; Smith, 2014; Smith, Seger, &
Mackie, 2007). Typical studies looking at the role of emotions in politics often examine the
types of political support more subject to short-term forces, such as vote choice or mobilization,
but democratic support is likely related to perceptions of what democracy means. Satisfaction
with and support for democracy, as well as trust in institutions and support for democratic values
are more likely due to a longer arc of experiences, perceptions, and beliefs. Dalton, Sin, & Jou
(2007) showed that perceptions of what democracy means are similar in democratic and nondemocratic countries and developed and undeveloped countries. However, the emphasis in
understanding shifts as exposure to democracy increases, such that people living in more
established democracies put more emphasis on freedom and liberty, while those in younger
democracies put more emphasis on democratic institutions and procedures. In this light, the
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split found here for the impact of emotional arousal on dimensions of democratic support may
not bode well for the future of popular democratic support in the United States in this era of
relentless political messaging and news coverage.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION:
THE IMPACT OF CONFLICT RHETORIC
ON POLITICAL SUPPORT
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Summary
The research reported in this dissertation has focused on the impact of conflict rhetoric on
political support. Conflict rhetoric is defined as political rhetoric employed with the intent of
highlighting differences between, and creating opposition to, people, groups or ideas. A major
assumption in this work is that conflict rhetoric is used purposively by political actors to appeal
to various social identities in the electorate with the aim of building political support. The
purpose of this rhetorical strategy is to activate group identities through the identification of a
threatening out-group. By identifying a threat to in-group status, political actors can sow anger
and anxiety toward out-groups and reap in-group support.
Political support is a multi-dimensional concept that includes not only tangible actions
(i.e. donating money to or voting for a specific candidate), but also latent attitudes such as
partisan attachment, trust, and satisfaction with the system. Following Dalton’s (1999) typology,
each study contained herein examines the impact of conflict rhetoric on a different dimension of
political support, and taken together, these studies provide an integrated view of the role conflict
rhetoric plays in building and diminishing this support in the public.
Recent research suggests that partisan identity is an increasingly important filter through
which people view the political parties, individual candidates, policy issues, and each other
(Mason, 2018; 2015; 2013). Political messaging is very often focused on delineating the
differences between the parties (Lee, 2016) and much of the research studying the various forms
of conflict rhetoric (i.e. attack advertising) focuses on the partisan tensions inherent in these
messages. Research indicates that conflict rhetoric increases partisan intensity in the electorate
(Iyengar, Sood, & Llelkes, 2012), yet, it also suggests that people do not like the partisan attacks
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so common in political rhetoric (Geer, 2006; Bartels, 2000; Brooks, 2000). The results reported
here support this conclusion.
Political messaging, however, also frequently involves targeting different social groups or
non-political entities as responsible for social problems rather than political parties and
opponents (Hood, 2010). This strategy was repeatedly employed during the 2016 presidential
campaign with, for example, Republican candidate Donald Trump blaming Mexicans and
Muslims and Senator Bernie Sanders (D-VT) targeting big banks for much of the economic and
societal woes in the U.S. (Deggins, 2015; Healy & Barbaro 2016; McAuliff, 2015).
Surprisingly, limited literature can shed light on how the public feels about or responds to attacks
on non-political groups. This research sought to fill this gap by answering whether there are
differential impacts to varying targets of blame along different dimensions of political support.
Each article presented here relies upon social identity theory (Tajfel, 1978, Tajfel &
Turner, 1986) to explain the importance of conflict rhetoric in building political support. Social
identity theory posits it is human nature to self-categorize, but the positive value put on the group
identity happens through comparison to other groups. Social group identity does not require
formal membership because it is based on perceived rather than formal belonging (Greene, 1999)
and is easily activated by group conflict (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). The struggle over “who gets
what, when, and how” (Lasswell, 1936) is the perfect backdrop for “us versus them” competition
and the emotions attached to group success and failure. As suggested by social identity theory,
politicians can use conflict rhetoric to maximize the perceived differences between their in-group
and the out-group, thus stimulating favoritism with the in-group through the perceived threat by
the out-group.
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Partisan-based conflict rhetoric has grown more important in political strategy over time
(Lee, 2016), but much of the rhetoric we hear from politicians appeals to group identities other
than those based upon partisanship. As Mason (2018) points out, however, many divisions
among social groups appear to sort neatly along partisan lines and this sorting reinforces an “us
versus them” mentality and blind group allegiance. The brilliance of a blame strategy is that the
group membership of the audience at which the blame appeal is directed doesn’t need to be
explicitly defined. Because group identities are easily constructed and manipulated through
rhetoric (Beasley, 2001), the use of subtle priming or cues in political messaging is sufficient to
activate group identities (Seger, Smith, & Mackie, 2009). As such, appealing to a conscious
sense of belonging is not necessary to activate negative emotions against an out-group (Mackie
& Smith, 2017). Thus, conflict rhetoric designed to activate group allegiance among message
receivers by creating an outgroup to rally against should serve to further partisan political goals,
both electoral and legislative.
Blame as a rhetorical strategy is not new in politics, but it is not often examined in the
literature. Most research focusing on blame has looked at how successful a “blame avoidance”
strategy is for political actors and entities (e.g. Hood, 2010; Weaver 1998; James, Jilke, Peterson,
& Van de Walle, 2016) and the role of personal responsibility and intentionality in support for
public policy initiatives (e.g. Thibodeau, Perko, & Flusberg, 2014; Barry, Brescoll, Brownell, &
Schlesinger, 2009; Peterson, Sznycer, Cosmides, & Tooby, 2012). The studies contained herein
are meant to provide a broad understanding of the impact variations in blame as a rhetorical
strategy has on the political system. Ultimately, the purpose of this research was to create a
foundation for a broader research agenda that seeks to determine how the prevalence of conflict
rhetoric in political discourse purposefully and inadvertently directs political outcomes. The first
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two articles presented examined the impact of conflict rhetoric, as manifested in blaming, on
distinct dimensions of political support that would impact partisan electoral and legislative goals.
The third article took a broader perspective by examining what the long-term implications of the
increasing incivility in political discourse may be for democracy.
Specifically, article one sought to answer whether, as suggested by social identity theory
(Tajfel & Turner, 1986), politicians benefit from messages that create and sustain a sense of
conflict between the parties by investigating the role conflict rhetoric plays in stimulating
feelings of partisan intensity and altering assessments of the aligned and opposing parties. This
study examined whether variations in the target of blame impact levels of political support as
exhibited through partisan identity strength and perception of party reputation. Next, article two
presented a framework within which to understand the influence of the media on political
rhetoric and the ramifications for public policy. As suggested by mediatization theory (Esser &
Stromback, 2014), social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), and social construction theory
(Schneider & Ingram, 1997), the media’s most important impact on the political system is
indirect through its effect on elite rhetoric. The increased reliance on conflict rhetoric fostered
by the mediatization of politics increases the likelihood that political actors will target groups to
blame for social ills. As blaming creates or reinforces negative perceptions of outgroups, it can
create demand for policy action against the offending group and these targeted groups are more
likely to be subjected to coercive, controlling, or punitive policy (Schneider & Ingram, 1997).
But, the success of such messages in raising political and policy support is likely dependent upon
perceptions of message credibility. This research tested the impact of variations in blame on
message and policy support through the mediating impact of message credibility.
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Last, article three explored the relationship between conflict rhetoric, emotions and
democratic support. The power of rhetoric as a persuasive tool lay in its ability to “engage and
transform emotions” in the audience (Kastely, 2004, p. 222; Giorgias, 1972) and intense
emotional arousal is linked to the activation of many dimensions of political behavior (see
Demertizis, 2013). This study focused on a dimension of political support mostly overlooked by
the conflict rhetoric and emotion research: democratic support. As New York Times columnist
Thomas Edsall (2017) has argued, conventional norms keeping political discourse within the
bounds of truth and good taste seem to have been abandoned and may be a contributor to the
recent documented decline in democratic support (see Foa & Mounk, 2017). This article
examined whether conflict rhetoric is, in fact, contributing to the detected decline in support for
democratic governance and values through the arousal of negative emotions.
By examining the differential effects of variations in blame, these articles offer a broad
overview of whether and when politicians may benefit from attacking the opposing party,
attacking a non-political group, or refraining from an attack. In the end, the results indicate that
blaming an opposing party offers more harm than good, blaming a non-political group can be
effective at manipulating perceptions of the attacked group and raising demand for punitive
policies, and no blame messages elicit positive reactions that are beneficial to political parties,
but arouse emotions that both help and harm measures of democratic support.
Overall, blaming an opposing party had impacts that should be undesirable to political
parties and lends support to earlier research that suggests that people do not like partisan politics
(e.g. Ramirez, 2009; Harbridge & Malhotra, 2011; Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 1995). It weakened
support on measures of partisan identity and party reputation, especially for the Democratic
Party; participants perceived these messages as the least credible and were less likely to agree
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with the content of the message; and they diminished satisfaction with democracy and the
perception that elections cause politicians to pay attention to what people think. These results
cannot shed light on whether these impacts definitively hurt politicians and political parties
electorally, but as markers of short-term political support, they do not seem to help.
The impact on markers of long-term support were mixed. Attacking the opposing party
did elicit the most negative emotions among participants, which may be the intention of such
attacks, but this had mixed effects on measures of democratic support. The negative emotions
evoked by this attack raised markers of satisfaction with how the government is working, but
diminished support for democracy and its values. There are some indicators (as with message
credibility), however, that the negative effects were less prevalent among partisans, which
suggests that partisan attacks may not cause significant harm among base supporters. But, these
types of attacks will not likely increase the base, as it does push others away. This may help to
explain the contradiction between the results found here and what seems to be a rise in virulent
partisanship in the electorate (Mason, 2015). It may also explain the increase in the number of
people that claim no party affiliation (Stonecash, 2006), as partisan attacks may be more likely to
alienate weak partisans and independents.
More short-term benefits seem to derive from blaming a non-political group. If
politicians do use these types of attacks to manipulate perceptions of the targeted group and raise
support for policies targeting those groups, then the results reported in article two support that
this is a viable strategy. People in the blame universities conditions did perceive universities
significantly more negatively and, compared to those in the no blame conditions, were more
likely to believe the student loan debt crisis to be an important issue. Additionally, the more
negatively participants perceived universities the more likely they were to support punitive
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policy targeting universities. Universities are likely not readily identified as an outgroup the
same way that a definable social group is. As such, these results suggest that blame is effective,
not because of explicit appeals to group identity, but because it creates an outgroup to rally
against. This strategy of generating negative affect toward an outgroup to build political support
is hardly new. It was, after all, the basis of the Republican Party’s southern strategy to curry
favor with white southerners through appeals to racial tensions (McVeigh, Cunningham, &
Farrell, 2014). The results here indicate that this strategy can be deployed specifically to build
public support for policies that deny benefits or harm certain groups, which is cause for concern
for its long-term impact on basic democratic values like equality and freedom.
Important to note is that the blame universities conditions elicited more negative
reactions and lower perceptions of credibility than did the no blame conditions, indicating that
these messages may also harm some components of political support. That negativity is a risky
strategy because it can cause a backlash against the message sender is well established (Damore,
2002; Dowling & Wichovsky, 2015; Hale, Fox & Farmer, 1996; Kahn & Kenney, 1999;
Peterson & Djupe, 2005; Theilmann & Wilhite, 1998; Banda & Windett, 2016; Fridkin &
Kenney, 2004), but the results here also lend support to research indicating the backlash can
extend to feelings for the group (Smith, Seger, & Mackie, 2007). Overall, however, these results
suggest that blaming a non-political group is a strategy that can be effectively deployed to build
political support around policy issues and initiatives.
Not surprisingly perhaps, the lack of blame provoked more positive reactions in
participants. The no blame messages led to the highest levels of partisan identity, were found to
be the most credible and, compared to the blame opposing party conditions, participants were
more likely to agree with the message. Among Democrats these messages led to greater affect
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and perception of party competence for the Democratic Party, while, interestingly, a lack of
blame led Republicans to perceive their party as less competent compared to the other
conditions. This indicates that the ramifications of political messaging are not uniform for the
political parties and perhaps people have different behavioral expectations for each party.
Compared to the blame universities conditions, these messages led to greater satisfaction with
democracy and the belief that elections cause politicians to pay attention to what people think.
The no blame messages also more consistently elicited positive emotions from
participants than the blame messages did negative emotions. The positive emotions elicited by
these messages led to increases in markers that people are satisfied with how democracy and
institutions are working, but they also led to decreases in markers of support for democratic
governance and values. The negative emotions aroused had similar effects. That neither the
difference in valence nor the distinct emotions elicited led to differential impact is unexpected
and not easily explained given that the literature strongly supports variations in attitudinal and
behavioral responses due to the arousal of different emotions. This may possibly be explained
by the fact that conflict rhetoric generally is not aimed at building or diminishing democratic
support, but rather is aimed at markers of short-term support such as vote choice or candidate
perceptions. The distinct emotions elicited by political rhetoric may very well cause differential
outcomes for short-term support, but for democratic support these same emotions may simply
intensify already held beliefs and perceptions rather than cause shifts in direction. Most
important to keep in mind, however, is that variations in blame produced significantly different
emotional intensity among participants and this in turn impacted levels of democratic support,
indicating how easily and surreptitiously political rhetoric can influence citizens’ perceptions of
government and governance.
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Limitations and Future Research
The conclusions that can be drawn from these studies are limited in part because of the
experimental design. The results of these experiments only provide a snapshot in time and can’t
speak to the cumulative effect of years of exposure to conflict rhetoric. People are regularly
exposed to multiple political messages of varying strength, source, direction, and topics. Studies
have repeatedly shown that competing (e.g. Zaller, 1992; Chong & Druckman, 2010; Arceneux,
2012) and repeated messages (e.g. Zajonc, 2001; Monahan, Murphy, & Zajonc, 2000; Harrison,
1977; Crisp, Hutter, & Young, 2009; Brickman, Redfield, Harrison, & Crandall, 1972) can
impact reactions and perceptions. One message exposure at one moment in time is not enough to
definitively draw any conclusions about behavioral or attitudinal responses or lasting effects.
Additionally, without pre-test measurements the direction of the effect among individual
participants remains an unknown. The results certainly point to long-term consequences that are
critical to the health of democracy. As such, more studies specifically designed to assess the
impact of conflict rhetoric over time are needed. This is not a simple task and requires a
combination of experimental, survey, and secondary data.
The use of one policy issue also limits what can be learned from these studies. As an
issue, the student loan debt crisis is likely less salient than some more hot button issues (i.e.
abortion or immigration) and that variations in blame for this issue still produced significant
results is telling. Generally, speaking the results show that conflict rhetoric is a powerful
political tool that can have unintended and possibly far-reaching effects. But, using only one
issue limits the generalizability of these findings and further studies varying or combining policy
issues would help determine if these results are anomalies and whether people were reacting to
the negative tone of the message or to the policy issue. Necessity often compels researchers to
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narrow the range of individual projects, however, the variation in impact across short- and longterm dimensions of political support suggests that future studies with a broader scope would aid
in understanding the full impact of conflict rhetoric on the political system.
Study Implications
Despite these limitations, some inferences about conflict rhetoric can be drawn. It is
noteworthy that one message exposure could produce significant results along so many
dimensions of political support and highlights how impactful political rhetoric is on the public.
For the most part, attacking a political party does not seem to be a boon to short-term political
prospects and these results confirm a distaste for partisan politics that is suggested in the
literature. But the steady increase in such attacks by politicians (Franklin-Fowler, Ridout &
Franz, 2016) coupled with the apparent increase in partisan intensity in the electorate (Mason,
2013, 2015; Iyengar, Sood, & Llelkes, 2012) belie these results. Strong partisans are more likely
to expect and be motivated by partisan attacks (Wolf, Strachan, & Shea, 2012) and the negative
impact detected here may be due to shifts among weak rather than strong partisans. The results
for article two, however, suggest that attacking a non-political group is beneficial for building
policy support and indicate how easily these types of attacks work. Blaming a non-political
group appears to be sound political strategy for short-term gain, as the results of the 2016
election anecdotally support. Politicians can use conflict rhetoric to effectively build political
support around a policy issue, but this strategy is risky because it can also diminish party
support.
Furthermore, the long-term implications for the status of these attacked groups in society
suggests that the result will be detrimental to the furtherance of democratic values and principles.
This conclusion is supported by the results from article three. While the direct effects of
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variations in blame on democratic support were limited, the results suggest that political rhetoric
aimed at short-term support can create an atmosphere of intense emotional arousal that affects
people’s perceptions of broader systems of governance. The effects appeared both positive and
negative, but the split in impact along the dimensions of democratic support suggest that the
emotions aroused by political rhetoric improves short-term perspectives of democratic
governance but damages long-term assessments of the value of democracy and its ideals.
Taken together these results illustrate how political messaging requires nuanced strategy
if it is to be effective and provides a broad overview of how a specific political strategy impacts
different levels of the political system. Different types of negative messages have both positive
and negative impacts on the variety of ways the public can exhibit political support and the
results suggest that rhetoric used for short-term political gain can come at the expense of longterm democratic health. Studies of political efficacy and mobilization already point to these
ramifications (e.g. Ansolabehere & Iyengar, 1995; see Lau, Sigelman, & Roverner, 2007). The
evolution in media has led to an atmosphere of relentless and combative political messaging and
future research should examine how these short- and long-term markers of political support and
democratic health shift and respond together.
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APPENDIX A: TABLES
Table 1.1: Appearances of the Words “Civility” and “Incivility”
in NYT Articles and Editorials
New York Times
New York Times
Year
Articles
Editorials
1940s
44
0
1950s

59

0

1960s

179

16

1970s

473

25

1980s

845

60

1990s

1581

137

Source: Gitlin (2013)

Table 2.1: Levels of Political Support
Level of Analysis
Affective Orientations
Community
National pride
National identity
Regime:
Democratic values
Principles
Regime:
Participatory norms
Political Process
Political rights
Regime:
Political Institutions
Authorities

Institutional expectations
Support parties
Output expectations
Feelings toward political
leaders
Party Identification

Instrumental Evaluations
Best nation to live
Democracy best form of
government
Evaluation of rights
Satisfaction with democratic
process
Performance judgments
Trust in institutions
Trust party system
Evaluations of politicians

Source: Dalton (1999).
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Table 2.2:

Conceptual Definitions for Conflict Rhetoric, Dimensions of Political
Support, and Intervening Variables
Variables
Conceptual Definitions
Conflict Rhetoric
Political rhetoric employed with the intent of highlighting
differences between, and creating opposition to, people, groups
or ideas
Dimensions of Political
Support
Partisan Identity

The extent to which people feel group attachment to a political
party

Party Reputation

The level of esteem people hold for a political party

Message Support

Attitude orientation toward the message content

Policy Support

The level of approval for policy initiatives

Democratic Support

People’s attitudes toward democracy and the political system

Intervening Variables
Credibility

Believability

Emotions

Specific feeling states that arise from events that happen and
prevailing situations

Table 3.1: Sample Characteristics, Experiment One
Sample Characteristics
Age
18-39
Ideology
M=20.23
Conservative
SD=2.64
Liberal
Race
Neither
White
80%
African American
10%
Party Identification
Hispanic/Latino
3%
Republican
Asian
3%
Democrat
Native American
<1%
Leaner
Pacific Islander
<1%
Independent
Unknown/other
3%
Student Loan Debt
Gender
Yes
Male
44%
No
Female
55%
No answer
<1%
N

47%
41%
12%
38%
29%
25%
7%
68%
32%
392
162

Table 3.2: Experimental Design
Target of Blame
Blame NonPolitical Group

Message
Sender

Blame
Opposing Party

Republican
Politician

Blame
Democratic
Party

Blame
Universities

No Target
of Blame

Democratic
Politician

Blame
Republican
Party

Blame
Universities

No Target
of Blame

No Blame

Table 3.3: Dependent Variables, Article One
Partisan Identity
Party Identity
Group Identity
Strength
Strength
M
2.49
2.66
SD
0.98
0.84
Range
0-4
1.5
Party Reputation
Affect for
Affect for
Republican Party Democratic Party
M
SD
Range

4.71
3.01
0-10

4.88
2.84
0-10

Republican Party
Competence

Democratic Party
Competence

1.81
1.89
0-4

2.12
1.31
0-4

N=364
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Table 3.4: Sample Distribution of Party Identification Strength
Party Identity by Strength
Strength of Party Identification
(Folded Scale with Leaners)
Strong Democrat
9%
Neutral
1%
Moderate Democrat
25%
Weak
17%
Weak Democrat
9%
Leaner
27%
Neutral
2%
Moderate
41%
Weak Republican
14%
Strong
14%
Moderate Republican
31%
Strong Republican
10%
N
364
N

265

Table 3.5: Mean Partisan Identity Strength by Target of Blame Message
Target of Negative Message
Partisan Identity
Blame Opposing
Blame Universities
No Blame
Measure
Party
Party Identity
2.35
2.55
2.57
Strength
(1.02)
(0.95)
(0.96)
Group Identity
2.59
2.63
2.72
Strength
(0.86)
(0.85)
(0.82)
N=115

N=122

N=127

Standard deviations in parentheses; Scale 0-4
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Table 3.6: OLS Regression for Strength of Party Affiliation on Differing
Targets of Blame
(1)
(2)
Party
Party
Variables
Identification
Identification
Strength
Strength
Blame Opposing Party
-0.269**
-0.223*
(0.126)
(0.126)
Blame Universities
-0.045
(0.123)
No Blame
0.045
(0.123)
Ideology
0.001
-0.001
(0.032)
(0.032)
Student Loan Debt
-0.0214
-0.214
(0.116)
(0.116)
Familiarity with Student Loan Debt Reform
0.077*
0.077*
(0.044)
(0.044)
Importance of Student Loan Debt Reform
-0.198***
-0.198***
(0.074)
(0.074)
Concern with Student Loan Debt Reform
0.115
0.115
(0.070)
(0.070)
Constant
2.920***
2.850**
(0.372)
(0.376)
N
R2
F

364
0.039
2.07**

364
0.039
2.07**

Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10, two-tailed tests
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Table 3.7: OLS Regression for Strength of Group Identity on Differing Targets of Blame
(1)
(2)
Group
Group
Variables
Identification
Identification
Strength
Strength
Blame Opposing Party
-0.180*
-0.062
(0.108)
(0.107)
Blame Universities
-0.119
(0.105)
No Blame
0.119
(0.105)
Ideology
0.077***
0.077***
(0.028)
(0.028)
Student Loan Debt
0.017
0.017
(0.099)
(0.099)
Familiarity with Student Loan Debt Reform
-0.034
-0.034
(0.038)
(0.038)
Importance of Student Loan Debt Reform
-0.128**
-0.128**
(0.063)
(0.063)
Concern with Student Loan Debt Reform
0.204***
0.204***
(0.060)
(0.060)
Constant
2.276***
2.157***
(0.334)
(0.370)
N
R2
F

364
0.053
2.82***

364
0.053
2.82**

Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, two-tailed tests

Table 3.8: Mean Party Affect by Treatment Group and Participant Party Alignment
Affect for Democratic Party
Affect for Republican Party
Participant Party Alignment
Participant Party Alignment
Treatment Group
Democrats
Republicans
Democrats
Republicans
Blame Opposing Party
6.36
3.07
2.95
7.52
(2.19)
(2.12)
(1.79)
(2.03)
Blame Universities
7.05
3.10
3.56
7.93
(1.99)
(2.24)
(1.97)
(2.18)
No Blame
7.55
3.05
3.21
7.80
(1.86)
(1.86)
(1.82)
(2.20)
N

165

199

165

199

Standard deviations in parentheses; Scale 0-10
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Table 3.9: Mean Party Competence by Treatment Group and Participant Party
Alignment
Party Competence for
Party Competence for
Democratic Party
Republican Party
Participant Party Alignment
Participant Party Alignment
Treatment Group
Democrats
Republicans
Democrats
Republicans
Blame Opposing Party
2.85
1.31
1.14
2.55
(0.85)
(1.09)
(0.98)
(1.01)
Blame Universities
3.11
1.42
1.00
2.52
(0.86)
(1.11)
(0.82)
(1.02)
No Blame
3.12
1.34
0.93
2.32
(0.82)
(1.16)
(0.78)
(0.98)
N

165

199

165

199

Standard deviations in parentheses; Scale 0-4

Table 3.10: OLS Regression for Affect for Democratic Party on Differing
Targets of Blame by Participant Party Affiliation
Affect for Democratic Party
Variables
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Democrats Democrats Republicans Republicans
Blame Opposing Party
-1.290*** -0.869**
0.079
-0.058
(0.344)
(0.357)
(0.350)
(0.339)
Blame Universities
-0.421
0.137
(0.319)
(0.348)
No Blame
0.421
-0.137
(0.319)
(0.348)
Ideology
-0.640*** -0.640*** -0.433***
-0.433***
(0.138)
(0.138)
(0.155)
(0.155)
Student Loan Debt
-0.143
-0.143
0.159
0.159
(0.327)
(0.327)
(0.308)
(0.308)
Familiarity with Student -0.570*** -0.570***
-0.106
-0.106
Loan Debt Reform
(0.119)
(0.119)
(0.125)
(0.125)
Importance of Student
0.167
0.167
0.678***
0.678***
Loan Debt Reform
(0.229)
(0.229)
(0.192)
(0.192)
Concern with Student
0.105
0.105
-0.250
-0.250
Loan Debt Reform
(0.205)
(0.205)
(0.185)
(0.185)
Constant
9.694*** 9.272***
4.017***
3.880***
(1.197)
(1.194)
(1.225)
(1.215)
N
R2
F

165
0.249
7.42***

165
0.249
7.42***

199
0.141
4.49***

199
0.141
4.49***

Standard errors in parentheses; ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, two-tailed tests
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Table 3.11: OLS Regression for Affect for Republican Party on Differing
Targets of Blame by Participant Party Affiliation
Affect for Republican Party
Variables
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
Democrats Democrats Republicans Republicans
Blame Opposing Party
-0.123
-0.408
-0.103
-0.139
(0.321)
(0.334)
(0.333)
(0.321)
Blame Universities
0.285
0.036
(0.299)
(0.331)
No Blame
-0.285
-0.036
(0.299)
(0.331)
Ideology
0.846*** 0.846***
1.089***
-0.147***
(0.129)
(0.129)
(0.147)
(0.155)
Student Loan Debt
0.202
0.202
0.826***
0.826***
(0.306)
(0.306)
(0.293)
(0.293)
Familiarity with Student
0.162
0.162
-0.257**
-0.257**
Loan Debt Reform
(0.111)
(0.111)
(0.118)
(0.118)
Importance of Student
0.024
0.024
-0.055
-0.055
Loan Debt Reform
(0.214)
(0.214)
(0.183)
(0.183)
Concern with Student
-0.256
-0.256
0.221
0.221
Loan Debt Reform
(0.192)
(0.192)
(0.176)
(0.176)
Constant
0.354
0.639
-0.107
-0.071
(1.12)
(1.12)
(1.156)
(1.165)
N
R2
F

165
0.270
8.28***

165
0.249
7.42***

199
0.265
9.84***

199
0.265
9.84***

Standard errors in parentheses; ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, two-tailed tests
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Table 3.12: OLS Regression for Democratic Party Competence on Differing
Targets of Blame by Participant Party Affiliation
Democratic Party Competence
Variables
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
Democrats Democrats Republicans Republicans
Blame Opposing Party
-0.375**
-0.360**
-0.127
-0.214
(0.155)
(0.161)
(0.192)
(0.185)
Blame Universities
-0.015
0.087
(0.144)
(0.191)
No Blame
0.015
-0.087
(0.144)
(0.191)
Ideology
-0.099*** -0.099*** -0.380***
-0.380***
(0.062)
(0.062)
(0.085)
(0.085)
Student Loan Debt
0.104
0.104
0.025
0.025
(0.146)
(0.146)
(0.169)
(0.169)
Familiarity with Student
-0.057
-0.057
0.111
0.111
Loan Debt Reform
(0.054)
(0.054)
(0.068)
(0.068)
Importance of Student
-0.159
-0.159
0.014
0.014
Loan Debt Reform
(0.103)
(0.103)
(0.105)
(0.105)
Concern with Student
0.408*** 0.408***
-0.343
-0.343
Loan Debt Reform
(0.093)
(0.093)
(0.101)
(0.101)
Constant
2.475*** 2.460***
3.191***
3.28***
(0.541)
(0.538)
(0.664)
(0.670)
N
R2
F

165
0.172
4.66***

165
0.172
4.66***

199
0.110
3.36***

199
0.110
3.36***

Standard errors in parentheses; ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, two-tailed tests
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Table 3.13: OLS Regression for Republican Party Competence on Differing
Targets of Blame by Participant Party Affiliation
Republican Party Competence
Variables
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
Democrats Democrats Republicans Republicans
Blame Opposing Party
0.283*
0.229
0.307*
0.126
(0.159)
(0.166)
(0.167)
(0.161)
Blame Universities
0.054
0.181
(0.148)
(0.166)
No Blame
-0.054
-0.181
(0.148)
(0.166)
Ideology
0.175*** 0.175***
0.435***
0.435***
(0.064)
(0.064)
(0.074)
(0.074)
Student Loan Debt
-0.154
-0.154
0.160
0.160
(0.152)
(0.152)
(0.147)
(0.147)
Familiarity with Student
-0.017
-0.017
-0.013
-0.013
Loan Debt Reform
(0.055)
(0.055)
(0.059)
(0.059)
Importance of Student
0.024
0.024
0.092
0.092
Loan Debt Reform
(0.106)
(0.106)
(0.092)
(0.092)
Concern with Student
-0.225**
-0.225**
-0.017
-0.017
Loan Debt Reform
(0.095)
(0.095)
(0.088)
(0.088)
Constant
2.475*** 1.579***
-0.515
-0.333
(0.541)
(0.554)
(0.579)
(0.584)
N
R2
F

165
0.131
3.39***

165
0.131
3.39***

199
0.167
5.45***

199
0.167
5.45***

Standard errors in parentheses; ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10, two-tailed tests
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Table 4.1: Sample Characteristics, Experiment Two
Sample Characteristics
Age
18-85
Ideology
M=43.55
Conservative
60%
SD=16.86
Liberal
40%
Race
White
64%
Party Identification
African American
11%
Republican
34%
Hispanic/Latino
14%
Democrat
46%
Asian
7%
Independent
20%
Native American
1%
Pacific Islander
<1%
Income
Unknown/other
3%
<$20,000
20%
$20,000-$39,999
25%
Gender
$40,000-$59,999
21%
Male
49%
$60,000-$79,999
14%
Female
51%
$80,000-$99,999
7%
No answer
<1%
>$100,000
13%

Education
<High School
High School Diploma
Some college
Associate’s Degree
Bachelor’s Degree
Master’s Degree
Professional Degree/Ph. D.

3%
24%
28%
13%
21%
8%
3%

Student Loan Debt
Yes
No

43%
57%

N=1023
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Table 4.2: Dependent Variables, Article Two

Mean
SD
Range

Message
Agreement
3.56
1.11
1-5

Issue
Importance
3.59
0.95
1-5

Policy
Demand
Mean
SD
Range
N=1023

1.90
0.88
1-3

Dimensions of Message Support
Perception of Outgroup
Item 1:
Educational
Item 2:
Item 3:
Experience
Bottom Line
Positive Effect
3.00
3.83
3.10
1.15
1.05
1.14
1-5
1-5
1-5
Dimensions of Policy Support
Policy Proposals
Policy 1:
Policy 2:
Policy 3:
Gov’t Puts
Eliminate
Universities
Lien
Interest on
Pay Back
on Paychecks
Loans
Loan Funds
2.50
4.13
3.41
1.34
1.02
1.19
1-5
1-5
1-5

Table 4.3: Mean Perception of Outgroup by Treatment Condition
Conditions
Blame Opposing
Blame
Statements About Universities
Parties
Universities

Item 4:
Make College
Affordable
3.80
1.06
1-5

Policy 4:
Universities
Decide Amount
Students Borrow
3.20
1.19
1-5

No Blame

1. Colleges today are mostly interested in
making sure students have a good
educational experience*

M=2.99
SD=1.14

M=2.91
SD=1.14

M=3.09
SD=1.17

2. Colleges today are like most businesses and
mainly care about the bottom line*

M=3.88
SD=0.99

M=3.87
SD=1.05

M=3.73
SD=1.11

3. Overall, universities have a positive effect
on the way things are going in this country*

M=3.08
SD=1.16

M=3.06
SD=1.11

M=3.16
SD=1.16

4. Universities don’t care about making
college affordable for people*

M=3.84
SD=1.03

M=3.83
SD=1.05

M=3.73
SD=1.09

N=382

N=321

N=320

Scale 1-5 (strongly disagree to strongly agree)
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Table 4.4: Mean Support for Policy by Treatment Condition
Blame Opposing
Parties

Conditions
Blame
Universities

No Blame

1. Allow the government to put a lien on the
paychecks of people who fail to make
student loan payments*

M=2.53
SD=1.35

M=2.54
SD=1.32

M=2.42
SD=1.34

2. Make student loans profit-free for the
federal government by eliminating all
interest on federal student loans*

M=4.10
SD=0.98

M=4.18
SD=1.01

M=4.11
SD=1.09

3. Require universities to pay back all student
loan funds they accepted if their former
students prove they cannot afford the
payments*

M=3.46
SD=1.19

M=3.42
SD=1.157

M=3.32
SD=1.21

4. Allow universities to determine the amount
students can borrow for student loans*

M=3.23
SD=1.26

M=3.17
SD=1.17

M=3.19
SD=1.23

N=382

N=321

N=320

Policy

Scale 1-5 (strongly oppose to strongly support)
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Table 4.5: Mediating Effects of Message Credibility on Dimensions of Message and Policy Support
Dimensions of Message Support
Perception of Outgroup
Treatment
Comparisons
Model 1 (N=703)
Step 1:
Blame Opposing Party
to Blame Universities
Step 2:
Message Credibility
Blame Opposing Party
to Blame Universities
Model 2 (N=702)
Step 1:
Blame Opposing Party
to No Blame
Step 2:
Message Credibility
Blame Opposing Party
to No Blame
Model 3 (N=641)
Step 1:
Blame Universities to
No Blame
Step 2:
Message Credibility

Message
Agreement

Item 4:
Make
College
Affordable

Policy 1:
Gov’t Puts
Lien
on
Paychecks

Dimensions of Policy Support
Policy Proposals
Policy 2:
Policy 3:
Eliminate
Universities
Interest on
Pay Back
Loans
Loan Funds

Policy 4:
Universities
Decide Amount
Students
Borrow

Issue
Importance

Item 2:
Bottom Line

0.105
(0.071)

0.194*
(0.083)

0.216*
(0.106)

0.220*
(0.095)

0.211*
(0.095)

0.266***
(0.041)
0.142*
(0.069)

0.186***
(0.049)
0.220**
(0.083)

0.087
(0.064)
0.228*
(0.107)

0.203***
(0.056)
0.249**
(0.094)

0.159**
(0.057)
0.233*
(0.095)

0.137*
(0.067)

0.202**
(0.084)

-0.305***
(0.070)
0.676***
(0.035)
-0.172**
(0.567)

-0.288***
(0.077)
0.620***
(0.039)
-0.202**
(0.066)

0.169*
(0.085)

0.153
(0.080)

0.291***
0.356***
0.324***
0.361***
(0.044)
(0.055)
(0.055)
(0.052)
Blame Universities to
0.143*
0.209**
0.176*
0.160*
No Blame
(0.065)
(0.055)
(0.082)
(0.077)
N=1023; Results display OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses; ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, two-tailed test.
All models include questions about student loans, political knowledge, participant alignment with message sender party and perception of negativity as control
variables.
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Table 5.1: Mean Democratic Support by Age Group
Democratic Support
It’s okay for the government to stop people
from saying things that are offensive to some
groups.
It is important to have civil rights that protect
people’s liberty from state oppression.
a. Having a strong leader who does not have
to bother with Congress and elections is a
good way of governing this country.
b. Having experts, not government, make
decisions according to what they think is best
for the country is a good way of governing
this country.
c. Democracy may have its problems, but it’s
better than any other form of government.
d. Having a democratic political system is a
good way of governing this country.
Democracy/Autocracy Index (C+D) – (A+B)

N

Under 30
2.94
(1.24)

Age Group
30-45
46-60
2.71
2.32
(1.27)
(1.24)

Over 60
1.97
(1.14)

4.04
(1.04)
2.88
(1.29)

4.16
(0.95)
2.81
(1.27)

4.31
(0.91)
2.56
(1.34)

4.45
(0.81)
1.85
(1.19)

3.37
(1.09)

3.21
(1.09)

3.10
(1.16)

2.60
(1.24)

3.49
(1.06)
3.61
(1.17)
0.55
(0.15)

3.69
(1.05)
3.65
(1.06)
0.58
(0.17)

3.88
(1.10)
3.81
(1.06)
0.63
(0.20)

4.40
(0.91)
4.25
(0.91)
0.76
(0.18)

271

311

230

211

Standard deviations in parentheses.
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Table 5.2: Dependent Variables, Article Three
Dimensions of Democratic Support
Trust in Institutions
Trust in
Trust in
Trust in
Republican
Democratic
Gov’t in D. C.
Party
Party
Mean
3.34
3.32
3.46
SD
1.76
1.90
1.75
Range
1-7
1-7
1-7
Support for Democratic Governance and Values
Democracy/
Autocracy
Post-Material
Limit Free
Index
Values
Speech
Mean
0.62
1.99
2.53
SD
0.19
0.62
1.28
Range
0-1
1-3
1-5
Satisfaction with Democratic Governance
Satisfied with
Elections
Gov’t is Run
Democracy
for the People
Mean
1.54
0.94
0.14
SD
1.01
0.73
0.34
Range
0-4
0-2
0-1

Trust in
Congress
3.43
1.71
1-7

Civil Rights
4.22
0.95
1-5

N=1023

Table 5.3: Mean Emotions by Treatment Conditions
Conditions
Blame Universities

No Blame

2.34
2.46
2.19
2.18
2.52
2.50
2.17

2.18
2.15
2.17
2.05
2.27
2.34
2.08

Emotions
Negative Emotions
Disgust
Nervous
Shame
Anger
Sad
Fear

Blame Opposing
Party
2.49
2.69
2.34
2.35
2.69
2.57
2.28

Positive Emotions
Excite
Happy
Hope
Pride

2.02
2.05
1.92
2.18
1.94

2.14
2.18
2.00
2.44
1.96

2.44
2.46
2.30
2.77
2.21

N

382

321

320
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Table 5.4: OLS Regression of Emotions on Treatment Comparisons
Treatment Comparisons
Blame Opposing Party
Blame Opposing
Blame Universities to
Emotions
to Blame Universities
Parties to No Blame
No Blame
Negative Emotions
0.154*
0.310***
0.167*
(0.074)
(0.072)
(0.077)
Disgust
0.252**
0.543***
0.311**
(0.096)
(0.096)
(0.099)
Nervous
0.145
0.172^
0.043
(0.040)
(0.091)
(0.092)
Shame
0.167^
0.301**
0.139
(0.099)
(0.097)
(0.100)
Anger
0.175^
0.413***
0.247**
(0.098)
(0.096)
(0.101)
Sad
0.069
0.224*
0.191^
(0.092)
(0.090)
(0.095)
Fear
0.117
0.208*
0.100
(0.092)
(0.090)
(0.094)
Positive Emotions
Excite
Happy
Hope
Pride
N

-0.157*
(0.078)
-0.165^
(0.089)
-0.118
(0.088)
-0.294**
(0.092)
-0.052
(0.090)

-0.408***
(0.080)
-0.410***
(0.091)
-0.374***
(0.090)
-0.584***
(0.093)
-0.263**
(0.094)

-0.265**
(0.081)
-0.256**
(0.092)
-0.272**
(0.094)
-0.310**
(0.097)
-0.221*
(0.097)

703

702

641

***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, ^p<0.10, standard errors in parentheses.
All models include student loan, political knowledge, and party alignment with message sender as control variables.
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Table 5.5: Regression of Dimensions of Democratic Support on Emotions
Emotions
Negative
Affect
Disgust
Nervous
Shame
Anger
Sad
Fear

Positive
Affect
Excite

Trust in
Gov’t in
D. C.
0.096^
(0.057)
0.077^
(0.043)
0.131**
(0.046)
0.079^
(0.043)
0.027
(0.043)
-0.041
(0.046)
0.085^
(0.046)

Trust in
Republican
Party
0.136**
(0.061)
0.141**
(0.046)
0.102*
(0.050)
0.094*
(0.046)
0.052
(0.046)
-0.006
(0.049)
0.113*
(0.049)

Trust in
Democratic
Party
0.148**
(0.055)
0.074^
(0.042)
0.124**
(0.045)
0.134**
(0.042)
0.049
(0.042)
0.029
(0.045)
0.139**
(0.045)

Trust in
Congress
0.117*
(0.055)
0.039
(0.042)
0.128**
(0.045)
0.082*
(0.041)
0.017
(0.042)
0.058
(0.044)
0.121**
(0.044)

Democracy/
Autocracy
Index
-0.021***
(0.006)
-0.011**
(0.004)
-0.018***
(0.005)
-0.019***
(0.004)
-0.003
(0.004)
-0.008^
(0.005)
-0.021***
(0.005)

PostMaterial
Values†
-0.102
(0.064)
-0.076
(0.049)
-0.105*
(0.053)
-0.030
(0.048)
0.004
(0.048)
-0.075
(0.052)
-0.109*
(0.052)

Limit
Free
Speech
0.138**
(0.040)
0.047
(0.030)
0.119***
(0.033)
0.127***
(0.030)
0.031
(0.030)
0.061^
(0.032)
0.133***
(0.032)

Civil
Rights
-0.094**
(0.029)
-0.027
(0.022)
-0.114***
(0.024)
-0.090***
(0.022)
-0.005
(0.022)
-0.026
(0.024)
-0.095***
(0.024)

Satisfied
with
Democracy
0.062^
(0.032)
0.049*
(0.024)
0.095***
(0.026)
0.041^
(0.024)
-0.003
(0.024)
-0.011
(0.026)
0.063*
(0.026)

0.371***
0.419***
0.260***
0.340***
-0.043***
-0.112^
0.269***
-0.102***
0.276***
(0.051)
(0.054)
(0.051)
(0.049)
(0.005)
(0.059)
(0.036)
(0.027)
(0.028)
0.285***
0.310***
0.206***
0.283***
-0.033***
-0.074
0.208***
-0.091***
0.219***
(0.045)
(0.049)
(0.045)
(0.044)
(0.005)
(0.053)
(0.032)
(0.024)
(0.025)
Happy
0.262***
0.293***
0.220***
0.269***
-0.033***
-0.064
0.243***
-0.091***
0.209***
(0.046)
(0.049)
(0.045)
(0.044)
(0.005)
(0.053)
(0.032)
(0.024)
(0.025)
Hope
0.288***
0.340***
0.168***
0.238***
-0.030***
-0.075
0.169***
-0.031
0.202***
(0.043)
(0.046)
(0.043)
(0.042)
(0.004)
(0.050)
(0.031)
(0.023)
(0.024)
Pride
0.282***
0.318***
0.193***
0.235***
-0.034***
-0.125*
0.196***
-0.097***
0.204***
(0.044)
(0.047)
(0.044)
(0.043)
(0.004)
(0.051)
(0.031)
(0.023)
(0.025)
N=1023; ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, ^p<0.10, standard errors in parentheses.
All models include student loan, political knowledge, and party alignment with message sender as control variables.
†
Results reflect OLS regression coefficients except for the Post-Materialist Values Index, elections make the government pay attention
to what people think and government is run for the people, which reflect logit coefficients.

Elections†

Gov’t for
People†

0.089
(0.062)
0.102*
(0.047)
0.119*
(0.050)
0.094*
(0.047)
0.011
(0.047)
-0.064
(0.050)
0.060
(0.050)

0.033
(0.095)
0.111
(0.071)
0.047
(0.077)
0.032
(0.071)
-0.073
(0.073)
-0.055
(0.076)
0.058
(0.075)

0.367***
(0.058)
0.247***
(0.051)
0.277***
(0.051)
0.283***
(0.048)
0.281***
(0.049)

0.393***
(0.083)
0.335***
(0.074)
0.271***
(0.073)
0.215**
(0.072)
0.367***
(0.071)
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Table 5.6: Indirect Effects of Treatment Conditions on Dimensions of Democratic
Support via Emotional Response
Treatment Comparisons
Blame Opposing Party to
Blame Opposing
Blame Universities
Parties to No Blame
(N=703)
(N=702)

Dimensions of
Democratic Support
Trust in Institutions
Government in Washington
Positive Emotions
Excite
Happy
Hope
-0.101**
Pride
Republican Party
Disgust
Positive Emotions
Excite
Happy
Hope
-0.112**
Pride
Democratic Party
Negative Emotions
Shame
Positive Emotions
Excite
Happy
Hope
-0.052*
Congress
Negative Emotions
Positive Emotions
Excite
Happy
Hope
-0.079**
Pride
Democratic Governance and Values
Democracy/ Autocracy Index
Negative Emotions
Disgust
Shame
Positive Emotions
Excite
Happy
Hope
0.009**
Pride

(0.035)

(0.039)

(0.023)

(0.029)

(0.003)

Blame Universities
to No Blame
(N=641)

-0.154***
-0.111***
-0.106**
-0.173***
-0.076*

(0.039)
(0.033)
(0.033)
(0.041)
(0.013)

-0.089**
-0.071**
-0.063*
-0.072*
-0.054*

(0.033)
(0.030)
(0.037)
(0.028)
(0.037)

0.072*
-0.175***
-0.130***
-0.115**
-0.194***
-0.088*

(0.033)
(0.044)
(0.037)
(0.036)
(0.045)
(0.035)

0.059*
-0.091**
-0.065*
-0.058*
-0.089**
-0.057*

(0.026)
(0.034)
(0.028)
(0.026)
(0.034)
(0.028)

-0.078**
-0.064*
-0.064*
-0.057*

(0.030)
(0.027)
(0.027)
(0.024)

-0.074**
-0.066*
-0.061*
-0.051*

(0.009)
(0.028)
(0.026)
(0.023)

-0.005*

(0.002)

0.011**
0.008*
0.009*
0.009**
0.007*

(0.004)
(0.003)
(0.003)
(0.003)
(0.003)

0.057*
0.058*
-0.094**
-0.084**
-0.079**
-0.083*

(0.025)
(0.024)
(0.031)
(0.029)
(0.028)
(0.034)

0.047*
-0.144***
-0.118***
-0.110***
-0.148***
-0.062*

(0.024)
(0.037)
(0.034)
(0.033)
(0.038)
(0.026)

-0.007*

(0.003)

-0.006*
0.020***
0.015***
0.013***
0.019***
0.010**

(0.002)
(0.004)
(0.004)
(0.004)
(0.004)
(0.004)

***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, ^p<0.10, standard errors in parentheses.
All models include student loan, political knowledge, and party alignment with message sender as control variables.
Bolded models reflect direct mediation, greyed reflect suppressor effects, all other models reflect indirect mediation.
†
Results reflect OLS regression coefficients except for elections make the government pay attention to what people
think and government is run for the people, which reflect logit coefficients.
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Table 5.5: Indirect Effects of Treatment Conditions on Dimensions of Democratic
Support via Emotional Response, continued
Treatment Comparisons
Blame Opposing Party to
Blame Opposing
Dimensions of
Blame Universities
Parties to No Blame
Democratic Support
(N=703)
(N=702)
Democratic Governance and Values, cont.
Protect Free Speech
Negative Emotions
0.049* (0.019)
Shame
0.044* (0.018)
Fear
0.034* (0.017)
Positive Emotions
-0.125*** (0.031)
Excite
-0.098*** (0.027)
Happy
-0.103*** (0.029)
Hope
-0.043* (0.018)
-0.109*** (0.029)
Pride
-0.060* (0.024)
Civil Rights
Negative Emotions
-0.036** (0.014)
Shame
-0.029* (0.012)
Fear
-0.022* (0.011)
Positive Emotions
0.047** (0.016)
Excite
0.040** (0.015)
Happy
0.038** (0.014)
Hope
0.024* (0.011)
Pride
0.030* (0.013)
Satisfaction with Democratic Governance
Satisfied with Democracy
Negative Emotions
0.032* (0.014)
Disgust
0.037* (0.017)
Positive Emotions
-0.110*** (0.026)
Excite
-0.083*** (0.022)
Happy
-0.078*** (0.022)
Hope
-0.059** (0.021)
-0.123*** (0.026)
Pride
-0.050* (0.020)
Gov’t for the People†
Positive Emotions
-0.146* (0.072)
Elections†
Positive Emotions
-0.164* (0.073)
Hope
-0.182** (0.070)

Blame Universities
to No Blame
(N=641)

-0.072**
-0.048*
-0.066**
-0.062**
-0.037*

(0.025)
(0.020)
(0.025)
(0.023)
(0.018)

-0.067**
-0.052*
-0.049*
-0.054**
-0.041*

(0.023)
(0.011)
(0.019)
(0.020)
(0.019)

***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, ^p<0.10, standard errors in parentheses.
All models include student loan, political knowledge, and party alignment with message sender as control variables.
Bolded models reflect direct mediation, greyed reflect suppressor effects, all other models reflect indirect mediation.
†
Results reflect OLS regression coefficients except for elections make the government pay attention to what people
think and government is run for the people, which reflect logit coefficients.

180

APPENDIX B: FIGURES
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Figure 2.1: The Relationship between Conflict Rhetoric and Political Support

conditions
unaligned

aligned

Figure 4.1: Mean Message Credibility by Participant and Message
Sender Party Alignment
Note: Alignment means that the message sender and participant identify with the same political party
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APPENDIX C: EXPERIMENTAL TREATMENT FOR ARTICLE ONE
*Conditions 1-4 – Democrat blames Republicans or Universities, Republican blames Democrats
or Universities
[Republican/Democratic] Representative Robert Murphy blames [Democrats/
Republicans/universities] for not doing enough to address the problems of student loan debt and
soaring costs that have inflated tuition rates. “The [Democrats/ Republicans/universities] are
proposing policy changes that won’t slow the rising cost of college and won’t lower total debt
owed and payments to a manageable level,” Mr. Murphy said. “Listening to
[Democrats/Republicans/universities] will make this crisis worse.’’

*Conditions 5-6 – Democrat with no target of blame, Republican with no target of blame
[Republican/Democratic] Representative Robert Murphy wants to address the problems of
student loan debt and soaring costs that have inflated tuition rates. “Current policy changes
won't slow the rising cost of college and won't lower total debt owed and payments to a
manageable level,” Mr. Murphy said.
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APPENDIX D: EXPERIMENTAL TREATMENT FOR ARTICLES TWO AND THREE
*Conditions 1-4 – Democrat blames Republicans or Universities, Republican blames Democrats
or Universities
The Federal Reserve released on Wednesday the latest statistics about student loan debt. Over
two-thirds of college graduates leave school with some student loan debt. In total, student loan
debt has topped $1.7 trillion and measures more than 6% of overall national debt. More than
11% of student loan borrowers are behind on their payments or in default.
In a series of tweets yesterday, [Democratic/Republican] Representative Brad Young blamed
[Democrats/Republicans/Universities] for not doing enough to address the problems of crippling
student loan debt and soaring costs that have inflated tuition rates:
Student loan debt is out of control and harming our economy because
[Democrats/Republicans/Universities] have pushed disastrous policies that do nothing to
lower tuition rates or the debt students are forced to take on.
Self-seeking [Democrats/Republicans/Universities] say they care about inequality, but
they keep backing ineffective policies that just make college more expensive.
If we keep listening to [Democrats’/Republicans’/Universities’] dishonest claims, the
student loan debt crisis will only get worse and soon higher education will be out of
reach for most people.
-- Representative Brad Young (@RepBradYoung) February 10, 2018
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*Conditions 5-6 – Democrat with no target of blame, Republican with no target of blame
The Federal Reserve released on Wednesday the latest statistics about student loan debt. Over
two-thirds of college graduates leave school with some student loan debt. In total, student loan
debt has topped $1.7 trillion and measures more than 6% of overall national debt. More than
11% of student loan borrowers are behind on their payments or in default.
In a series of tweets yesterday, [Democratic/Republican] Representative Brad Young commented
on the effort to address the student loan debt crisis:
Student loan debt is out of control and is harming our economy.
Current policies do nothing to lower tuition rates or the debt students are forced to take
on.
We need to work together to put policies in place that fix the problem.
-- Representative Brad Young (@RepBradYoung) February 10, 2018
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APPENDIX E: SURVEY QUESTIONS FOR ARTICLE ONE
Pre-Test Questions
Q1. How familiar are you with proposals for student loan debt reform?
A: Not at all familiar...very familiar (5-point scale)
Q2: In your opinion, how important an issue is student loan debt reform?
A: Not at all important…Very important (5-point scale)
Q3: How concerned are you about the issue of student loan debt reform?
A: Not at all concerned…Very concerned (5-point scale)
Q4: As a student, do you expect to have student loan debt upon graduation?
A: Yes/no
Q5: In politics people sometimes talk of liberal and conservative. Where would you place
yourself on a scale from 0 to 7 where 0 means very liberal and 7 means very conservative?
A: very liberal ... very conservative
Post-test Questions
Q1: Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat or an
Independent?
A: Republican, Democrat, Independent
If Republican or Democrat on Q1:
Q2a: Below is a scale with strong Democrats on one end and strong Republicans on the
other. Where would you place yourself on this scale?
A: Strong Democrats…Strong Republicans
If Independent on Q1:
Q2b: Do you generally lean toward the Republican or Democratic Party?
185

A: Republican Party, Democratic Party, Neither
Q3-12: Using the scale below, please indicate how well the following statements describe how
you feel. Republican or Democrat substituted.
A: Does not describe my feelings…Clearly describes my feelings
•

When someone criticizes my political party it feels like a personal insult.

•

I don’t act like the typical member of my political party.

•

I’m very interested in what others think about my political party.

•

The limitations associated with my political party apply to me also.

•

When I talk about my political party I usually say “we” rather than “they.”

•

I have a number of qualities typical of members of my political party.

•

My political party’s successes are my successes.

•

If a story in the media criticized my political party, I would feel embarrassed.

•

When someone praises my political party, it feels like a personal compliment.

•

I act like a member of my political party to a great extent.

Q13-16: On the scales below, please indicate the degree to which the following statement
represents what you believe:
[Republicans/Democrats] would do a better job dealing with student loan reform.
A:

Disagree…Agree
True…False

Q17-18: On a scale from 0 to 10, please indicate how you feel about the Republican Party, with
10 meaning a very warm, favorable feeling, 0 meaning a very cold, unfavorable feeling, and 5
meaning not particularly warm or cold.
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A: 0 (very cold, unfavorable feeling)…10 (very warm, favorable feeling)
Demographic Variables
Q7: What is your age?
A: [Input box] years
Q8: What is your gender?
A: Male, Female, Other
Q9: What is your ethnicity?
A: Asian, American Indian or Alaskan Native, Black or African American, Hispanic, Native
Hawaiian or Pacific Islander, White, Other
Q10: What is the highest level of education you have completed?
A: Less than High School, High school graduate, Some college, Associate’s Degree, Bachelor’s
Degree, Master’s Degree, Professional Degree, Doctorate
Q11: What is your household income?
A: drop-down menu
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APPENDIX F: SURVEY QUESTIONS FOR ARTICLES TWO AND THREE
Pre-Test Questions
Q1. How familiar or unfamiliar are you with the ongoing student loan debt crisis?
A: Not at all familiar...very familiar (5-point scale)
Q2: How much attention do you think the student loan debt crisis is receiving from lawmakers?
Would you say it is receiving the right amount of attention, it should receive more attention, it
should receive less attention, or are you unsure?
A: Receiving the right amount of attention, should receive more attention, should receive less
attention, not sure
Q3. Do you have now or did you have in the past student loan debt?
A: Yes/no
Q4. In your experience, how easy or difficult is it to make student loan debt payments?
A: very easy...very difficult (5-point scale)
Post-test Questions for Article Two
Q1: To what extent do you agree or disagree with Representative Young’s tweets about the
student loan debt crisis?
A: Strongly disagree...Strongly agree (5-point scale)
Q2: There are many important problems facing our country today. In your opinion, how
important or unimportant a problem is the student loan debt crisis?
A: Not at all important...Extremely important (5-point scale)
Q19: Overall, would you say that Representative Young’s tweets were positive or negative?
A: Very negative...very positive (5-point scale)
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Q20-22: How poorly or well do the following adjectives describe Representative Young’s
tweets?
A: describes very poorly ... describes very well (5-point scale)
•

accurate

•

authentic

•

believable

Q23-25: Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following statements
regarding Representative’s Young’s tweets:
A: Strong disagree...strongly agree (5-point scale)
•

Representative Young’s tweets are offensive

•

I would call Representative Young’s tweets polite

•

The tone of Representative Young’s tweets is hostile.

Q26-29: Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following statements about
universities/colleges:
A: Strongly Disagree ... Strongly Agree (5-point scale)
•

Colleges today are mostly interested in making sure students have a good educational
experience.

•

Colleges today are like most businesses and mainly care about the bottom line.

•

Overall, universities have a positive effect on the way things are going in this country.

•

Universities don’t care about making college affordable for people.

Q30: We are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can be solved easily or
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inexpensively. Please indicate whether you think we're spending too much money on it, too little
money, or about the right amount of money on dealing with the student loan debt crisis.
A: Too much money, too little money, or about the right amount of money
Q6-9: Please indicate how much you oppose or support each policy intervention listed below as a
way to deal with the student loan debt crisis:
A: Strongly Oppose ... Strongly Support (5-point scale)
•

Allow the government to put a lien on the paychecks of people who fail to make student
loan payments.

•

Make student loans profit-free for the federal government by eliminating all interest on
federal student loans.

•

Require universities to pay back all student loan funds they accepted if their former
students prove they cannot afford the payments.

•

Allow universities to determine the amount students can borrow for student loans.

Post-test Questions for Article Three
Q1-5: There are many different institutions in this country, for example, the government, courts,
police, civil servants. Please indicate on the 7-point scale below, where 1 represents great distrust
and 7 represents great trust, how much is your personal trust in each of the following:
A: Great distrust... great trust (7-point scale)
•

The government in Washington

•

The Democratic Party

•

The Republican Party
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•

Congress

•

Universities

Q10: Would you say that the government is pretty much run by a few big interests looking out
for themselves or that it is run for the benefit of all people?
A: A few big interests, for the benefit of all people
Q11: How much do you feel that having elections makes the government pay attention to what
people think?
A: Not so much, some, a good deal
Q12: On the whole, are you extremely satisfied, very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied,
or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in the United States?
A: not at all satisfied ... extremely satisfied (5-point scale)
Q13-18: Below are statements describing various political systems. Please indicate how much
you agree or disagree with each statement.
A: strongly disagree ... strongly agree (5-point scale)
•

A good way of governing this country is having experts, not government, make decisions
according to what they think is best for the country.

•

It is important to have civil rights that protect people’s liberty from state oppression.

•

Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with Congress and elections is a
good way of governing this country.

•

Having a democratic political system is a good way of governing this country.

•

It’s okay for the government to stop people from saying things that are offensive to some
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groups.
•

Democracy may have its problems, but it’s better than any other form of government.

Q19: People differ in assigning priority or importance to various goals. If you had to choose
among the following things, which are the two that seem most desirable to you?
•

Maintain order in the nation

•

Give people more say in the decisions of the government

•

Fight rising prices

•

Protect free speech

Q20-29: This scale consists of a number of words that describe different feelings and emotions.
Read each item and indicate to what extent Representative Young’s tweets about the student loan
debt crisis make you feel this way right now.
A: Not at all...extremely (5-point scale)
Excited

Hopeful

Disgusted

Angry

Nervous

Sad

Happy

Proud

Ashamed

Afraid

Demographic Variables
Q1-3: Next are some questions about our government. Many people don’t know the answers to
these questions, so if there are some you don’t know, please indicate this.
Q1: Which job or political office is now held by Mike Pence?
A: open text box
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Q2: Which party held the majority in the U.S. House of Representatives before the 2016
election?
A: Republicans, Democrats, don’t know
Q3: Which party would you say is more conservative?
A: Republicans, Democrats, don’t know
Q4: In politics people sometimes talk of liberal and conservative. Where would you place
yourself on a scale from 0 to 7 where 0 means very liberal and 7 means very conservative?
A: 0, very liberal ... 7, very conservative
Q5: Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, Independent or
what?
A: Republican, Democrat, Independent, other
Q6a: IF REP OR DEM on Q5:
Below is a scale with strong Democrats on one end and strong Republicans on the other. Where
would you place yourself on this scale?
A: Strong Democrat...Strong Republican (7-point scale)
Q6b: IF IND or OTHER on Q5:
Do you generally lean toward the Republican or Democratic Party?
A: Republican, Democrat, Neither
Q7: What is your age?
A: [Input box] years
Q8: What is your gender?
A: Male, Female, Other
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Q9: What is your ethnicity?
A: Asian, American Indian or Alaskan Native, Black or African American, Hispanic, Native
Hawaiian or Pacific Islander, White, Other
Q10: What is the highest level of education you have completed?
A: Less than High School, High School graduate, Some college, Associate’s Degree, Bachelor’s
Degree, Master’s Degree, Professional Degree, Doctorate
Q11: What is your household income?
A: drop-down menu
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